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ABSTRACT 
Organisations from the multinational Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development through to national initiatives such as the UK’s Cabinet Office, have 
recognised that risk – the realisation of undesirable outcomes – needs a firm framework of 
policy and action for mitigation. Many standards have been set that implicitly or explicitly 
expect to manage risk in information systems, so creating a framework of such standards 
would steer outcomes to desirable results. 
This study applies a mixed methodology of desk enquiries, surveys, and action research to 
investigate how the command and control of information systems may be regulated by the 
fusion and fission of tacit knowledge in standards comprising the experience and inductive 
reasoning of experts. Information system user organisations from the membership of The 
National Computing Centre provided the working environment in which the research was 
conducted in real time. The research shows how a taxonomy of risks can be selected, and 
how a validated catalogue of standards which describe the mitigation of those risks can be 
assembled taking the quality of fit and expertise required to apply the standards into 
account. The work bridges a gap in the field by deriving a measure of organisational risk 
appetite with respect to information systems and the risk attitude of individuals, and linking 
them to a course of action – through the application of standards – to regulate the 
performance of information systems within a defined tolerance. The construct of a 
methodology to learn about a framework of ideas has become an integral part of the 
methodology itself with the standards forming the framework and providing direction of its 
application. 
The projects that comprise the research components have not proven the causal link 
between standards and the removal of risk, leaving this ripe for a narrowly scoped, future 
investigation. The thesis discusses the awareness of risk and the propensity for its 
management, developing this into the definition of a framework of standards to mitigate 
known risks in information systems with a new classification scheme that cross-references 
the efficacy of a standard with the expertise expected from those who apply it. The thesis 
extends this to the idea that the framework can be scaled to the views of stakeholders, used 
to detect human vulnerabilities in information systems, and developed to absorb the lessons 
learnt from emergent risk. The research has clarified the investigation of the security culture 
in the thrall of an information system and brought the application of technical and 
management standards closer to overcoming the social and psychological barriers that 
practitioners and researchers must overcome. 
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CHAPTER 1. ABOUT THIS THESIS 
1.1 About this chapter . . . 
In this chapter… 
• I suggest that knowledge of the risks to information systems could be signposts to 
the standards that would treat them. 
• Consider the questions that have driven this research. 
• Consider the motivation for this research. 
• Map out the design and structure of the thesis. 
1.2 The hypothesis 
In this section, I suggest that knowledge of the risks to information systems creates 
signposts to the standards that would treat them. The research of this key premise – that 
standards mitigate risk – led me to consider the accessibility of standards and how 
standards may be linked to respective risks. 
This thesis addresses the treatment of risk within the development and use of information 
systems. Both the public and the private sectors face many risks which must be managed or 
mitigated in order to avoid undesirable outcomes (Swann, 2000). The lessons learnt through 
the distillation of best practice and the use of proven tools and techniques, as encapsulated 
in standards, can support organisations1 in mitigating such risks (DTI, 2005) but despite this 
research, The National Computing Centre had observed that only 10% of organisations had 
a formal and well integrated IS/IT risk management framework (NCC, 2003). Managing risk 
is an integral part of good governance (Turnbull, 1999) and is something many managers do 
already in one form or another in daily decision making; risk management recognises and 
prepares for a range of possible future outcomes (NISCC/CESG, 2005 and Morton, 2002). 
The ubiquitous and pervasive nature of information systems in business would suggest that 
organisations would be well advised to apply standards that mitigate at least the known 
risks. To achieve this, the relevant information contained within standards must be 
accessible. ‘Standards mitigate risk’ is my core hypothesis. 
                                                                                                                                                      
1
 This thesis uses the labels ‘organisation’ and ‘business’ interchangeably. In both instances, no 
assumptions are made as to their size and complexity. 
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There are many standards which can usefully be applied to the development and use of 
information systems2. Therefore, there is a clear need for an accessible, scalable, route map 
through such standards to assist all sizes of business in understanding, selecting, and 
utilising the appropriate standards for their individual circumstances. Such a route map 
would create a beneficial environment for innovation together with a stable, sustainable 
‘ecosystem’ through which existing practices can be supported and the production of new 
practices optimised. Weaker links in supply chains will therefore be strengthened thus 
encouraging trust and security (Dresner and Wood, 2007). The challenge is to identify the 
respective risks and then to link them to the mitigating standards (CESG, 2009). This lexicon 
of risk and mitigating standards could then be represented in a scalable framework that 
would be useful for corporate bodies, SMEs, academe and the public sector. Such a 
prescription for reducing the likelihood of known errors should provide the confidence for 
innovation (see the discussion of the ‘Toynbee Conflict’ in chapter 2). As long as the 
dynamic of risks and change is recognised, the framework of risks and risk-treating 
standards would inhibit reliance on the checklist-bound mentality associated with compliance 
with documented standards. 
1.3 Research questions 
In this section I consider the three questions that have driven this research: 
 Do implemented 'Standards' mitigate risk? 
 Can 'Standards' be made more accessible? 
 How do you link risks to the 'Standards' that may mitigate them? 
1.3.1 Questions and early methodological considerations 
My research looks at how to link risks to the standards that may mitigate them. I bear in 
mind the risk (sic!) that any methodology which may emerge from the research could, when 
employed, become a risk in itself (Thomas, 1997). What problems may emerge as a result of 
deploying the methodology? Because of this, my analysis in Chapter 6 also considers where 
the selected standards could affect the outcomes of the mitigating action, the difference in 
outcomes that may result from different approaches to analysis, and how the interpretation 
of standards – their accessibility – may affect the use of standards to mitigate risk. 
These potential conundrums are laid out in Figure 1 which suggests that it may be possible 
to get the wrong result by implementing the correct method (as defined by a standard) and 
                                                                                                                                                      
2
 See catalogues for BS/CEN/ISO/IEC et. al., the e-Government Interoperability Framework, 
Technical Standards Catalogue, version 6.1, 17 September 2004, and A Catalogue of Publicly 
Available Information Assurance Guidance (described in Chapter 3) 
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vice versa. This uncertainty bears out the need for my investigations into the application of 
codified, acquired knowledge of good practices – standards – as mitigating actions to treat 
risk and the causes of risk. Instances where the application of the knowledge – that is, the 
implementation of the standard in practice – becomes a risk in itself are exemplified by the 
popular recommendation to encrypt data (CESG, 2009 and Cabinet Office, 2008) to protect 
it from inappropriate disclosure. This may render that data inaccessible to the legitimate 
users if the decryption key is forgotten (Anderson, 2008). 
Standards
Implemented
Standards not
Implemented
Risks
realised
Risks
Mitigated
Appropriate action
is carried out with the
expected good results.
Appropriate action
is carried out with
unexpected bad results.
Appropriate action
is not carried out with
expected bad results.
Appropriate action is
not carried out but good
results happen anyway.
 
Figure 1: Rigour in the method. 
Is the use of standards coincidental in the mitigation of risk? 
A method of risk assessment is only complete if it weighs up the balances of implementing 
the risk treatment suggested against accepting it untreated. A quick reaction to risk can have 
greater adverse effects than the realised risk (CESG, 2009 and Ranum, 2005). 
Two core questions were originally considered for this research (Dresner, 2005): 
• Can standards be made more accessible by relating them to risk and the causes of 
risk? 
• Do implemented standards mitigate risk? 
My interest in these questions lies in the observation that documented standards tend to be 
shunned by people and their organisations unless some external influence – such as the 
threat of a fine from a regulatory authority3 – suggests that they would support their 
                                                                                                                                                      
3
 Typically exemplified by £980,000 fine imposed by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) on the 
Nationwide Building Society that had lost a laptop computer holding unprotected, confidential 
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objectives. This may in the crudest form be a regulator (in this context, a body who sets 
regulations) or stakeholder demanding compliance, or the self-realisation of a problem 
awakening a readiness to embrace the lessons learnt elsewhere. If this ‘problem’ is referred 
to as ‘risk’ – uncertainty that matters (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007) – it is observed 
that when faced with risk, people become more amenable to approaching these documented 
standards when they understand them to be an explicit encapsulation of best practice. That 
is, what to do about it. This is an observation made during my work of over 10 years on the 
members’ help desk at The National Computing Centre. Information systems practitioners 
looking for support with a variety of sociotechnical issues in the life cycle of their information 
systems would be satisfied by being referred to published standards hithertofore not 
considered or even wholly undiscovered4. The documented standards provided the trusted, 
recorded know-how to deal with the risks faced5. This is exemplified by the challenge to 
capture knowledge and keep it relevant in its explicit form and release it back into a tacit 
environment. This is discussed in Chapter 2. 
My intention was to investigate these questions respectively by: 
(1) Designing a usable framework from which mitigating standards may be identified 
from the risks that give rise to their need. 
(2) Creating a methodology to populate this framework. 
(3) The analysis of standards implementation to understand if risk was managed as a 
result of the application of standards. 
From a practical viewpoint, the framework manifested as A Catalogue of Publicly Available 
Information Assurance Guidance (project γ which is discussed in Chapter 3). This catalogue 
adapted the taxonomy of risks to information documented in the International Standard ISO 
17799:2005 (now 27002:2007 and often referred to as BS 7799) Information technology — 
Security techniques — Code of practice for information security management. The 
populated catalogue was refined using a Delphi-like method with participants acknowledged 
in the resulting report.  However, the development of the framework catalogue was 
unsatisfying in providing a broad piece of research that investigated the interaction of 
information systems, the people involved in their life cycle of concept, development, use, 
and decommissioning and assumed that there would be early take up of the framework 
catalogue as a selection tool for risk treatments. Information assurance professionals 
                                                                                                                                                      
details of customers’ bank accounts and more recently (August 2008) Zurich SA lost an 
unencrypted back-up tape of 46,000 account records during a routine transfer to a data storage 
centre, resulting in an FSA fine of £2,275,000 (including a. 30% discount for prompt payment!). 
4
 A profile of NCC members can be found in Chapter 3. 
5
 See the discussion of tacit/explicit pathways in Chapter 2 referring to Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno, 
2000. 
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welcomed the catalogue, ‘a fantastic resource and the mapping to controls is exactly how we 
map controls through our set of HMG baseline guidance’ (correspondence from CESG, 12 
January 2010), but it was not widely distributed! I had created the framework postulated in 
the early formulation of this research, complete with a supporting paper for its sponsors 
about how to refresh and update it. But it was apparent that behind the fundamental 
hypothesis, there were clearer questions to be answered as well as the original standards-
risk-mitigation paradigm. This linkage – the human factors consideration of those involved 
with information systems, and the practicality of applying standards in risk management 
were extruded as the questions which remained as the foundation for the research. I could 
then apply a hybrid research methodology comprising several discrete projects, combining 
validated desk research and action research to apply standards in the area of information 
security and the management of its associated risks. Taking the original questions and the 
methodological considerations into account, I settled on three questions: 
(1) Do implemented 'Standards' mitigate risk? Can 'Standards' be implemented to 
mitigate risk?6 
(2) Can 'Standards' be made more accessible? (How can 'Standards' be made more 
accessible by relating them to risk and the causes of risk? What are the barriers? 
Why don't people access standards?) 
(3) How do you link risks to the 'Standards' that may mitigate them?7 
1.3.2 What prompted the research? 
Managing risk is an integral part of good governance (Turnbull, 1999) in business, and good 
governance is realised by effective action against, at least the risks that are, or should be, 
known (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). The corollary is that good governance requires not only 
encyclopaedic knowledge of risks but also of the accepted practices to mitigate them. Such 
as standards (Swann, 2000). As I have stated above, there are many standards8 which can 
usefully be applied to information systems – some of which are very specific (Cabinet Office, 
2004) – but there is no accessible, scalable, route map through the body of knowledge 
represented by published standards that can show which standards may mitigate the risks 
                                                                                                                                                      
6
 How can risk reduction techniques be linked to the reduction in risk with surety? cf. Y2K which is 
now cited as a false alarm because too few examples of the risk were realised to suggest that the 
value of the work done to change the date calculations of many systems was worth the effort 
involved. Was the lack of impact of the ‘Year 2000 Problem’ the result of careful analysis and 
reprogramming of the systems’ inventory, or the overestimation of the danger caused? Does one 
stop an inoculation programme because outbreaks of a disease are reduced or eradicated? 
7
 Do the selected standards affect the outcomes of the mitigating action? Does the difference in 
outcomes that results from different analysis methods become a threat/risk? 
8
 See catalogues for BS/CEN/ISO/IEC et. al. 
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that those standards were created to manage. Such a route map could create a beneficial 
environment for innovation and a stable, sustainable ‘ecosystem’ for existing practices, 
where production can be optimised. 
Connecting standards form a framework of linked ideas (Checkland, 1985). This framework 
may be applied in, and academically honed by, action research to an area of concern 
(Figure 2). My literature review (Chapter 2) establishes the area of concern for this thesis as 
the treatment of risks by standards. The experience of risk treatment, deliberately or 
coincidentally, encourages a codification of knowledge in the development of the standards 
that comprise the ideas in the framework. The emerging framework of research (Figure 3) 
that related directly to the research questions (Figure 4) was applied directly to the 
investigation of my overarching hypothesis that standards mitigate risk (Figure 5). My area of 
concern was the encouragement of the use of the explicit knowledge of standards in the tacit 
expertise displayed in the deployment of information systems. The standards ‘body of 
knowledge’ is represented in the Checkland/Holwell model as framework (F). Framework (F) 
maybe an ontology of standards focused by the worldview or weltanschauung (Checkland, 
1985) of owner, actors, and customers of an information system at risk. A focus on the 
mitigation of risk in information systems drew my study towards standards to treat security 
risk, that is, risk associated with confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
handled in and around those systems. The intention of my research planning – described in 
chapters 3, 4, and 5 – was to apply fitting methodologies to either determine the existence of 
the framework – such as which standards are likely to mitigate risk – or to become 
convinced that a belief in the causal link is futile. The framework (F) of the standards and the 
methodologies of the investigating projects (M) merge, in as much as the research papers 
yielding the learning are themselves a framework. The framework of projects overcame at 
least part of the problem of finding a single methodology that can present meaningful results 
with surety. So, the framework of projects presents itself as the answer to the meta-research 
questions about the efficacy of the methodology itself – is this framework a good way of 
investigating whether standards mitigate risk? The construction of what became a 
framework of frameworks is described in Chapter 6 – Analysis, conclusions and future work 
– in which the learning opportunity presented by the three frameworks of ideas (standards, 
research methodologies, and projects) yields learning about the area of concern (standards 
and risk). 
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Methodology M Area ofConcern
Embodied
in
Applied
to
Yields
Learning
about
Framework of
ideas F
Elements relevant to any piece of research
(from ‘Information Systems and Information Systems: Making sense of the field’
Checkland and Holwell, 1998)
 
Figure 2: Elements relevant to any piece of research 
(Checkland and Holwell, 1998) 
The projects each had methodologies varying from desk to action research that could be 
analysed to explore several different but complementary ends. These projects were: 
• Alpha α: Top Ten IS/IT Risks - An analysis of surveys for the Small Business Service 
of the Department of Trade and Industry, February 2005 
• Epsilon ε: Accredit UK General Segment – Developing a standard to manage the risk 
in the supply of ICT by small to medium sized ICT suppliers (2006). 
• Work with BSI and the Local e-Government Standards Board 
− Beta β: Using Standards to Mitigate Risk in Information Systems: Project Brief, a 
response to: the work programme of Committee IST/15 Software Engineering in 
collaboration with BSI Publications (2004) 
− Zeta ζ: Local e-Government Standard Board: defining and piloting a Standards 
Development and Adoption Process (2005 – 2006) 
• Gamma γ: Maintaining a catalogue of standards and best practice advice for effective 
information assurance, for the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (2006 - 
2007). 
• Fieldwork (2006 – 2008) where standards were applied to mitigate information 
security risk in a housing association (Eta η), a construction company (Theta θ), and 
a firm offering financial services related to pensions (Iota ι). 
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• Delta δ: Are you now, or have you ever been, a vulnerability? – A project to 
investigate how to find the human vulnerabilities in network security and improve an 
organisation’s risk culture (2007).  
ζ Defining and piloting
a Standards Development
and Adoption Process
for the Local e-Government
Standards Board
ε Developing
the Accredit UK
General Segment 
Fieldwork: Information
security  management
in the construction (θ) and 
social housing (η) sectors,
security analysis and policy
development in finance (ι)
α Identifying 
the Top Ten IS/IT Risks
δAre you now, or have
you ever been,
a vulnerability?
Human vulnerabilities
in network security
β Using Standards
to Mitigate Risk
in Information Systems:
Project Brief for BSI
γMaintaining a catalogue
of standards
and best practice advice
for effective
information assurance
 
Figure 3: Desk research and case studies9 
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Figure 4: Relevance of the case studies to the three research questions 
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 A table of projects is shown in Appendix A. 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
31
As there are many risks to information systems (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, 2001) some selection was needed to focus the attention of the 
research. Responding to a call for the DTI10/SBS study (described in Chapter 3) gave the 
impetus to select a ‘top 10’. Top of this list were issues associated with human factors in 
information systems security and so a call for research from TSB/ESRC into the human 
vulnerabilities in network security gave the opportunity to investigate one specific area of risk 
and suggest that the framework of standards (catalogued in the project to compile a 
catalogue of publicly available risk treatments – particularly standards – for the Central 
Sponsor for Information Assurance) would provide the means to react to the findings of 
implementing the methodology that emerged (Figure 5). 
Methodology M Area ofConcern
Embodied
in
Applied
to
Yields
Learning
about
Framework of
ideas F
Elements relevant to any piece of research
(from ‘Information Systems and Information Systems: Making sense of the field’
Checkland and Holwell, 1998; interpreted by Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1996)
Identify risks and match them to the mitigating 
standards, or take the body of knowledge in standards 
and reverse engineer a register of risks that they 
mitigate, and implement those standards accordingly
How can
standards
be made
accessible?
Standards
that mitigate
Risk
 
Figure 5: Checkland and Holwell’s research construct as applied 
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 The Department for Trade and Industry became the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) and then the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). See 
the preliminary pages for a list of acronyms. 
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1.4 Personal motivation for this research 
In this section I explain how the thesis makes use – but is not driven by – the results of 
studies that have taken place at The National Computing Centre during the period of 
research. I discuss how data from the studies has been used to (a) improve and (b) answer 
the research questions. I explain my interest in the 'human factor' of risk in information 
systems which emerged as the most perceived risk in a view of the top 10 risks to 
information systems (NCC, 2005). 
I can trace back my continued motivation for learning to the final year (1984 – 5) of my 
undergraduate degree11 when I was challenged to design a pragmatic method for white-light 
holography at Manchester Polytechnic. During the literature search and writing up the 
experiments, I postulated the opportunity to continue learning through written work as a 
career. This led me to discover the discipline of technical writing and the subsequent 
blessing of a graduate training position at Ferranti Computer Systems working on urban and 
motorway traffic control systems. When I moved from civil to military (training) systems 
within Ferranti, I first experienced the explicit, audited, application of standards to the 
technical publications, particularly as I became the principal author for software 
documentation and became involved in Ferranti’s audit by the Ministry of Defence to the 
NATO information technology (IT) standards AQAP 1 and 13 (which were replacing 
Ferranti’s benchmark to the previous UK military standard 05-21). The result of preparing for 
this audit made me aware of Deming’s (applying Shewhart) practical quality process of plan-
do-check-act (Deming, 1950) and the application of documented ‘standards’ as a tool to 
strive for predictable, successful outcomes. The expectations of what was needed to 
successfully use and maintain the systems we were building was described in standards that 
the documentation was expected to comply with, in order to meet contractual obligations and 
so receive the stage payments for the work that was tied to completion of the 
documentation. This interest in quality management become more focused after moving to 
The National Computing Centre (also as a technical author) and becoming a quality 
manager taking the organisation first through certification to ISO 9001 (the internationalised 
version of the original manufacturing standard BS 5750 Part 1 which itself was based on 05-
21) for its activities in consultancy, training and education and subsequently – under the 
TickIT inspection framework – for software development. The national role of the Centre in 
promoting good practice for effective use of IT awarded me the opportunity not only to apply 
standards, engage with the Centre’s members in advising on such application, but also to 
join some of the standards-setting committees of the British Standards Institution (BSI), 
namely for Software Engineering and the TickIT Certification Scheme. The TickIT Scheme, 
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 BSc (Hons) Combined Studies: Applied Physics and Computing Science. (Subidiary, Science, 
Technology and Society.) 
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although also concerned with good practice in software engineering, warranted its own 
steering committee giving some indication of the perceived bureaucracy and political 
distraction that is often the public face of standardisation (Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva, 2006). 
My experience in technical writing spanned writing for two contrasting audiences: the 
technicians who would program the software (including programming described as 
‘maintenance’ to correct defects that became apparent when the software was in use) and 
the end-users who would apply the software and who would have no need to understand 
how it worked to be able to fulfil the tasks the software was designed to do. In that second 
group – the users – the documentation presented on paper or on-line (perhaps as ‘help’) – 
became an integral part of the usability of the software. This led me to study human factors, 
particularly usability, more closely through the ‘Usability Now!’ programme of the Department 
of Trade and Industry that was run by The National Physical Laboratory. This programme 
was primarily concerned with the effective application of knowledge about human-computer 
interaction (HCI) and built on the outputs emerging from the European Esprit Methods for 
Usability in Computing (MUSIC) project (Bevan and Macleod, 1994). From this I learnt about 
the application of standards to manage risk in usability testing, making a presentation on the 
connection between usability testing and the ISO 9001 standard for quality systems 
(Dresner, 1992). From this I learnt about the application of standards to manage usability 
risk and the psychology of HCI (Dresner, 1996). My interests in human factors and risk 
management converged in this post-graduate research in a project to investigate the 
detection and treatment of human vulnerabilities in information systems (Chapter 4). The 
premise of that project was that if the vulnerability could be detected, standards – such as 
those catalogued for the Cabinet Office (Chapter 3) – could be used to treat the risk and 
reduce the vulnerability. The importance attending to the human factors in information 
system (security) risk management is shown by the survey of surveys described in Chapter 
3 and encouraged the project – described in Chapter 4 – which made a significant 
contribution to answering the third research question: How do you link standards to the risks 
that may mitigate them? 
Chapter 5 encapsulates my regular day-to-day activity which began rooted in challenging, 
relevant consultancy and continues under the rigorous mantle of research. This has all 
brought rich opportunities to see project and operational work at different stages. Engaging 
with the gamut of organisations and their information systems was providing a learning 
opportunity that was ripe for organising into a structure beyond the ad hoc chance of 
professional development. I saw the rewarding possibility of bringing much of my 
professional work into the structure of postgraduate, doctoral studies to enable me to 
consolidate the experience of 18 years in the work place and build it up – G-d willing – to 
enable me to both learn and teach for many more. This research apprenticeship has gladly 
changed me from a head to foxes to a tail to lions12. Further growth is assured, not least by 
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 Rabbi Masya ben Charash, Ethics of the Fathers. 
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the possibilities documented in the final chapter (Chapter 6) which analyses the work done, 
the success of the methodologies employed, and sets out the research position (see 6.3) 
that I am entrenched in. 
1.5 The design and structure of this thesis 
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Figure 6: The design and structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters establish the background for 
the research and look at the complementary work that has been done in this discipline: 
• About this thesis (this chapter) – about the research, the thesis, and the research 
questions. This chapter looks at the motivation for the research and how I went about 
learning how to learn again. 
• Literature review – where I set out the main literature study with the arguments of 
both the academic literature that underly the rigour of the research, and the political 
and business literature that confirms the relevance of the research topic. 
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With the background and literature support for the research established in the first two 
chapters, the central three chapters discuss the purpose, methodology, and application of 
the respective methodologies for the research that was carried out. This comprised desk 
research which was commissioned by government and private bodies who concur with the 
basic premise of the thesis that standards mitigate risk, action research with private and 
quasi-governmental organisations to set standards and implement them within the life cycle 
of information systems, and the research and development of a method to test the exposure 
to risk of information systems from human vulnerabilities in relation to the expectations on 
implemented standards to mitigate such risks. These chapters comprise: 
• Linking risks to standards – A chapter that describes the desk-based research to 
identify the core risks that threaten information systems and a catalogue of standards 
in a framework for risk treatment. 
• The risk of human vulnerabilities in information systems – A chapter that 
describes the research and development of testing the effectiveness of what 
organisations are doing to manage risk by applying the standards identified by the 
desk-based research. 
• Case studies: what are organisations doing to manage risk? – A chapter that 
describes action research to develop and set standards and to benchmark the 
application of some of the standards referenced in the desk-based research (from 
Chapter 3). 
• Analysis, conclusions and future work – A chapter that analyses the research 
from desk and action research projects (the theoretical and practical work of chapters 
3, 4, and 5), looks at the level of success in the research in demonstrating that 
standards mitigate risk, and discusses the tools and methods that are emerging that 
validate the approach and findings of the research. 
Although the main literature review is contained in Chapter 2, relevant literature is brought 
into the discussions about the research projects in the respective chapters. For each project, 
I discuss the reasoning behind the selection of the research methodology for that project, the 
assessment of the results of that research, and the conclusions that may be drawn 
therefrom. 
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CHAPTER 2. A LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 About this chapter 
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Figure 7: This chapter in the context of the thesis 
This chapter introduces the theoretical basis for this research on the topic of risk, standards, 
and their importance in the management of information systems by reviewing and analysing 
the academic, practitioner, and governance literature in the disciplines of cybernetics, 
information security, knowledge management, standards, and risk. Academic, from the body 
of knowledge peer reviewed by academe, practitioner material – mostly in the form of 
industry reports and text books – and governance literature, mostly in the form of published 
standards. And this is significant for the research activity which comprised a complementary 
mix of ethnographic (see Chapters 3 and 4) and clinical (Schein, 1976) case studies 
(Chapter 5). Standards – particularly those published by national and international standards 
bodies (such as the International Standards Organisation or the British Standards Institution) 
or consortia (such as the World Wide Web Consortium W3C) – have a rigorous peer review 
system of their own that filters the wheat of experience from the chaff of speculation (see 
2.13). The review of standards – which is discussed in this chapter – is at least as strong as 
the review of academic literature if not more so as the standards development process13, 
has an early phase of considering ‘new work items’ which may result in the rejection of any 
further research under the aegis of the standards bodies involved. Academic research may 
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 See Table 5: Standards development processes 
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only be rejected by a wider audience when its author presents it for publication. Until then 
they will continue to embrace their favoured paradigm (Cawthron and Rowell, 1978). Figure 
8 shows my relative consideration of material included in this literature review.  
 
Figure 8: Literature and its relative strength – a personal view 
There is insightful work on ‘Standard Making’ (of particular note is the special issue on the 
subject (MIS Quarterly Vol. 30, 2006) and critical work (Seddon, 1998 and Thomas, 1997) 
but a work on a causal link between risk and its mitigation by standards is hard to find. In this 
chapter, I consider the risks and the causes of risk to information systems (in advance of 
selecting a ‘top 10’ list in Chapter 3) whilst contemplating if risks and the causes of risk can 
be usefully separated, and discuss how the perception of risk affects the way that risk is 
managed, with an interest in where standards are applied to do so. My objective for this 
approach was to address the research question: Do implemented standards mitigate risk? I 
do not suggest that there is a simple relationship between a risk and a standard – one 
standard may mitigate one risk, part of a risk or require other standards to be applied with 
it14. Nor is the value of standards regarded universally, a problem which is discussed below 
after a consultation with standards users. 
The original research plan to analyse whether standards are efficacious in the treatment of 
risk was founded on the assumption of seeking a consensus opinion that standards may be 
implemented to mitigate risk in information systems. This consensus view pervades the 
basis of the projects and case studies (see Chapter 1) that were carried out during the 
period of research and so I have presented this literature review as the formal recording that 
risk reduction techniques be linked to the reduction in risk with surety. The theme of this 
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 As shown during the compilation of the catalogue of risk treatments for the Central Sponsor for 
Information Assurance (Chapter 3). 
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literature review is that where papers and reports recommend the uptake of standards15, 
they are making the general recommendation to espouse good practice for desirable 
outcomes rather than explicitly acknowledging the standards-risk relationship. Failed 
projects are treated as historical occurrences, not as the overt realisation of risk or risks. 
This chapter has considered the evidence and support for the notion that the application of 
standards treats risk – that standards remove either the problem or part of the problem – 
with due caution of plucking simplicity out of complexity: models attenuate (Beer, 1993). The 
field of literature has been surveyed, tempered with the view of considering levels of 
mitigation rather than absolute resolution. The gap in the premise is discussed in the final 
chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6 Analysis, conclusions, and future work. 
2.2 Why is the problem worthy of research? 
It turns out that not only are there losses from undesirable outcomes (Swann, 2000) but that 
the uptake of standards to mitigate these losses is not endemic (BCS and RAE, 2004). 
However, the third report on standardisation for the National Strategic Standardisation 
Framework says that where standards are implemented, they contribute £2.5 billion to the 
UK economy (DTI, 2005). It would seem that a method to encourage the application of 
standards to information systems would highly advantageous; information systems could be 
immunised against avoidable losses. Customers, actors, and owners (Checkland, 1981) in 
the life cycle of information systems may be encouraged to ‘only make new mistakes’ 
(Dourado, 2007). 
If losses are associated with the result of risk, a validated method for mitigating risk is likely 
to be welcomed. This may well comprise a method that could be clearly laid out and 
explained in a format that can be taken up by organisations of varying size and encourage 
them to use standards as a matter of course and benefit from the explicit knowledge therein 
in risk management programmes. This may result in more effective strategic planning as a 
result of increased knowledge and understanding of key risk exposures. There would be 
fewer costly surprises, because undesirable outcomes are prevented from occurring, 
programme sustainability results from effectiveness, efficiency, and greater openness and 
transparency in decision-making and the ongoing management processes. Projects that are 
more efficiently and effectively managed - where advisers and stakeholders understand their 
vulnerability to risk and take adequate preventative or mitigation measures – there is a 
greater likelihood of projects attaining their objectives because constraints are minimised 
and opportunities maximised. The desirable outcomes will have a greater likelihood of being 
sustainable. A methodology for applying the knowledge in standards as mitigation to risk will 
provide greater openness and transparency in project decision making and management 
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 For example, DTI Economics Paper No. 12, The Empirical Economics of Standards, June 2005 
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processes. This contributes to improved governance (ISO/IEC 38500:2008) that can be in 
itself a development objective. 
This research builds on preceding work that identifies standards as a solution to warding off 
undesirable outcomes (Swann, 2000) but does not offer the means by which practitioners 
may be encouraged to take up the advice in standards. This research proposes such a 
method. The soft systems method (Checkland and Holwell, 1998) highlights the importance 
of understanding the ‘weltanschauung’ or perspective of stakeholders in an information 
system. My research suggests that as ‘risk is in the eye of the beholder’ (Bernstein, 1998) it 
is a sufficiently important to deal with it in the context of stakeholders and so this research 
will be a useful addition to modelling systems from a soft viewpoint. It is also likely to benefit 
system life cycle modelling (ISO/IEC 15288:2008) and project management techniques and 
processes (BS 6079-3:2000). For example, the methodology developed in Chapter 4 – for 
the detection of human vulnerabilities in information systems – provides a decision support 
tool for selecting the balance of technology and process controls with end-user awareness 
during information systems design. 
2.3 Attitudes to standards 
Collated feedback collected during a consultation with ‘Knowledge Networks’ of interested 
parties comprising National Computing Centre members16 showed concern about the 
accessibility of standards – and the processes used to develop them. It is relevant to this 
research because it shows how the emerging risk treatment framework can itself mitigate 
some of these concerns. The consultation took place December 2003 to January 2004. It is 
included here because issues raised by the respondents have some of their solutions based 
in the risk treatment framework proposed in this thesis, namely: overcoming the perceived 
complexity of too many standards through to navigation based on stakeholder views of risk; 
the approach to risk treatment using standards is agnostic of the source of the standard and 
picks out the risk treatment regardless of the publisher of that standard; the ‘standards treat 
risk’ paradigm increases risk awareness in the utility of standard to reduce the failures that 
have given concern over the performance of organisations who have been certificated to 
standards; linking risk and treatment by standard will not make standards cheaper to procure 
from publishing organisations but it can be used to direct users to very specific standards 
that will offer them value for money through the treatment of otherwise expensive risks.  
                                                                                                                                                      
16Contributors: Senior Performance Test Analyst, Operational Acceptance Test Services, Service 
Introduction and Planning, Group Technology, HBOS plc; Chief Executive Emeritus of The National 
Computing Centre, IT Manager from a large North East of England Law Firm, Parliamentary 
Lobbyist on Information Technology issues, Project Officer from the Information Security Policy 
Group of the Department of Trade and Industry. 
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The complexity of standards is a result of the need to try to include not only the intended 
scope of implementing a technology or process, but also predict the effect of unintentional 
applications. This results in the perception of much of the information in standards as being 
preventive and therefore negative. Successful standards are seen to be simple or minimalist, 
with the emphasis on communication rather than ‘prevention’. Although it is undoubtedly 
important that the impact of proposed changes are understood, it is more important that the 
need for the change is recognised and accepted by all stakeholders. Leadership and 
teamwork were cited as the framework for successful projects; standards provide a 
communications medium within that framework. The source of standardisation was also 
noted by participants as an area of confusion, with many contributors to the body of 
knowledge of IT standardisation. One respondent to the survey cited, as examples, ECMA, 
ITU, BSI, and ISO. Another respondent referred to the declaration of certain suppliers as 
being the owners of standards, whereas they may have been more successful in penetrating 
the market place with a particular technology. References were made to the oft quoted 
remark by Professor Andrew S. Tanenbaum in Computer Networks, Prentice-Hall, Inc., (first 
published in 1980) which describes the International Standards Organisation Open Systems 
Interconnection model17: 
‘The nice thing about standards is that there are so many of them to choose from’ 
referring to the proliferation of standards, and The Matelot's Prayer18, that says: 
‘Let’s drink to our wives, wonderful wives, bane of our lives; And if we have one wife 
may we also have ten.’ 
This intimates a love-hate relationship with standards whose proliferation is not differentiated 
by quality. The development process in which standards are formulated, reviewed, agreed, 
and then published was deemed to take too long, have too many roles involved, and be too 
concerned with synthesising a product that satisfies all view points. The problems were 
specifically reported as: time-consuming – the derivation of standards from series of 
meetings, will normally take place over a period of years, whereas market changes and 
business opportunities seem to be more immediate, and bureaucratic – the layers of 
committees and standards bodies mean that it is very difficult to navigate how a standard is 
progressing or have access to the latest thinking until a consensus is reached. The effort to 
gain a consensus agreement is time consuming and can lead to the omission of useful 
information that, having been removed during editing, is not circulated to the wider standards 
audience19. 
                                                                                                                                                      
17
 Professor of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, University of Amsterdam 
18
 20th Century Royal Navy song 
19
 An example being in the development of ISO/IEC 9421 for graphical user interfaces. A draft of this 
standard contained a conceptual model describing the relationship between the representation of 
information in the machine, the representation of that information graphically on screen, and the 
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Whereas kite marking20 of certain products such as glass, hot-water bottles, and tyres 
commands a certain degree of respect in the relevant market places, compliance with 
information system standards – particularly process standards – does not command similar 
respect where standards are expected to deliver a degree of assurance on the part of the 
supplier. This may be the result of the contrast between product and process standards. The 
perceived (at least) effectiveness of information technology and systems usually depends on 
the compliance of their suppliers to standards for organisational process21. Compliance was 
also seen as difficult as there seems to be limited understanding that there is more than just 
simple pass-fail tests to be applied, particular in a complex IT-based information system. 
The NCC study reported that would-be standards followers saw the cover price of standards 
as prohibitive, particularly to small businesses, who see the full cost in terms of ‘cash flow’ 
rather than the benefits that accrue from the implementation of the standard, possibly on 
many occasions, spreading the cost over more than one project. 
This research looks to mitigate many of these perceived flaws by making the information in 
standards that is directly relevant to operational issues accessible and more obvious. This 
may be accomplished by using a taxonomy-centric framework that avoids adding any layers 
of complexity to the standards. However, the changes to time-consuming, bureaucratic and 
overly ‘political’ standards development process are outside the scope of such a framework. 
2.4 What is risk? 
Although most definitions of risk tend to be mainly concerned with harm, loss, or danger22, 
the risk management process is increasingly recognized as being concerned with both the 
positive as well as the negative aspects of uncertainties (PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002; 
DEFRAS, 2002; ALARM, 2001; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). Similarly if risk is 
viewed in terms of its outcomes, such as losses and gains, then the definitions do little to 
separate hazards23, or the causes of risks, from the actual ‘loss/gain’ resulting from the risks 
                                                                                                                                                      
cognitive understanding of the symbolism on screen. The diagram and explanatory text was 
removed in favour of a document merely listing the screen icons and their meaning so removing 
any appreciation of the decision making process for standardising an icon and the subsequent 
improved commitment to memory of an understood semiotic. 
20
 A trademark of the British Standards Institution and not applicable to any other quality marque. 
21
 Such as ISO 9001 for quality, ISO/IEC 20000 for IT service management, or ISO/IEC 27001 for 
information security. 
22
 Houghton Miflin American Heritage Dictionary 
23
 Hazard is an event or situation which can cause harm (including ill health and injury; damage to 
property, plant, products or the environment; production or financial losses, increased liabilities, 
etc.). ALARM – the forum for risk management in the public sector A key to success - a guide to 
understanding and managing risk February 2001 
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themselves. The concept of risk as an ‘undesirable outcome’ (Swann, 2000) can, however, 
still be a useful focus. A review of risk registers (which are discussed later) supports the 
assertion that there is usually poor differentiation between risk (as the outcome – the loss) 
and the cause(s) of the risk. Risk may be defined, therefore, as a catch-all term pertaining to 
the possibility of loss, the loss itself, or any characteristic, object or action that is associated 
with that possibility (Kontio, 1998). The subject of risk management is now associated with 
good governance across corporate governance in all disciplines (PD 6668: 2001). 
The idea of risk appears to have been coined first by 16th and 17th Western explorers and 
the word 'risk' seems to have come into English through Spanish or Portuguese where it was 
used to refer to sailing into uncharted waters. Thus it had an orientation to space, eventually 
being transferred to time as used in banking and investment, in order to include the 
calculation of the probable consequences of investment decisions before referring to a wider 
range of other situations of uncertainty. It gradually became clear, therefore, that there is no 
risk where an outcome is 100% certain (Giddens, 1999). 
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (the self-regulating body for banking24) 
defines operational risk as: 
• 'the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events' (Harris, 2002) 
and this definition was adopted widely in banking (The Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, 2002). The challenge, however, is how to model external events of processes, 
people and systems with a view to controlling them and to avoid undesirable outcomes and 
so achieve positive results. Without effective and repeatable risk identification methods, truly 
effective risk management is impossible (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). It therefore follows that 
a course of action is required to deal with the identified risks and to have them accepted by 
the respective, authoritative stakeholders. 
Other approaches model generic risk as a combination of consequence or impact and 
likelihood or probability. (PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002; Defense Contract Management 
Command, 1999; Financial Services Authority, 2003; Australian Agency for International 
                                                                                                                                                      
24
 The Basel Committee was established at the end of 1974 and comprises members from Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Countries are represented by their central bank 
and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking 
business where this is not the central bank.  
The Committee formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements 
of best practice in the expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement them 
through detailed arrangements – statutory or otherwise - which are best suited to their own national 
systems. (www.bis.org) The ‘banking crisis’ of first decade of the 21st century suggests a lack of 
enforcement of the standards and guidelines. 
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Development; IEEE Std 16085:2003; PD 6668: 2001) and these approaches can be seen as 
being bounded by the project envelope (BS IEC 62198, 2001) of cost, schedule, quality, or 
technical constraints (US Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2004). This is shown in  
Figure 9 where the area within the cloud outline represents the boundary within which the 
project resources and attributes should be contained to achieve the desirable outcomes. 
Desirable outcomes suggest that risk is managed. Resources are applied directly to 
mitigating the security risks associated with information systems (ENISA, 2006). Even so, 
contingencies to make the outcomes more or less satisfactory are typically built into project 
plans and there are at least 16 methods of risk assessment (BS 6079-3:2000) although the 
emphasis seems to be on opening up the issues rather than matching them with a method of 
treatment. 
COST
CONTENTQUALITY
TIME
 
Figure 9: The project envelope 
Risks are associated with one or more certain or uncertain events (a single occurrence or a 
series of occurrences of a particular set of circumstances) which have a likelihood or 
probability, that is, an extent to which an event is likely to occur. The impact of the event 
may be judged by whether the risk is ‘uncertainty that matters’ (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 
2007). Events have consequences (outcomes) that can range from the positive to the 
negative and there can be more than one consequence from one event. However, 
consequences are always negative for safety aspects and consequences can be expressed 
qualitatively or quantitatively (PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002). Information assurance processes 
need to have structure (BS 7799-2:2002) to see that good governance (Turnbull, 1999) of 
programmes of projects put in place at board level can be carried through to the 
management of risk and, hence business continuity of information systems. 
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2.5 Risk management models 
The contemporary focus on maturity models25 may be used to contrast two extreme 
approaches to risk management (Figure 10). In a mature process there is adequate planning 
included as a key stage of a recognised life cycle of predictable activities to realise the 
project’s aspirations. Project management should recognise a clear taxonomy (Pickford, J. 
(Ed.), 2001) of the risks which may affect the successful, efficient conclusion of the project 
as well as developing a feedback loop that will collect the lessons learnt from the emergent 
risks that were either unforeseen or thought to be less significant. A risk management 
accreditation documentation set is expected to be kept up to date for UK public sector 
information systems (NISCC/CESG, 2005) and a risk and issues log is expected as good 
practice, on projects concerned with the development and delivery of information systems 
and associated services (BS 6079-3:2000). 
Risk Management Extremes: Proactive and Reactive 
Lifecycle
Fire fighting
Planned
Emergent
Proactive
Reactive
Operational risk
Product market risk
Input risk
Tax risk
Risk
Emergent
Mitigation solutions
Mitigation solutions
Regulatory risk
Legal risk
Financial risk
 
Figure 10: Risk management extremes 
Lessons learnt in projects are important. As an example, in order to come to the conclusions 
of acceptable risk in terms of watertight bulkheads, lifeboats, crew drills etc., the imagination 
of the Titanic’s designers was not constrained by the later tragedy because no one had been 
able to imagine such a disaster on that scale before (Kuntz, 1998).. Now that the events of 
history are knowledge, later shipbuilders can prepare to mitigate the causes of a ‘Titanic’-like 
                                                                                                                                                      
25
 Particularly the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity 
Model, and the International Standards Organisation’s process assessment model ISO/IEC 15504 
Process Assessment, and in 2010, the development of a Common Assurance Maturity Model 
(CAMM) and an Information Assurance Model for SMEs (IASME). 
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disaster. This concept of having an individual view point has a significant impact on attitude 
to risk and this point will be discussed later in this chapter where the idea of 
‘weltanschauung’ is analysed. 
The process in the lower section of Figure 10 shows that operating reactively to risks which 
emerge creates not a feedback loop, but rather a cycle of always dealing with risks as they 
emerge ‘on the fly’. This is the approach of small organisations26 (also Lacey and James, 
2010). 
The classic maturity model (Crosby, 1979) that resonates with auditors has five states 
(viewed here from a security perspective): 
                                                                                                                                                      
26
 As reported at consultation meeting for small businesses held at the Computer Software and 
Services Association (CSSA – now Intellect) in December 1999. A software process assessment 
scheme was proposed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Small software development 
companies were invited to comment on the proposal which comprised an on-line assessment 
based on the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute Capability Maturity Model. 
The consensus opinion was that small businesses may aspire to good quality practices but are 
usually focused on a particular customer’s problem, the need to deliver information to the 
accountant, or meet the bank manager for additional investment. The programme that emerged 
from the DTI proposal is Towards Software Excellence (TSE). 
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Table 1: The classic maturity model 
Level Label State of the organisation 
1 Initial or Ad Hoc When the organisation works on a project by project basis. 
From a security point of view, policies are rarely seen and at 
best were cut and pasted from elsewhere. Corporate security 
is in the hand of the employee; audit trails are at best 
contrived, at worst there is no evidence of any good practice. 
2 Repeatable When stakeholders occasionally get involved to articulate 
what would otherwise have been an unknowable risk. The 
good news is that the risk treatments get embedded in the 
business and can be carried out over and over again. This is 
usually the time when an ISO management standard sticks 
its head over the parapet and raises the organisation to 
‘Level 2½’ in conflict with the quantum nature of maturity 
modelling. The standard-build PC or other technology-led 
security policies are typical and pragmatic examples. 
3 Defined Where policies are not only becoming better tailored to the 
organisation’s needs, risk management is becoming a better 
balance of people, process and some automated technology. 
Return on investment can start to show in audit costs settling 
down. There will be enough connecting controls and security 
governance to make automation worthwhile. 
4 Managed The level that can only be achieved through measurement. 
Measuring security is a contemporary challenge; the search 
is on for meaningful, leading metrics for information security. 
Reports of ‘how few laptops have been lost this year’ are 
unlikely to instil confidence. 
5 Optimised The organisation is ‘self healing’. Events and incidents are as 
predictable as can hope for. When they occur, the state of 
forensic readiness feeds the dashboards of management 
information, decisions are supported, improvements made, 
threats are held at bay. 
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2.6 What is a standard? 
This section of my literature review looks at complementary or competing organisations who 
declare standards and concludes that a ‘respectable’ standard is the product of a refinement 
process which may be empirical, by consensus, or by a combination of both. An organisation 
or individual with the wherewithal to make their views known may declare their way of doing 
things as ‘standard’. The corollary may be the emergence of a ‘standard’ way of doing things 
– such as a ubiquitous computer operating system – without intention of it becoming 
standard in the sense of a formal, published, peer-reviewed specification but rather with the 
(usually) commercial aim of making something the most popular. Therefore, as well as the 
corpus of work that may be referred to unchallenged as standards – such as those from the 
British Standards Institution – may find itself alongside other corpii or single pieces of work 
that originate from sources with apparently less rigid governance. It is unusual to find work to 
assess the accuracy of a standard except in cases where there is a challenge to the 
standard’s modus operandi (Seddon, 1998; Lacey, 2008) but there is limited debate about 
whether a product or process should be declared as standard and who is authorised to 
make such a declaration. 
Standards have different connotations27. Standards, which can be seen as useful when a 
plug fits a socket, worry some innovators with perceived threats of constraint or rigidity 
(Knight, 2005; Schultze and Stabell, 2004). This may be the inherent danger in the transfer 
of knowledge. The accessibility of standards may be inhibited by the loss of idiosyncrasy 
during the conversion of tacit28 to explicit29 knowledge (Figure 11). Practitioners may benefit 
from the successful channelling of emotions stimulated by risk to internalise the explicit 
knowledge of standards back to tacit realisation. Explicit knowledge ‘can be expressed in 
words and numbers, and easily communicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific 
formulae, codified procedures, or universal principles’(Nonaka and Hirotaka, 1995). Would-
be standards users find it difficult to understand that the availability of many standards 
(Tanenbaum, 1980) is part of the refinement process that they crave30. Too little knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                      
27
 NCC Knowledge Network Consultation, December/January 2003/2004. 
28
 Tacit knowledge is ‘knowledge that is nonverbalized, or even nonverbalizable, intuitive, 
unarticulated’ (Hedlund, G. (1994). A model of knowledge management and the N-Form 
Corporation. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 73–90.). 
29
 Explicit knowledge is ‘formal and systematic’ (Nonaka, Ikujiro, and Hirotaka Takeuchi. 1995. The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation, 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press) 
30
 NCC Knowledge Network Consultation, December/January 2003/2004. 
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gathering leads to inefficiencies, where as too much results in rigidity31. To satisfy the need 
for knowledge in the short term, the message – like risk management – is to dredge first, 
hedge later (Banfield, 2001). 
Where trust is put in standards, the level of confidence or acceptable level of risk is more 
tangible. Knowledge management scholars (Schultze and Stabell, 2004) quote Mark Twain, 
‘All you need in life is ignorance and confidence’. The question that needs to be asked is 
how much ignorance is acceptable? This may be answered by the observation that risks can 
be known – if not explicitly as risks, at least as concerns by at least one person, unknown – 
in so far as they could be found with the appropriate weltanschauung, or unknowable – the 
truly emergent risks that no one could reasonably foresee (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). 
Presumably only the unknowable aspect – the unpredictable risk that will emerge in future – 
of the spectrum of ignorance is acceptable in judgements of an organisation’s ignorance. 
Perhaps the reticence by many to comply with standards is based on the potentially vicious 
– rather than virtuous – circle that can develop (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 2005) through 
the process of capturing knowledge in standards. The process of capturing the knowledge in 
standards produces, not support, but ‘information overload’. Excessive emphasis on the 
capture and codification of tacit knowledge to create explicit standards can be seen to 
trivialise the knowledge, particularly when compliance with standards becomes the raison 
d’être, a ‘tick’ on the compliance checklist rather than the successful conclusion that the tick 
represents. There is a popular perception that third-party certification of compliance to 
standards has more advantages in marketing than in the maturing of processes. Certification 
is attractive therefore for those seeking either competitive advantage or where no 
certification is a barrier of entry into the market place. Those who do not have faith in the 
conversion of the tacit to the explicit see sustainability of competitive advantage through 
resources which are idiosyncratic (and therefore scarce), and not easily transferable or 
replicable (Grant, 1991)32. The accessibility of standards is therefore inhibited by the loss of 
idiosyncrasy during the conversion from tacit to explicit. Emotions associated with attention 
to risk create the spark of idiosyncrasy to convert that knowledge back from explicit to tacit, 
and so make standards accessible – appreciation of the risk encourage espousing the 
previously shunned standard (Vara, 2007)33. 
                                                                                                                                                      
31
 Ulrike Schultze and Charles Stabell, Knowing what you don’t know? Discourses and contradictions 
in Knowledge Management Research, Journal of Management Studies, 2004, quoting Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991) 
32
 Ulrike Schultze and Charles Stabell, Knowing what you don’t know? Discourses and contradictions 
in Knowledge Management Research, Journal of Management Studies, 2004 quoting Grant, R. M. 
(1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: implications for strategy formulation, 
California Management Review, 33, 3, 114–35. 
33
 This article explains how to by-pass risk treatments but explains the dangers of doing so and as a 
result reinforces why the risk treatments should not be bypassed. 
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BSI sees a number of drivers to standardise which are tested according the outcome of any 
project to develop standards. These drivers create the context – the energy, quality and 
place or Japanese ba (Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno, 2000) within which knowledge is 
created. Ba is the catalyst that drives the knowledge into codified standards and back to the 
tacit knowledge of those who implement them (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Risk stirs Emotion which promotes Idiosyncrasy that releases the 
Knowledge from standards 
Codification of knowledge reduces the attention to that knowledge whilst those in need of it 
have to relearn what others have found out by experience. 
2.7 The Toynbee conflict 
The application of standards to mitigate risk is implied in Stafford Beer’s work on cybernetics 
(Beer, 1993) and arguably from the negative reaction to standards in Toynbee’s historical 
commentaries (Toynbee, 1949). Toynbee contends that standards become a risk in 
themselves because a society that applies them will stagnate and lose innovation. However, 
this conflicts with Toynbee’s view that to achieve a positive future, a society must keep the 
scenario its wants to achieve in view and work unerringly towards that vision. Toynbee may 
not have appreciated that standards hold the lessons learnt about what may prevent the 
realisation of that future as well as providing key actions to shape it. The knowledge in 
standards may be applied to avoid mistakes – to be positively risk averse in known areas – 
allowing for innovation to springboard from those known areas into areas of emerging risk. 
Toynbee may be echoing the concerns of cybernetics (Ashby, 1957) that regards centralised 
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control as a (negative) risk to innovation. This could indeed see ‘stagnation’ if it were not for 
the observation that standards developed with a consensus or central dictat tend to have 
localised implementation. This facilitates the management of known risks yet allows for 
Ashby’s requisite variety by removing the cybernetic flaw of centralisation. 
My postulation that standards mitigate negative risk, and their implementation as a 
realisation of the positive risk of success, builds on this work in cybernetics. Beer suggests 
that Ashby’s variety is a measure of complexity and highlights the risk of modelling as a 
‘variety attenuator’. However, the model of actions to be taken, or measurements to be 
achieved that are encapsulated in standards are strong rules which are set to avoid the 
degradation of the activities that a project or operational plan – as the model of a set of 
activities to achieve a defined or implied goal – may suffer. This may be evident in attitudes 
as to what constitutes the core activities to achieve the goal: the weltanschauung relevant to 
the model’s purpose. Contemporary interest in business continuity is promoted not by the 
general expectation of having to counter day-to-day risk, but rather the apocalyptic risks of 
floods (such as those in Hull and Sheffield in 2007), pandemics (such as the worry of the 
H5N1 or bird flu in 2007), or man-made catastrophe (such as the explosion at the Buncefield 
oil depot in 2005). Business models and business continuity models conflict because 
business continuity requires a business model to expand to deal with events and incidents 
that do not make a positive contribution to the achievement of business goals.34 Business 
continuity is a security model – protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information systems from risks faced. 
Similarly, the security controls which manifest in the safeguards to realise business or 
service objectives may be viewed negatively as optional extras to a business plan. Security 
controls are the implementation of security policies which manage risk to a state where risk 
is reduced to a level that is acceptable to stakeholders35. So this acceptable level of risk may 
be measured as the appetite for risk which is in turn apparent in the actual implementation of 
security policies. These policies are evident as Beers’ regulators (Beer, 1993), shaping and 
guiding activity along a path in the belief that the desired goal will be achieved. The policies 
become the standards that must be worked towards to achieve the desired goal and so in a 
social hierarchy, laws may be regarded as standards designed to reduce risks to acceptable 
                                                                                                                                                      
34
 Information security event is an identified occurrence of a system, service or network state 
indicating a possible breach of information security policy or failure of safeguards, or a previously 
unknown situation that may be security relevant. An information security incident is indicated by a 
single or a series of unwanted or unexpected information security events that have a significant 
probability of compromising business operations and threatening information security. (PD ISO/IEC 
TR 18044:2004) 
35
 Which is why defined, applied, and audited policies are used as an indicator for risk appetite on the 
human vulnerabilities chart that emerged as the practical application of the research project 
described in Chapter 4. 
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levels. Security risks are also recognised as manageable but not necessarily eliminable. 
Meta-standardisation – the collation of a set of standards as a standard in itself – provides 
the framework to manage risks that are realised as security events or incidents (PD ISO/IEC 
TR 18044:2004)36. The comparison of an organisation’s security policies against the 
consensus view of standards which show what policies should be in place present a 
measure of the organisation’s appetite for risk (The Technology Strategy Board, 2007). The 
fewer measures in place – as defined by the policies – the greater the appetite for risk (See 
Chapter 5). Thus, in an attenuating model of an information system (see Figure 12), 
regulators are standards – shown by the tall rectangles – shaping the project envelope 
which may encapsulate either the development or the operation of an information system 
that is threatened by risk – shown by the small squares that threaten to misshape the 
encapsulating area.. 
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Figure 12: Project envelope affected by risk and regulated by mitigating standards 
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 See the cataloguing of standards carried out for the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance in 
Chapter 3. 
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Figure 13: Layers of risk and a taxonomy of response 
The discipline or process of incident response (Figure 13) when risks are realised is 
designed to contain risk within the levels acceptable to the information system’s 
stakeholders. If the response to an incident exceeds expected levels then the regulating 
policies may need to be adjusted in the realisation of ‘plan-do-check-act’ (Deming, 1950) life 
cycle. Differences in otherwise standard practice(s) are the cybernetic regulators of the 
autonomous components of a cohesive system so standard(s) protect the requisite variety 
by allowing centralised practice to be adapted by the autonomous components. The 
feedback of experience37, may make standards the regulating attenuators and amplifiers that 
lead upwards from each variable component of the ‘system’ to a central collator such as a 
government department or standards body. The experience from applying the standards 
feeds back to be the attenuators and amplifiers to create benchmarks that can be adapted 
by each autonomous component preserving the requisite variety (Figure 14). Therefore 
standards, used thus, are a tool for cybernetic success. Standards that aim for uniformity 
(that is without variety and adaptation) would otherwise lead to Toynbee's assertion that 
standards lead to uniformity and stagnation through insufficient variation. However it would 
seem that standards enable variation without chaos arising in an otherwise closed system; 
the information system is reopened by local changes. Standards are not a tool for central 
control (and subsequent failure of the ‘system’). They facilitate the prerequisite of viability 
that a system should develop maximum autonomy in its parts according to the law of inter-
recursive cohesion (Beer 1993). 
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 Through – for example – a Warning Action and Reporting Point (WARP, www.cpni.gov.uk) 
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The commonality in the standards – when applied to information systems – can create a 
cohesive whole of integrity with distinguishable parts. Information systems that apply 
standards procure variety equivalence and therefore requisite variety (Ashby, 195738) 
particularly through localising the applied standards (Figure 14). These information systems 
still retain identity (as in Beer's ‘total system identity’39) and feedback lessons learnt to create 
new standards (plan…capture knowledge in a standard; do…carry out the instructions of a 
standards; check...the results are desirable; act…on the outcomes of the implementation to 
improve the standard – Deming, 1950). Improvements may come from the diversity in 
decision-making (Coles-Kemp, 2008) and are captured in single and double-loop learning 
(Argyris and Schön, 1974). 
Standards
S1 S2 Sn
I1 I2 In
D1 D2 Dn
Implementation of all or some of the 
standards
Distribution through explicit 
documentation or tacit experience of 
practitioners
 
Figure 14: Standards are localised and lessons learnt are centralised 
I have termed this ‘The Toynbee Conflict’ – the contradiction that if standards create 
uniformity and stagnation, therefore reducing variety, so that (in tune with Ashby and Beer) 
they lead to systemic failure of society, civilisations need to grasp their image of the future 
positive in order to achieve it. This aspirational view of the future positive becomes a 
standard to achieve. This highlights both good standards and bad standards or rather the 
good and bad implementation of standards. Standards provide guidance to counteract the 
potential chaos of requisite variety (Figure 15). 
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 ‘nothing can be achieved by organisations [information systems] that are cybernetically flawed’ 
(Beer, 1993) 
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 That is, when does it stop being a system? 
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Figure 15: Risk threatens the desired shape of the Project Envelope 
2.8 Approaches or responses to risk mitigation: a taxonomy 
Table 2 catalogues different approaches to managing risks identified during a risk 
assessment. They are presented here to contrast each approach with another and to 
highlight where the hypothesis on which this thesis is based fits. 
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Table 2: Approaches to risk mitigation 
Approach Significance 
Accept the 
risk 
Unless the chance of a risk can be reduced to zero, there must be some 
level of acceptance. This will be a combination of the likelihood of 
occurrence and the impact. In such circumstances, monitoring is the key 
response once the level of acceptable risk is decided. 
Avoid risk If the level of risk is deemed unacceptable or the means to control it 
exceeds the desired cost-benefit calculation, the risk may be avoided by not 
engaging in the activity which could realise it. This may impair the ability of 
an organisation to achieve certain goals. 
Reduce 
likelihood of 
the risk 
occurring 
This involves putting controls in place which may vary from design 
processes to close monitoring for any early warning signals. Both are likely 
to require educational effort. This preventive approach underpins the 
methodology of this research project. 
Impact 
mitigation 
When there is a high chance of a risk occurring and it is not viable to 
remove the actions and avoid the risk, the next best thing is to reduce its 
consequences say, through disaster recovery planning40. 
Transfer 
(allocate) 
treatment of 
the risk41 
Responsibility for treating risk can be allocated to parties best able to 
manage it. This transfer can often occur through contracting or other 
arrangements with a third party. In some circumstances, risk transfer can 
raise difficult issues of governance – for example, of accountability for risk – 
and may result in higher costs. Risk communication can be a very important 
element of this option. 
2.9 How have attitudes to risk changed? 
Increased access to information has resulted in more informed consumers with less brand 
loyalty, so that competitive pressures on companies increase (Stewart, 1997). At the same 
time, improved communication channels have provided the mechanism for business 
conglomerates of unprecedented size, and although these conglomerates have access to 
new economies of scale, they also experience new management problems as a result of 
their global scope. With this increase in size of businesses, public concern has grown about 
the power of the commercial sector over their private lives, and pressure from electorates 
has in many places resulted in new laws to govern health and safety, privacy, competition 
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 BS 25999 for business continuity management as interpreted by BS 25777 for IT continuity 
management. 
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 Not a transfer of ownership of the risk. 
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and the environment, which in turn has increased regulatory pressure on business through 
new legislation. 
The focus of business has changed with new business markets emerging from new 
information and communications technologies and the shift of the majority of the European 
and American workforce to work in the service sector; heavy industries have moved 
elsewhere in the world. As the market’s businesses targets have changed, so have their 
assets. The phrase 'intellectual property' had barely been heard of in the early 1990s, yet 
now IP often represents the most valuable item on the balance sheet (Stewart, 1997). 
Changes in assets have come with changes in the threats to those assets. Unknown, 
anonymous hackers can now wreak havoc on critical company systems from thousands of 
miles away, with minimum effort and resources. 
As the pressures have increased and changed, new management techniques have been 
created for dealing with these pressures including quality and total quality management, 
business process re-engineering, and risk management or total company risk (strategies for 
company-wide risk control). 
Where the inadequate controls are perceived to threaten economic and social stability, laws 
and regulations have been established to force organisations to manage risk. This maintains 
a high profile for risk which may engender a belief in being ‘risk averse’; that is, risk is to be 
avoided completely rather than managed. This contrasts with the potential exorcism of the 
‘whistle blower’ on risk who may be seen as unduly negative. These characteristics manifest 
in the poor communication of generally known software development risks by a project’s 
technical staff42. To counter this, a structured and repeatable, life cycle-spanning method of 
risk identification is necessary for consistent risk management (IEEE Std 16085:2003). To be 
effective, the risk identification process must create and sustain a non-judgmental and non-
attributive risk elicitation environment so that tentative or controversial views are heard. 
2.10 Why is risk a problem? 
Here I discuss why risk needs to be mitigated by looking at the consequences of inadequate 
risk management such as the cost of failure and realised risk in information systems. I also 
consider the stakeholder organisations that have taken action to raise awareness and 
provide working frameworks which encourage attention to the obligation to manage risk. 
These tend to be state and self-regulatory bodies such as government departments or 
professional institutions (see 2.6). The realisation of risk in information systems can have 
detrimental effects on the stakeholders who are the thrall of these bodies. They suffer the 
direct and indirect economic liabilities that result from the increased cost of correcting the 
information systems, as well as from the failure to realise the cost-benefit ratio expected 
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 Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University. 
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from the introduction of such systems. There are also ethical liabilities (Cavanagh, 1997) 
that result from injury or death that might occur from faults in the systems. It is therefore 
advantageous, both in terms of money and the quality of life of stakeholders, to introduce a 
method of eliminating as much risk as possible. 
In 1988, research (Price Waterhouse, 1988) commissioned by the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry estimated that the annual loss to the UK economy that resulted from defects in 
domestically produced software sold on the open market was in the order of £600 million. 
These costs typically arose from the need to correct defects, both before and after delivery 
(including unnecessarily high maintenance costs), having to extend the expected delivery 
time and the development budget, and the indirect costs (such as the loss of business that 
results from damage to reputation) associated with a frustrated workforce and the frustration 
that users incurred because of the poor quality of the software (www.tickit.org). 
Such losses are not solely confined to the UK and a study (Standish Group, 2003) of 13,522 
information technology projects in the United States categorised projects as either: 
successful, challenged, or failed. Only a third of these projects were deemed to have been 
successful, with 43% of the projects having failed to keep within budget constraints and 82% 
of them having been delivered late. Twenty two years on from the DTI report, the failure of 
major public sector IT-enabled projects is still characterised by delay, overspend, poor 
performance and abandonment (POST, 2003). The measure of one third of projects being 
successful may be optimistic with a UK survey43 reporting that only15% of private sector IT 
projects were deemed to have been successful, with one in ten projects being abandoned. 
There is a rich vein of literature describing projects which have suffered failures (see Table 
3) related to their information system components through operational risk as rendered in 
the ‘Basel’ definition (see 2.4) but the language of these papers mainly refers to overall 
failure in the development process and does not approach this process failure in terms of the 
realisation of risk. A notable exception is Gotterbarn and Rogerson (2005) who draw out the 
need to improve risk management within the development process. Their paper presents the 
problem in these terms when a traffic management system failed. However they convey the 
view that the software which failed had worked correctly until the coincidence of two 
circumstances (the need to manually reset the software after a prescribed time and the need 
to run that software for a period longer than that stipulated in the documentation). This can 
be classified as known risk (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003) which was poorly mitigated against; I 
regard the software as never having worked properly – it was always broken but required the 
coincidence of certain circumstances to show this. Some projects where risk was realised 
are characterised by significant additional costs and extra work to meet requirements, loss of 
equipment, or the death or some interruption to the quality of life of the stakeholders and 
some prominent examples are discussed here. The Libra IT system for magistrates’ courts 
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was designed for upgrading infrastructure, office automation facilities, a national casework 
application, and electronic links with other criminal justice agencies. The original contract for 
£184m was awarded in 1998 but implementation problems led to renegotiation of the 
contract in 2002, with a revised cost of over £318m, and a delay of two years before the 
initial benefits were anticipated (BCS and RAE, 2004). The principal cause being that the 
system was developed to support existing processes rather than re-engineering processes 
with new IT (National Audit Office, 2003). At the Department for Work and Pensions, a 
mistake by a computer operator prevented 40,000 PCs from accessing core systems 
between 22 and 26 November 200444 and problems with the implementation of a new IT 
system at the UK Passport Agency resulted in a backlog of 565,000 passports, delays of up 
to 50 days, and queues outside Passport Agency offices.45 
Table 3: Realised risk and the potential for standards intervention 
Project where 
risk was realised 
Risk/Loss Cause Standards that may 
have helped 
Ariane 5 Loss of equipment and 
subsequent confidence 
in reliability. 
Expecting old 
software to be 
compatible with new 
hardware 
Formal inspection of 
the implications of old 
software on new 
hardware (BS 7925-
1:1998). 
California 
telephone system 
stoppage 
Loss of social and 
business 
communications and 
the inability to contact 
emergency services. 
System untested 
after changing three 
lines of code. 
Regression testing 
(ISO/IEC 
12207:1995)46 
Credit card fraud Financial Allowing staff to 
access enough 
details for identity 
theft. 
Staff vetting 
(BS 7858:2004) and 
segregated 
responsibilities 
(ISO/IEC 17799 (BS 
7799) Part 1:2000) 
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 Computer Weekly, 7 December 2004 
45
 Computer Weekly, 29 June 2000 
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 Although it is noted that at the time of writing there is little or no international standardisation for 
software testing despite this being a clear area of risk mitigation. 
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Table 3: Realised risk and the potential for standards intervention 
Project where 
risk was realised 
Risk/Loss Cause Standards that may 
have helped 
Department for 
Work and 
Pensions 
Payments could not be 
made to benefit 
recipients. 
A software upgrade 
was inadvertently 
made to PCs not 
intended to receive 
it.47 
Configuration 
management (BS 
ISO/IEC TR 
15846:1998, BIP 
0051:2004) 
Disclosure of 
minors’ 
information 
Access to information 
about vulnerable 
individuals. 
Allowing staff with 
inappropriate 
intentions to access 
sensitive details 
Staff vetting (BS 
7858: 2004) and 
segregated 
responsibilities 
(ISO/IEC 17799 (BS 
7799) Part 1:2000). 
Libra Desired gains to 
efficiency. 
The Department 
developed IT to 
support existing 
processes rather 
than re-engineering 
processes with new 
IT (National Audit 
Office, 2003). 
Soft Systems 
Methodology 
(Checkland, 1981) 
Requirements 
management under 
the umbrella of the 
STARTS Initiative 
(NCC, 1989). 
Patriot missile 
failure 
28 people killed A chopping error 
(where the software 
only accepts 
numbers to a 
predesignated 
significant figure) 
dulled the accuracy 
of the interceptor 
Risk modelling to 
determine the level of 
accuracy required 
(BS EN 61014:2003). 
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Table 3: Realised risk and the potential for standards intervention 
Project where 
risk was realised 
Risk/Loss Cause Standards that may 
have helped 
Therac 25 Death from fatal 
radiation doses to 
recipients of therapy 
(Joch, 1995). 
Coding errors 
(Leveson and 
Turner, 1993). 
Modelling the 
structure and the 
behaviour of the 
radiotherapy system 
using LOTOS 
(Turner, 2002; BS 
ISO 8807:1989). 
Software Quality 
Assurance framework 
(British Standards 
Institution, 2001, PD 
CR 13694:1999). 
Other implemented systems, documented in the literature discussing software reliability, 
have seen the realisation of significant risks as a result of unreliable software (Jiantao, 
1999). Control software known to be reliable for the Ariane 4 rocket was used on new 
hardware components of the Ariane 5. The old software failed to cope with the faster 
horizontal drifting speed of the new rocket. The rocket was destroyed..But worse still was the 
administering of burning radiation doses by the Therac 25 computer-controlled radiation-
therapy machine which replaced mechanical safety controls with a software controlled safety 
mechanism (Leveson and Turner, 1993), and the sinking of the British destroyer Sheffield by 
an incoming missile mistaken as ‘friendly’ by radar system software. 28 lives were lost when 
a cumulative chopping error in guidance software missed 0.000000095 of a second in 
precision in every tenth of a second, accumulating for 100 hours, so that a Patriot missile 
failed to intercept a Scud missile. Lives were lost again during the stoppage of the local 
telephone systems in California and along the Eastern seaboard of the US as a result of 
changing three lines of code in a signalling program which contains millions lines of code – 
the change was considered small enough to negate the need for testing (Joch. 1995). 
Preliminary data collection in the development of a taxonomy of risk suggested that security 
risks in information systems are greater in number than other types of risk. This may be 
because the definition (BS 7799-2:2002) of security risks relates to a wide range of losses 
affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Typical business publications (NCC 2004; 
DTI/Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2004) class realised risks in information systems in terms of 
the vulnerabilities that are exploited. Archetypal examples from these reports include a 
feature of virus checking software designed to automatically download updated virus 
‘signatures’ being hijacked to operate as an open relay to distribute ‘spam’ (unsolicited e-
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mail, usually comprising sales, promotion, and marketing material). In a similar incident, an 
incorrectly configured e-mail server was used to relay spam and was blacklisted by several 
key organisations that are vital in distributing e-mails. Perhaps more serious were instances 
of theft of customer information by a member of staff who passed it to a third party who used 
the information to conduct credit card fraud and an member of staff who e-mailed a list of 
minors’ personal details in relation to a sports club to himself before leaving employment. 
These are examples where apparently emergent risk was realised although it may be 
argued that these were all unknown risks (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003) that were eminently 
discoverable. 
2.11 Who says it's a problem? The drivers, stakeholders and interested parties 
This section discusses the drivers for risk mitigation, representative stakeholder 
organisations which have identified the need to manage risk and some of the established 
and developing initiatives that they have created in response. 
Information and knowledge are the thermonuclear competitive weapons of our time (Stewart, 
1997). Any information that an organisation holds is an important asset and needs to be 
treated as such (BS 7799-2:2002). Risks are inherent (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003) in the 
software driving information systems that store and process that information. It is therefore 
not surprising that in order to secure information, international consortia (such as the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision) and governments have set out regulations with punitive 
measures for non-compliance to encourage a proactive response to risk48. Individual 
examples of compliance are knitted together under the banner of good governance (Carr, 
Konda, et al., 2003), so that risks to the disclosure of sensitive, personal information carry 
national and international obligations49 rather than allowing the risk of disclosure to be 
accepted. In addition to the social obligations of the regulatory regimes, information system 
users are typically at risk from e-crime (NHTCU, 2004) including the misuse of computer 
systems for fraud, hacking, virus and denial of service attacks, software piracy, on-line child 
abuse, extortion and drugs trafficking. In addition to social protection and e-crime, misuse 
(deliberate or accidental) of information systems by otherwise legitimate users is still the 
highest security risk (DTI/Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2004). 
An interested party is a person or group having an interest in the performance or success of 
an organisation; a stakeholder is any individual, or organisation, that can affect, be affected 
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 In April 2010 the Information Commissioner was empowered to fine organisations up £500,000 for 
the loss of personal data and in August 2010, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) fined Zurich 
Insurance £2.76m for the loss of a laptop with 46000 customer records. 
49
 For example: Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. 
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by, or perceive itself to be affected by, a risk. Stakeholders include interested parties who 
may be customers, owners, people in an organisation, suppliers, bankers, unions, partners, 
or society (PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002). 
A useful categorisation of stakeholders (Checkland, 1981) is presented by the soft systems 
methodology (SSM). SSM is a systematic thinking process for tackling situations where 
problems and issues can at first be unclear, or where there is uncertainty about precise 
objectives and actions. It is regarded as a business and risk management tool or technique 
(BS 6079-3:2000) which is appropriate for any type and level of problem identification and 
problem solving activity (Table 4). 
Table 4: Roles in the Soft Systems Methodology 
Stakeholder Role 
Customers Benefit from the system 
Actors Transform inputs to outputs 
Owner Has the authority to decide whether the system is accessible (that is, they 
may have the system switched off). 
Customers would correspond to the thrall of the information systems, actors would be those 
developing and servicing the information systems and owners would be those bodies who 
issue the constraining edicts that should govern how the actors work together with the 
information system. SSM also refers to environmental constraints which may be influenced 
by those who do not interact directly with a system but rather exist (or coexist) within its thrall 
and corresponds to the external events of the definition of operational risk. 
Each stakeholder will have a different view of the risks associated with a system because 
they will have different world views or ‘Weltanschauung’. A wider taxonomy of stakeholders 
(Alexander, 2007) may be worth considering for the definition of this framework. 
Communications between stakeholders is often the major obstacle to risk management 
(Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). This suggests that methods for communicating risks, and what to 
do about them – proposed here as the application of knowledge encapsulated in standards – 
should be well received. 
Regulatory bodies react to emergent risk by creating laws and regulations (social 
obligations) to promote the environment in which organisations have to manage risk as part 
of their operations. The drivers for organisations to proactively respond to these emergent, 
undesirable outcomes are regulatory pressures. Because, although risk management is a 
continuous process (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003), regulations are seen to be ‘here and now’. In 
contrast, there is faith that (non regulatory) risks can be avoided. National and international 
government, and non-governmental organisations have recognised the need to either 
establish policies for managing risk or deliver tools to implement policies. In the context of 
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this thesis, a policy to manage risk may be realised by the detail in laws or in one or more 
standards. The views of the following organisations are considered. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2002), which 
comprises 30 member nations (with connections to 70 others), first published guidelines for 
information security in 1992 and revised them in 2002. The document advocates such 
principles as awareness, responsibility, ethics, risk assessment and security design and 
implementation. The guidelines are a framework to engender greater trust by promoting a 
culture of security amongst stakeholders in information systems and networks. It is a high-
level set of policies to raise awareness of the risks in information systems and networks, and 
the importance of implementing the policies, practices, measures and procedures available 
which exist to address those risks. The guidelines are, importantly, intended for both 
information system users and providers. They cover the respect for ethical values in the 
development, deployment and use of information systems and networks, to encourage the 
appropriate environment for co-operation and information sharing, that is deperimeterisation. 
At the lowest level, it is an encouragement for methods to improve risk culture as described 
in Chapter 4. 
Security and risk was the focus of a proposal by the (then) Department of Trade and 
Industry for a European Union policy approach. The European Parliament, the Council, and 
the Commission have sought closer European co-ordination on information security by 
setting up the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) with a view to 
ensuring a high and effective level of network and information security within the Community 
and in order to develop a risk-aware culture of network and information security for the 
benefit of the citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organisations across the 
European Union. The objective is support for the smooth functioning of the internal market 
The Greece-based Agency was granted an initial mandate of 5 years from 2003 but has 
been sustained beyond this. It was awarded a significant budget of €24,300M for the original 
15 Member States and further €9M for the 10 new entrants. 
In the mid-seventies, the central banks and financial regulatory authorities of Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States created the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (Lopez, 2003). By the late eighties their first Capital Adequacy Accord was the 
benchmark for commercial banks to maintain standards to control credit risk. Following 
major bank collapses where credit risk was the victim of inadequate operational controls, a 
new accord – popularly known as Basel II – was established to fill the gap50. Basel II 
comprises three 'pillars' of minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review of capital 
adequacy, and public disclosure. The key difference between the first and second accords is 
the new attention to assess and manage ‘operational risk’. Just as information technology 
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has learnt much from the banking industry in the management of security, it may be 
assumed that the force of Basel II will have spin-off lessons in risk management. 
In 1994, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) commissioned The National Computing 
Centre to carry out a Security Breaches Survey which showed that virus attacks, misuse, 
and equipment theft were widespread and cost organisations, on average, £9,000 to put 
right (a cost rising in subsequent biannual surveys). As a result DTI supported the 
development of a code of practice using the best practices recorded by a group of leading 
companies. In 1995, the British Standards Institution refined the code of practice and 
published it as British Standard (BS) number 7799. BS 7799 was refined in 1999 and 2000 
to become a two-part standard defining a collection of information security – not information 
technology – controls to select from and build into business management systems. This was 
again refined in 2002 to reflect the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) life cycle of ISO 9001 (the 
standard for quality [management] systems) and the first part (the code of practice) was 
issued as an International standard by the International Standards Organisation (ISO) and 
given the number ISO/IEC 17799. The management system specification was published in 
2005 as ISO 27001. BS 7799 (ISO/IEC 17799 or ISO/IEC 27002) is a framework within 
which the level of information security can be assured. A second part (BS 7799-2 or ISO/IEC 
27001) sets out the requirements for an asset-based information security management 
system (ISMS) through attention to risk. In 2006, the Small Business Service of the DTI 
commissioned a tool that combined the policies of BS 7799 with the likelihood and impact of 
risks that may be realised without them. The risks that this tool addressed were derived from 
the ‘survey of surveys’ research (see Chapter 3). 
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Figure 16: Uptake of accredited BS 7799 (ISO/IEC 27001) certification51 
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An ISMS is the implementation of a documented set of policies, processes, and procedures 
that pin down the general requirements of the code of practice to the individual nature of the 
organisation. Targets are set, controls are put in place to meet them, and measurements are 
made to confirm achievements or initiate improvements. Its uptake as a process of risk 
management is increasing (see Figure 16) but in the UK where certification is driven by 
market pressures the number of certifications remains counted in hundreds whereas in 
Japan ISO/IEC 27001 certification is a legal requirement for certain types of work, and 
certificates are registered in thousands. 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) recognised how the software industry has 
learnt much from developing the programs that lie at the heart of our everyday lives – from 
controlling traffic lights to running elevators, from powering microwave ovens to flying jumbo 
jets. When it goes wrong, lives may be lost, businesses can fail. In 1988, a report for the DTI 
indicated that quality risks in software development could be mitigated by implementing ISO 
9001 (originally BS 5750 and then ISO 9000/9001/9002/9003) for Quality Systems and then 
being independently certificated for it (British Standards Institution, 2001). 
A wealth of good practice had been built up from this experience. Ensuring these practices 
are available to all, especially smaller enterprises, became the heart of the DTI/NCC-
established scheme: Towards Software Excellence (TSE)52 The scheme provided self-
assessment, advice, and support over the Internet, aimed at helping smaller software 
development companies and IT enterprises to understand the capability of their current 
practices and improve their business processes. It was based on ISO/IEC 15504 for Process 
Assessment (ISO/IEC TR 15504:1999). The overall objective set for TSE, supported not 
only by UK government but also by industry bodies, enabled smaller enterprises in the UK 
software supplier industry to compare their contemporary approach with best practice. This 
gave them the knowledge to manage the risk in their software processes and hence 
maintain or improve their competitiveness. 
Significantly, TSE was free from the pressures of certification, and complemented existing 
schemes including ISO 9001/TickIT and the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) with the 
objective of encouraging SMEs to take up such schemes when they feel the time is right and 
they have the resources available. 
The Office of Government Commerce (OGC)53 guidance outlines the approach to managing 
risk in its ‘Management of Risk’ (OGC, 2003) and advises on the preventive action 
approach. It does not detail further where the framework (herein suggested to be the 
standards knowledge base) may be drawn from. 
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The collapse of major organisations through fraudulent financial reporting prompted the 
passing, in the United States, of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protector Act of 2002 (commonly referred to as Sarbanes-Oxley) and its management 
through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)54. Section 404 requires board 
level certification of an organisation's financial activity and the effectiveness and status of 
the organisations’ internal controls. It is these internal controls that manage operational risk 
so the implied requirements of good governance are now a statute in the US (with significant 
implications on foreign subsidiaries and non-US firms with listings on Wall Street, NASDAQ 
et al.) rather than implied ethical and moral obligations. As a result, a visible, approach to 
operational risk management is needed for auditors to see the effective management 
process and the subsequent accuracy of the reporting. Deficiencies, weaknesses, and acts 
of fraud must be reported. 
The formalisation of ethics and good governance in the UK, leading to a demand for 
demonstrable management of operational risk, has largely matured since the end of the 
Twentieth Century (Morton, 2002). The emergent risk of poorly reported inadequacies in 
high-level governance of the Maxwell pension funds, the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI), and Polly Peck became the driver. The first set of improvements was 
proposed by Sir Adrian Cadbury (Cadbury, 1992), former chairman of the Cadbury chocolate 
company, in ‘The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’. This was a code of conduct 
for stock market-listed companies addressing ethical as well as legal questions. The 
implementation only really became clear when Turnbull promoted attention to risk 
management. This evolution of benchmarks for corporate governance was given focus by a 
working party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). This 
was led by Nigel Turnbull (Turnbull, 1999), so the subsequent documents ‘Internal Control: 
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code’ has become known as the ‘Turnbull Report’. 
Its message is that good corporate governance is achieved by internal controls and risk 
management. Like Sarbanes-Oxley and Basel II, financial prudence is the driver and a high 
quality of transparent reporting is a key aspect of compliance. Risks had to be managed and 
their acceptance must be from the highest level. The ability to put this into practice was been 
greatly boosted by the Higgs Report (Higgs, 2002) which reviewed the roles and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors in the UK. As a result, Higgs sets out measures 
designed to improve the structure and accountability of boardrooms in the UK. This is vital to 
instil a transparent approach to risk management. 
Government (Cabinet Office, 2002; Cabinet Office, 2004 [2]) is concerned with enabling the 
public and private sectors as well as individuals to achieve secure and resilient information 
systems. To achieve this, the UK established the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance 
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(CSIA)55 to facilitate working in partnership with the public and private sector to address the 
protection of information systems, the information they carry, and their users, from hi-tech 
crime. The department promotes education and awareness of information security and took 
in hand training and skills for development in information security (before handing that 
responsibility to the Institute of Information Security Professionals56). 
The confidentiality, availability and reliability of information systems and the information they 
handle is an important concern for Government. The continuous provision of goods and 
services to citizens depends on the smooth running of the information systems supporting 
them – particularly in the event of a crisis. But Government cannot make the UK’s 
information systems secure by itself. Most information networks are neither owned nor 
operated by Government so the actors (Checkland, 1981) who are expected to play a part in 
protecting information systems – from home computers, to the IT networks behind large 
companies to local and central government systems – will vary in characteristics and 
abilities, suggesting that any evaluation of risks emerging from the human vulnerabilities in 
information systems (see Chapter 4) will have to be focused on a taxonomy of users 
(Alexander, 2007) to provide sufficient variety (Ashby, 1957) in the responses to those risks. 
Interconnection and transfer through portable media is such that the contagion from a home 
computer can spread to business and into Government and vice versa (BIS/Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). A new culture of cyber-vigilence requires us to protect our 
computers from viruses and our privacy and identity from those who would abuse it (HMG’s 
Office of Cybersecurity). The complexity of the risks requires a scalable approach that can 
be made to fit the size and place of impact. The risk mitigation framework of standards and 
risks described in this thesis (see Chapter 3) is so designed as to account for the risk and 
stakeholder view or weltanschauung in its application. Risks to security are no longer a 
simple matter of who you keep out; they are a complex and changing set of layers that 
decide who you let it in and how far. 
2.12 Who sets standards? 
Different types of organisation issue standards relevant to information systems. This thesis 
groups the organisations that develop standards into three categories: National and 
International Standards bodies, Professional bodies, and Consortia. 
2.12.1 National and International Standards Bodies 
National Standards Bodies are usually independent of government except for the 
endorsement of the institution and the granting of some financial assistance. For example, in 
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 Which became Information Security and Assurance (IS&A) before merging with the Office of 
Cybersecurity 
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the UK, the national standards body is the British Standards Institution (BSI). BSI has a royal 
charter to set standards and award marks for compliance. BSI receives annual grants for 
standards development from the Department for Business Innovation and Skills. BSI is 
active internationally with permanent membership of all senior management committees of 
the Internal Standards Organisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC/CLC). This is a typical arrangement for 
collaboration which is seen in other standards bodies such as those for Germany (DIN), and 
France (AFNOR). Outside the European dimension, other national bodies participate, for 
example: the US (ANSI) and Japan (JISC). 
Above the national level, two levels of standards setting are apparent. Within the European 
Union, the Committee for European Standardisation (CEN) sets its own standards in areas 
with National Standards Bodies from the EU, supplying expertise and endorsement. 
Internationally, National Standards bodies participate in the development and endorsement 
of standards by the International Standards Organisation (ISO). National standards bodies 
can submit their own standards for endorsement or further development as International 
standards by ISO. For example, this has been realised for: British Standard BS 5750 for 
Quality Systems which became ISO 9001, British Standard BS 7799 for Information Security 
which became ISO/IEC 17799 (and then ISO/IEC 27002), and British Standard BS 15000 for 
IT service management which became ISO/IEC 20000. 
2.12.2 Professional Bodies 
Professional bodies – for example The British Computer Society (BCS), The Institution of 
Electronic and Electrical Engineers, and The National Computing Centre (NCC) – will assign 
delegates to their respective national standards bodies as well as publish standards of their 
own. These may be standards which are refined by the application of specified development 
processes or published to supply a perceived need of members and then more widely 
accepted as the de facto standard for an activity57. 
2.12.3 Consortia 
There is at least a perception that the traditional standards organisations are too slow to 
react to the need for standardisation58. The standards bodies have met this criticism with 
mechanisms to ‘fast-track’ standard specifications through their approval process if a mature 
specification is available. They have also created classifications of document that do not 
have the same authority as a published standard but allow the promulgation of best practice 
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was eventually subsumed into TickIT Guide managed by BSI (q.v.) 
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 See 2.3. 
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in the view of a significant organisation, or group of organisations. Examples of these are the 
Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) of the British Standards Institution (BSI) and the 
Workshop Agreement of the European Committee for Standardisation (CWA). This 
promulgation of consensus lies at the operational root of standardisation consortia which are 
created by organisations with a common interest agreeing on a mode of working to declare a 
working practice associated with a specific discipline or technology as standard to meet a 
particular commercial need. Examples of consortia include the Jericho Forum59 established 
for standardisation in information security, the World Wide Web Consortium60 to set Internet 
technologies, and OASIS61 to determine appropriate information interchange standards 
using XML. 
Consortia are characterised by their structures of governance and policies and procedure for 
managing intellectual property which are perceived as less formal than the National and 
International standards bodies. 
2.13 How are standards set? 
A standard can be described as an agreed-upon convention, specification, or way of doing 
things (LeGSB, 2005). The process by way that convention, specification, or way of doing 
things is recorded or codified is the process of developing documented standards. It is the 
codification of knowledge or an aspect of knowledge management. This may be implicit in 
the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge (Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno, 
2000), or explicit in a formal process (BS 0:1997). The challenge is to maintain a process 
that can deal effectively with that tacit knowledge which may be ‘non-verbalized, or even non 
verbalizable, intuitive, unarticulated’ (Hedlund, 1994). The creation of standards, by 
standards bodies and consortia, to mitigate risk using knowledge manifests the processes of 
externalisation and combination (Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno, 2000) – Figure 11 and 
Figure 17. Externalisation is the process of converting tacit knowledge, which is difficult to 
communicate, deeply rooted in action, procedures, routines, commitment, ideals, values, 
and emotions, to the explicit, codified knowledge – that which can be expressed in formal 
and systematic language, shared in the form of data, scientific formulae, manuals etc. – of 
documented standards. 
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Figure 17: Maturing: Explicit to Explicit 
Table 5 compares the processes whereby standards are developed to form a consensus 
document. The application of action research to test and refine one process exemplified by a 
standard consortium is described in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 includes a case study that looks at 
standards adoption in local government e-commerce, where e-commerce is defined as any 
information-based transaction according to the Cabinet Office report ‘e-commerce@itsbest 
(1999). 
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Table 5: Standards development processes 
Stage Standards 
Body 
Standard62 
Standards 
Consortium 
Recommendation63 
Standards 
Body 
Consensus64 
Knowledge 
Management65 
Proposal A trigger for 
standardisation 
manifests itself 
and a New Work 
Item is 
proposed.  
A trigger for 
standardisation is 
perceived and the need 
for a standard is 
proposed. This is 
formally recorded as a 
‘Request for a Proposal’ 
(RFP).66 
Experience of a 
successful 
method is 
proposed to the 
standards body 
for at least 
implied 
endorsement. 
Originating ba 
This is typically 
represented by the 
coffee machine or 
water cooler 
interaction. 
Individuals share 
experience and 
opinion face to 
face. 
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 British Standards Institution, BS 0 A standard for standards, 1997 
63
 World Wide Web Consortium, Local e-Government Standards Body. The latter, which became the 
e-Standards Body, is the subject of a case study in Chapter 5. 
64
 This process summary is modelled on the author’s experience of CEN Workshop Agreements 
(CWA) and BSI’s Publically Available Specification (PAS). 
65
 Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno, 2000 
66
 RFPs will usually be raised by someone who has an interest in the work of the consortium or by a 
member of the consortium. Some consortia are prepared to receive proposals in relation to all parts 
of their agenda, but prioritise those that support areas of activity of particular interest. 
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Table 5: Standards development processes 
Stage Standards 
Body 
Standard62 
Standards 
Consortium 
Recommendation63 
Standards 
Body 
Consensus64 
Knowledge 
Management65 
Review of the 
proposal 
The proposal is 
reviewed by a 
Technical 
Committee and, 
if accepted, an 
author or team 
of authors is 
assigned to 
prepare a draft 
(who may or 
may not be 
members of the 
Technical 
Committee). To 
ensure that the 
current work is 
well understood, 
other 
complementary 
work is collated 
etc., a period of 
study may be 
designated to 
research the 
contents of the 
upcoming 
standard. 
The RFP is reviewed by 
senior nominees within 
the consortium and will 
proceed to the 
development stage 
providing sufficient 
support for the topic is 
given. 
A proposal to 
create a 
documented 
report of the 
good practice is 
made to the 
standards part 
with particular 
reference to 
funding the 
development of 
the report. 
Dialoguing ba. 
The collective and 
face to face 
interactions begin 
to get some form 
as tacit knowledge 
is shared and 
articulated. 
Individuals with 
relevant 
knowledge and 
capabilities come 
to the fore. 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
74
Table 5: Standards development processes 
Stage Standards 
Body 
Standard62 
Standards 
Consortium 
Recommendation63 
Standards 
Body 
Consensus64 
Knowledge 
Management65 
Drafting and 
review of the 
draft 
One or more 
working drafts of 
the standard will 
be developed 
until the 
author(s) deem 
the work ready 
to submit as a 
Committee 
Draft. The 
technical 
committee will 
vote on the 
worthiness of 
the work to be 
accepted as a 
committee draft. 
Further 
development of 
the draft may be 
commissioned, 
creating 
additional 
committee 
drafts. 
An initial draft of the 
proposed standards is 
collated by the 
consortium and is then 
referred to as a Request 
for Comments (RFC). 
An RFC is then released 
into the wider body of 
the consortium and the 
community for review. 
The consortium looks for 
expert and experiential 
comments as to the 
appropriateness of the 
topic and content of the 
standard. 
The standards 
body appoints a 
secretariat to 
edit the report. A 
draft report of 
the method is 
compiled and 
reviewed at one 
or more 
meetings or 
workshops 
before experts in 
the field of the 
report are invited 
to review and 
return comments 
based on their 
experience. 
Systemising ba. 
Collective and 
virtual interactions 
combine explicit 
knowledge. 
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Table 5: Standards development processes 
Stage Standards 
Body 
Standard62 
Standards 
Consortium 
Recommendation63 
Standards 
Body 
Consensus64 
Knowledge 
Management65 
Testing When the 
technical 
committee 
deems that the 
standard 
contains all the 
relevant 
knowledge, 
presented as 
well as possible 
in the 
experience of 
the committee 
(and the 
author(s)), it will 
be made 
available as a 
Draft for Public 
Comment for a 
set period. 
If the opinions recorded 
about the RFC are 
favourable, its status is 
elevated to a ‘Draft 
Recommendation’. 
The draft 
recommendation is 
accorded an ‘amber light 
status’ and given a 
period during which use 
of the standard provides 
a further review. If the 
emerging standard is 
considered to be stable it 
will be deemed ready for 
approval and publication. 
The report is 
distributed for 
comment 
beyond the initial 
list of invited 
experts, calling 
on stakeholders 
in the subject 
area to pass 
judgement on 
the contents of 
the report. This 
is the equivalent 
of a Draft for 
Public 
Comment. 
Exercising ba. 
Individual and 
virtual interactions 
offer a context for 
internalization – 
the adoption of 
personal, tacit 
knowledge from 
the explicit 
knowledge 
resource 
(documented 
standards in this 
context). It puts 
into practice or 
action what 
dialoguing ba did 
through thought. 
Publication Comments from 
the period of 
Public 
Comment are 
reviewed by the 
committee and 
used to revise 
and create a 
Final Draft 
which, when 
voted for by the 
Technical 
Committee, 
becomes, the 
Published 
Standard. 
Approved standards are 
typically published by 
storing them in a 
repository made 
available foremost to 
members of the 
consortium 
The report is 
revised through 
the disposition of 
comments 
received. Again, 
meetings or 
workshops may 
be the method of 
interaction. 
When the report 
is deemed by 
the secretariat to 
comprise the 
consensus 
opinion of the 
stakeholders, it 
is prepared for 
publication. 
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Table 5: Standards development processes 
Stage Standards 
Body 
Standard62 
Standards 
Consortium 
Recommendation63 
Standards 
Body 
Consensus64 
Knowledge 
Management65 
Promulgation Published 
Standards enter 
the Catalogue 
of the standards 
body as the 
definitive 
recorded 
knowledge on 
the subject. 
The consortium will 
engage in some sort of 
promotion and 
dissemination to 
encourage uptake of the 
standard. 
The Standards 
Body will 
promulgate the 
report as part of 
its portfolio but 
with the 
demarcation that 
it is not to be 
regarded as a 
standard. 
 
Period of use. Standards are 
resubmitted for 
review by the 
Technical 
Committee after 
a fixed period of 
time which may 
result in the 
standard 
remaining 
unchanged, 
being submitted 
for revision, or 
withdrawn. 
The consortium will 
assign a period of use 
after which time the 
standard will be 
reviewed for its 
continuing suitability. 
The RFP/RFC process 
may be repeated to 
maintain the status quo, 
update the standard, or 
withdraw it. 
The Consensus 
Document will 
remain on the 
Standards 
Body’s 
catalogue until 
such time as it is 
either deemed to 
have lost its 
sponsorship, or 
that its 
popularity leads 
to its refinement 
as a fully 
endorsed 
standard. 
 
2.14 What is the status of the standards? 
Standards are typically normative – those which must be followed to deliver the end result of 
the standard’s objectives, or informative where they provide information to support a process 
or development or production of a product. The informative standards set out information 
which ought to be known but is not a mandatory element to assure the successful delivery of 
the end result. Some standards comprise67 a mixture of normative and informative elements. 
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informative ISO/IEC 27002. 
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In the example model of the LeGSB (see the case study in Chapter 5), the highest priority 
standards are those which they adopt for use. In the nomenclature of LeGSB these are 
Certified Standards, a confusing term when viewed against the usual usage of ‘certification’ 
which normally refers to a certificate of compliance being awarded to an organisation or a 
product because it can provide evidence of conformance with the requirements of a 
standard against which it has been benchmarked. In the LeGSB model, normative standards 
are characterised by those relating exclusively to local government business and which have 
been ‘certified’ by the LeSGB process of consultation with its members and invited sources 
of expertise. These generally include standards of a very technical nature such as data 
definitions, XML schemas, ICT technical components and practice definitions. 
LeGSB makes some effort to reduce the proliferation of standards in that it will adopt 
standards set by other recognised organisations, for example, BSI, ISO, eGU, OECD, which 
need to be inherited by local government, rather than look to develop their own version. This 
is a sensible approach which is also taken by other standards bodies,, including BSI, and 
suggests that there is a conscious effort to avoid proliferation that concerns even the 
advocates of standardisation68. Examples also include the detailed technical standards of 
data definitions, XML schemas, and ICT technical components referred to above, and bring 
in standards with wider applicability to information systems such as those for accessibility 
and security (non-functional quality characteristics). Because LeGSB recognises the rigour 
that these standards go through before acceptance by the recognised organisations, they 
are adopted through a simpler process than those emerging through use in their own 
discipline. This is similar to the liaison categories of the National and International standards 
bodies referred to above. 
Another form of standard which permeates information systems – particularly those with 
Internet-enabled components – are recommendations of the World Wide Consortium (W3C) 
whose goal is to enhance the functionality and interoperability of the Web. Technologies or 
components of a technology are proposed for standard usage. A period of review by W3C is 
opened, the positive results of which are declared a recommendation. This is similar to the 
process of adopting standards for interoperability in central UK government under the mantle 
of the e-Government Interoperability Framework (e-GIF) which aims to manage the risk in 
interoperability by a catalogue of standards with a developing status of future consideration, 
under consideration, recommended, and approved. Some technologies may enter the 
‘observatory’ for future consideration but be rejected during the approval process. (The 
Technical Standards Catalogue of the e-Government Interoperability Framework fulfils the 
BSI trigger of ‘Will the published standard(s) ensure interoperability of businesses, 
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processes or products and services?’ and could be a framework to study interoperability 
standardisation specifically69). 
2.15 Differentiation: when is a standard not a standard? 
Standards, as noted above, have agreement or approval under some process. This would 
seem to be accepted nomenclature, and not to be confused with ‘specification’ which is 
accepted to be informative. The status of specifications is similar to the third level of 
document declared by LeGSB which recommends Implementation Guides to help to convert 
the explicit knowledge of standards back to the tacit knowledge of practitioners who use 
them. LeGSB looks to include in this type of guidance on the implementation and usage of 
standards either set by LeGSB or by other organisations including examples, legal issues, 
and the financial considerations. This implementation guidance, fitting in with whether a 
standard is normative, has a simplified approval process before adoption, and carries the 
status ‘LeGSB Recommendation’ (not to be confused with the higher standard status of the 
W3C recommendation). So guidance may be referred to as informative documents that 
reduce risk in the implementation of standards. It may be valid to describe this as ‘best 
practice’, which may be documented as case studies. This is where conflicting views may be 
resolved. Implementers may disagree about how to implement a standard. The best practice 
and guidance can catalogue the acceptable (and note the unacceptable) implementations. 
Another example of documents which are informative, and contain consensus opinion of 
stakeholders in the field the document is the CEN Workshop Agreement. (CEN is the 
European Standards Committee, a pan-European agency for standards setting.) As the 
name suggests, these are the reports of collaborative efforts and hold a similar status to the 
Technical Reports (TR) of the International Standards Organisation. A CWA or TR may be 
refined as a standard eventually but their informative nature allows for faster collation than 
their normative ‘standard’ counterparts. W3C also uses the grade of technical report. 
Similarly, the British Standards Institution publishes locally championed (usually by 
organisations with a particular field of expertise) ‘standardisation’ at the consensus level of 
the technical report. These ‘Publicly Available Specifications’ may be refined in time to 
become full standards but they are able to fill a gap in the standardisation portfolio, often by 
employing technical writers and a Delphi Technique-style panel to temper the content. 
2.16 How much detail do standards provide? 
Standards documentation – and by this I refer to the gamut of normative standards to 
informative specification – comprise a range of information levels within them. At the highest 
level there is the objective or policy statement which may be effected in different ways. A 
standard may comprise a number of normative policies which may be achieved in several 
informative ways, not necessarily prescribed by the standard. Informative standards may be 
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embodied in codes of practice, the implementation of which produce the standard result or 
product or service benchmark. 
These ways in which the policy may be effective are likely to be a network of processes, 
some of which may lie outside the area the standard focuses on. Processes may be 
documented as a succession of related procedures which may require implementers to 
develop local work instructions to take practitioners through the steps uniformly, depending 
on the level of expertise of the practitioners. 
Just as the soft systems methodology recognises that different users will have different 
views of systems, so too does the body of knowledge in standards require a view of the 
support for particular technologies or communities. The weltanschauung or user view of a 
group of standards-related documents has been neatly labelled by LeGSB as a ‘Blueprint’ or 
a metastandard, of which e-GIF is an example. A blueprint is a collation of all known 
emerging standards and related information on a particular issue. Such metastandards are 
not only a source of convenience, they can also help focus further work to identify gaps and 
develop standards. Again, frameworks emerge as a source of learning about a problem. 
2.17 Conclusion: leading to human vulnerabilities in information systems 
Embracing standards as an explicit or implicit solution to a problem by treating risk is 
compatible with the common five-stage model of knowledge management (Khalil, Claudio 
and Seliem, 2006). These stages are knowledge acquisition (KA), knowledge documentation 
(KD), knowledge transfer (KT), knowledge creation (KC), and knowledge application (KP), 
where the documentation is exemplified by the publication of standards documents. There is 
also resonance with the classification method for standards that was defined during the 
research of a catalogue of standards and best practice advice for effective information 
assurance (Chapter 3) which shows that a standard (KD) may only provide a partial 
mitigation of a risk and that the knowledge documented therein may only be suitable for 
application (KP) by someone with suitable training or experience. 
The poor regard for standards (see 2.3) when viewed as poor regard for espousing the 
appropriate behaviour in the face of risk, is indicative of the problem of preventing 
information security breaches as a result of a lack of correct human-information system 
interaction at the time of threat. Actors, customers and owners (Checkland, 1981) will still 
accept a wide band of risk depending on the perceived levels of stress the outcomes of the 
realised risk will cause (Coles, R. and Hodgkinson, 2008) and for some the risk is actually 
caused by measures put in place to treat it (Bryant, Davis et al., 2010). The emotional 
response to the stress drives the willingness to treat the risk using techniques which may be 
explicitly documented (Figure 11) but disregarded. It would be useful to have a methodology 
that could be used to learn where risk management in information systems relies on 
emotional literacy (Chapter 4) of the people involved and where technical constraints reduce 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
80
the risk to an acceptable level in terms of the impact of the realised risk (CESG, 2009). This 
will be useful to the stakeholders responsible for risk governance (see 2.11) as a means of 
decision support for taking action against unintentional error. 
Three pieces of work have been particularly influential in the formulation of this thesis and 
the research methodology that was developed to investigate my ideas. 
Taxonomy-based risk identification (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003) was the portal to other 
academic work on the components of information system risk (especially those associated 
with human factors and software) and introduced me to a sober representation of risk that is 
known, unknown, or unknowable in relation to the involvement of stakeholders in assessing 
that risk. 
World in torment: a time whose idea must come (Beer, 1993) cemented the idea of drawing 
in literature on cybernetics and bringing out the attenuation risks of modelling and Ashby’s 
laws of requisite variety and inter-recursive cohesion. 
The six dumbest ideas in computer security (Ranum, 2005) sets out well the fundamental 
design flaws in computer systems that will remain as legacy until systems that have been 
designed with security in mind take over from them. This paper however suggests that 
locking down technology to avoid misuse is the only route to assurance. My hypothesis is 
that there is a wider source of good practice to be extracted from standards and the balance 
of locking down technology against the practice of educating and training users can be 
determined from the work described in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3. LINKING RISK TO STANDARDS 
3.1 About this chapter 
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Figure 18: This chapter in the context of the thesis 
This chapter describes three projects which address the research question, ‘How do you link 
risks to the standards that may mitigate them?’. These complementary projects are set out in 
Table 6 and described in detail below. 
Table 6: Projects documented in this chapter 
Label Project 
Alpha 
α 
An analysis of surveys for the Small Business Service of the Department of 
Trade and Industry where a ‘Top 10’ view of risks to information systems was 
derived. This highlights what the research problem is. 
Beta 
β 
Research and development of a project brief for the British Standards Institution 
(BSI), 'Using Standards to Mitigate Risk in Information Systems’ which made 
the justification of why guidance is needed to promote standards to be 
promulgated as risk treatments. 
Gamma 
γ 
A project to establish a catalogue of which standards treat risks associated with 
information assurance. 
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Choice and selection 
The original research plan to analyse whether standards are efficacious in the treatment of 
risk was founded on the assumption that I would seek a consensus opinion that ‘Standards’ 
may be implemented to mitigate risk in information systems. This idea of taking a consensus 
view pervades the basis of the three research projects that are described in this chapter. It is 
also a recurring theme in my literature review (Chapter 2) which considers the formal 
recording of risk reduction techniques being linked to the reduction in risk with surety. Each 
of these projects comprised a period of desk research followed by the validation of that 
research by a Delphi-style panel of experts comprising a balanced mix of practitioners in the 
field of information security risk, both specialists and end-users. This is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Research sources and validation 
 α 
‘Top 10’ IS/IT Risks 
β 
BSI Project Brief 
γ 
CSIA Catalogue 
S
o
u
rce
 
m
ate
rial
 
Multiple surveys of 
risks in IS/IT. 
Software engineering body of 
knowledge (SWEBOK) and 
complementary standards. 
Catalogues of standards 
in the field of information 
security and assurance. 
Info
rm
atio
n
 
e
xtra
cted
 
Survey of surveys. Specification of how the body 
of knowledge can be presented 
as a risk-treatment toolkit. 
Populated taxonomy of 
publicly available 
guidance on information 
assurance. 
V
alid
atio
n
 of
 
re
sults
 by:
 
End-user members 
of The National 
Computing Centre. 
Subject matter experts from 
BSI panel IST/15 Software 
Engineering. 
Information security 
experts. 
The three projects may be viewed respectively as a granular exploration of the problem of 
risk in information systems (‘Top 10’ IS/IT Risks), an engine of engagement with the 
stakeholders who would benefit from a solution to the problems suggested by these risks, 
and a standard of standards – a metastandard – which provides the solution to the problem. 
The impact of the risks described in the first project (Alpha α) and which standards may be 
usefully applied from the third project (Gamma γ) to reduce risk to an acceptable level can 
be shown by the application of the methodology derived from the investigations into the 
human vulnerabilities in information systems (see Chapter 4). 
A key objective of the survey of surveys was to establish some scope for the research 
overall. A list of prevalent (‘top ten’) IS/IT risks to small to medium sized enterprises was 
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requested by the Small Business Service (SBS) of the (then) UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI). Discussions with the DTI’s adviser settled the need to target ten risks in the 
list as a precursor to a possible larger study that may include the development of a risk 
assessment tool. The tool was commissioned and developed70 soon after but using the ‘Top 
10’ only. Feedback from the reviewers of the ‘Top 10’ list explained that they are not specific 
to SMEs as originally envisaged, but had implications for all information system users – 
owners, actors and customers. The limit of ten risks for this initial work was agreed so as to 
be able to market the information to the SME business community (defined by DTI as 
comprising organisations of less than 250 employees) in a popular format. It was recognised 
that this was not intended to be a definitive list of all risks but that the top-ten approach 
would have value as an introduction to the subject and that any other risk or risks outside of 
the selected ten could be the most critical for an SME carrying out a risk assessment. 
The wider view of information systems risk within the ‘Top 10’ was maintained with the 
support of the British Standard Institution’s (BSI) IST/15 committee which is responsible for 
developing and ratifying standards for software engineering. This assured consideration of 
information systems risk beyond the popular security triumvirate of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (CIA) to include, for example, ‘systems life cycle management, poor 
requirements definition, poor system design and inadequate testing’ which may be the root 
cause of CIA breaches. 
The National Computing Centre (NCC) had sent a delegate to attend IST/15 meetings since 
1990 as a result of NCC’s interest in good quality documentation. This lead to my specifying 
the content of BS 764971 for paper-based user documentation for application software, BS 
783072 for on-line user documentation for application software, and co-authoring a standard 
which combined the two (ISO/IEC 18019). The potential interest of BSI in this research was 
recognised and the research concepts were presented to IST/15. The result of this was an 
invitation to research and specify a project brief for consultants to develop a framework of 
the standards, information, and guidance required by industry to enable the efficient 
management, and opportunities for mitigation, of risk in information systems. This would 
include the most appropriate methods or deliverables in which this framework may be 
presented, covering (for example) a repository of risks and the details of standards that may 
be applied to mitigate them, and a Code of Practice for Using Standards to Mitigate Risk in 
Information Systems. As BSI’s work would require exploitation of the project’s deliverables 
for a financial return, the brief would be expected to specify the presentation of information 
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 www.businesslink.gov.uk/itrisks 
71
 BS 7649 British Standard Guide to the Design and Preparation of Documentation for Users of 
Applications Software. 
72
 BS 7830 British Standard Guide to the Design and Preparation of On-line Documentation for Users 
of Applications Software. 
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on-paper and on-line, by single purchase or by subscription and derived opportunities such 
as events and training73. 
This framework would have to be designed to be expandable and scalable to cover all 
relevant IT standards to ensure a sufficiently comprehensive approach to a variety of risk 
vectors. However, the initial focus would be those under the auspices of BSI Committee 
IST/15, which are expressly software engineering standards. IST/15 is well connected with 
other standardisation relevant to the research, in particular the committees which are 
responsible for IT service management and information security.74 
With this understanding of the identification of prevalent risk before specifying a 
methodology for detection and treatment, I established a project to survey contemporary 
surveys of information security risk. In this section I describe how a selection of significant 
risks was identified, with a view to investigating the standards that may be associated with 
the mitigation of that selection, and concentrating on collecting evidence that the standards 
contributed to that mitigation. The compilation of an initial list is described and then validated 
with the opinion first of a closed group of experts, and then with a broad church of 
information system users straddling the public and private sectors. 
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 These later manifested in: 
• Information Asset Management, ½ day workshop, January 2010, (Maidenhead) 
• Internal Audits of Business Continuity, One day workshop, October 2009, (London) 
• Information Security in the Public Sector, Training Programme for the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance, July 2009, (Manchester) 
• IT Governance, workshop for the British Standards Institution, May 2009, (London) 
• Assessor Training – accrediting new assessors for AccreditUK, April and May, 2009 
(Manchester) 
• IT Governance workshop, February 2009 (Edinburgh), March 2009 (Cardiff) 
• Security: From Risk to Treatment, One day workshop, April 2008 (NCC, Manchester), July 
2008 (London), September 2008 (Manchester), February 2009 (London)  
• CS639/COMP60391/COMP61421 Computer (and Network) Security Module of the University 
of Manchester Advanced Computer Science MSc, 2004, updated 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 
• Dredge first, hedge later: Keeping risk business-focused (Aspects of information risk - being 
proportionate) Construction Industry Computing Association (CICA) Workshop, 7 November 
2007  
• Information Security Management: A standards approach, One day workshop: March 2006 
(NCC, Manchester) 
74
 The brief was not taken forward to be implemented when the BSI’s publishing arm overruled 
IST/15 requesting the development and publication of the framework be carried out by a single 
author without the rigour of review by the committee members. This was reminiscent of the 
observations of control in standardisation programmes referred to in Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva, 
2006. 
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Researching and selecting the ten risks - described herein (see Table 11) - met the difficulty 
in separating risk (strictly the effect, outcome, or loss) from the causes of the risk. It was 
considered that for the SME audience, it would probably not be useful to focus on the end 
results (the loss) alone as it may detract from attention that must be given, by the SME, to 
the timely reduction of the cause(s). To this end, the investigation did not distinguish 
between risk and the causes of risk. 
Table 8: The method for selecting the 10 risks 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description 
Stage 
Deliverable(s) 
1 Survey of surveys. Collate the results of surveys about risk 
related to information systems. 
Raw information 
about risks. 
2 Identify a taxonomy 
of risk. 
Arranged those risks and causes of risk 
in ten headings. 
A taxonomy of risks 
from the surveys. 
3 Define the top 10 
risks. 
Create a uniform style of description for 
each taxon to make it clear and 
unambiguous for reviewers. 
A description of 
each of the top-ten 
risks. 
4 Review the 
suggested ‘top 10’. 
The list was distributed to a selected 
‘panel’ of experts for refinement. 
Feedback from 
reviewers. 
5 Adjust the top 10 
using feedback 
from the review. 
The opinion of the experts was collated 
to create a ‘top ten’ for submission to the 
SBS (who were working to a time-based 
agenda to deliver business-support 
information on the Internet). 
A refined list of the 
top 10 risks. 
6 Refine and validate 
the top 10 further. 
Distribute the list for review by members 
of The National Computing Centre75 the 
Institute for Information Security 
Professionals, and consultants in 
information technology security 
subscribed to the discussion group of a 
World Wide Web forum 
(www.itsecurity.com)76. Revise the list 
with feedback from the consultation. 
A list that has been 
compared to 
experience. 
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 an association of information system users. 
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The survey of surveys involved finding studies and opinions on risks to SMEs. To be 
inclusive but avoid bias, surveys were sought and found that had been carried out by, or 
commissioned by, a representative sample of organisations. This meant that the risks in the 
list delivered by this research were initially defined by creating an aggregated view of risk 
lists published by UK public sector bodies, UK and European Consortia, trade press, and 
private enterprise studies published by information systems suppliers, and suppliers of 
information security services. The surveys from private enterprise were regarded with a 
degree of caution as they appeared to serve as marketing materials for products related to 
risk mitigation. However, they were deemed suitable for consideration because they could 
be correlated with the more independent studies and did not draw direct lines of action 
between the survey results and the product offerings77. Only a few product suppliers were 
found to have carried out their own research and most referred to the (then) DTI’s own bi-
annual security breaches survey78.  
The evidence for information security risk – using the ‘top 10’ as examples – provided 
evidence and encouragement for BSI to commission (in the first instance) a project brief for 
metastandardisation – a framework connecting risk with mitigating standards. Table 9 
describes the methodology for the research and development of the brief which included the 
following stages above and beyond the expected project management activities: 
                                                                                                                                                      
76
 who added some additional free-form comment to the body of knowledge analysed for the 
research. 
77
 Note how Computer Weekly, 29 June 2010, reported that passwords were the biggest risk to 
information security supporting its article with the case proposed by a vendor of two-factor 
authentication. (However, the bias from an equipment manufacturer does not necessarily mean 
that the supporting evidence is suspect.) 
78
 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Information Security Breaches Survey, Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI)/Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), 2004, 2006, 
and 2008 
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Table 9: The method for setting the project brief for BSI 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
1 
Desk 
research. 
Desk research of standards published and 
in development: use the defined scope of 
the standards to define the risks that they 
are recognised as mitigating. 
A connection 
between standards 
and realised risk. 
2 Peer review. 
Peer review – throughout the project – by 
an NCC colleague as the core method of 
internal quality assurance. 
Corrections and 
amendments to 
prepare the brief for 
review by BSI. 
3 
Describe the 
framework. 
Writing a description of the framework, its 
background, and justification. 
The main body of the 
project brief 
4 
Specify a 
code of 
practice for 
applying the 
framework. 
Specifying the contents of guidance and 
advice about how to apply the framework in 
practice. 
5 
Describe the 
project’s 
deliverables. 
Describing how the framework and its 
attendant products should be made 
available, including publications, electronic 
products, subscription services for updates, 
briefings, training, and possible certification 
schemes for those who may apply the 
specified processes in their management 
systems. 
6 
Review by 
BSI 
Review the project brief with BSI Committee 
IST/15 (Software Engineering) and update it 
with feedback received. 
Corrections and 
amendments to 
prepare the final brief 
for implementation. 
The project brief was needed to set out the fully researched and justified background for the 
framework. It would specify how that framework should be constructed for an initial sample 
comprising those software engineering standards under the auspices of the IST/15 and 
other critical standards including ISO 9001 (Quality System), BS 7799 – now more readily 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
88
referred to as ISO/IEC 27001 (Information security management) and BS 15000 – now 
ISO/IEC 20000 (IT Service Management). 
Although it was not apparent at the time the brief was under development, the commercial 
interests of BSI were to overtake the intentions of implementing the brief79 and the 
opportunity arose to realise the intentions of the brief in a separate project where the range 
of standards scrutinised was focused on information security and assurance. This third desk-
based research project investigated a process for collating and navigating through the 
standards that may mitigate the risks associated with information assurance. The research 
addressed methodological enquiries which emerged from consideration of the main research 
questions. These are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Methodological elements supporting the research questions 
 Research question Methodological element 
1 
Do implemented 'Standards' 
mitigate risk? 
Can the knowledge of risks be reverse-engineered 
from ‘Standards’ to link the ‘Standards’ to the risks? 
2 
Can 'Standards' be made more 
accessible? 
Can you group standards, best practice, regulations 
and law into risk treatments? 
3 
How do you link risks to the 
'Standards' that may mitigate 
them? 
Can standards and risks be linked in a route map? 
How can that route map be applied?80 
One of the definite deliverables that was envisaged by the research was a ‘standard of 
standards’ to mitigate risk in information systems. If such a metastandard could be created, 
it would produce an answer to two of the three research questions: Can 'Standards' be made 
more accessible? – because the metastandard would be a catalogue of standards and place 
them in the context of their utility, and How do you link risks to the ‘Standards’ that may 
mitigate them? – because the taxonomy of the catalogue would be the connecting structure 
of risks and the standards that populate the catalogue. 
The research and development of the metastandard was initiated by the Central Sponsor for 
Information Assurance (CSIA – part of the Cabinet Office – now Information Security and 
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 The commercial decision to prepare a book on standardisation and risk mitigation that would not 
be part of the IST/15 programme of work. 
80
 Better shown in the ‘human vulnerabilities’ project (Delta δ) of Chapter 4 
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Assurance81) to establish any gaps in the good practice advice available to mitigate the risks 
to information systems as defined by the International standard ISO/IEC 27001 Information 
security management. The research and development was specified as a commitment by 
The National Computing Centre to deliver a Technical Report82 – similar to the established 
‘Body of Knowledge’ document that records the standards that define good practice in 
software engineering (SWEBoK) – that catalogued the standards and documented good 
practice that provide the detailed treatment of the risk that the ISO/IEC 27001 controls are 
designed mitigate. Items included in the catalogue will be ranked for applicability and 
suitability. This lead to a gap analysis that showed what controls were missing from ISO/IEC 
27001, and what guidance83 was missing to provide the detailed advice (for both the extant 
and the missing controls). The Cabinet Office would then be able to consider how the gaps 
could be filled by encouraging new research or declassifying government documents that 
already recommend risk treatments and making them more readily available. (An example of 
this was a set of recommendations on the secure destruction of electronic records that 
required access to classified technical processes to effect the destruction.) 
The research and development method followed the stages documented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Research and development stages for cataloguing IA standards 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
1 Mapping risk 
treatments. 
Map the 135 risk treatment controls of 
ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A and design or 
select a taxonomy to assist navigation 
through them84. 
A taxonomy of risk to 
information systems. 
2 Mapping 
standards to 
the 
taxonomy. 
Map the controls to standards and best 
practice known to The National Computing 
Centre85 for implementing those risk 
treatments. 
An initial gap analysis 
as a first draft 
definition of the Risk 
Treatment ‘Body of 
Knowledge’. 
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 And joining with the Office of Cybersecurity in September 2010. 
82
 Available from the author. 
83
 The importance of including both social and technical controls was recognised. 
84
 The suitability of the ISO/IEC 27001 taxonomy was considered. 
85
 Sources were to include but not be restricted to: respected books, Chambers of Commerce, 
Consortia (for example: the Jericho Forum, SAINT, the Information Security Forum), Government 
agencies (for example nationally: ACPO, CESG, CSIA, DTI, NISCC, OGC, SOCA and 
internationally: ENISA, OECD/WTO). WARPs/CERTs etc., Professional Bodies (for example: BBA, 
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Table 11: Research and development stages for cataloguing IA standards 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
3 Rank the 
effectiveness 
of the 
standards 
and 
expertise 
required to 
use them. 
Design a scale for rating suitability and 
applicability of risk treatment information. 
Consider: The type of standard or guidance 
(is it process or product based?); Which risk 
treatments are well documented? Which 
risk treatments need more guidance? The 
scale would take an e-GIF-like approach86 
to the standard/best practice/guidance. The 
ranking would be applied to award an initial 
suitability and applicability rating to each 
treatment87. 
Ranked catalogue of 
publicly available risk 
treatment guidance. 
4 Define the 
availability of 
the 
guidance. 
The taxonomy/ranking would also consider 
the availability of items from the Body of 
Knowledge. 
Ownership and 
access rights to the 
catalogued 
information. 
5 Consultation 
and review. 
Consult a representative sample of 
organisations straddling the public and 
private sectors to check and supplement 
the early draft with their own knowledge88. 
Additional entries for 
the catalogue. 
6 Apply 
feedback 
from the 
consultation. 
Update first draft to incorporate responses 
from those on the contact list. 
Updated catalogue. 
                                                                                                                                                      
BCS, CIPD, IISP, Intellect, NCC), Standards Bodies (for example: BSI, ISO/IEC, IEEE, IET, and 
NIST). 
86
 That is: ‘Adopted’, ‘Recommended’, ‘Under review’, or for ‘Future consideration’? 
87
 The suitability and applicability ranking may be context based so that risk treatments are keyed to 
the risks where they will have the best mitigating effect. 
88
 Reviewers were asked to include a critical suitability and applicability rating for recommended 
information (both for what they add and for what is already there) and request suggested ‘not 
recommended’ risk treatment information. 
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Table 11: Research and development stages for cataloguing IA standards 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
7 Report 
writing. 
Create a report in a format that is a hybrid 
of the e-GIF ‘Technical Standards 
Catalogue’ and CSIA’s ‘A review of UK 
Government and industry initiatives’. 
Report for issue. 
8 Define how 
the 
catalogue 
may be kept 
current. 
Research and development to specify how 
the deliverables from the original work 
package will be kept up to date, relevant, 
and made available (such as - for example 
– web presence89, CD ROMs, printed 
catalogues, analysis tool etc.). 
A second, supporting 
report that defines 
delivery mechanisms 
to provide the initial 
documentation 
baseline, and 
maintain both the gap 
analysis and the 
documentation 
baseline on an 
ongoing basis. 
The second report would recommend mechanisms for introducing new risk treatment 
guidance into the catalogue, withdrawing obsolete material and noting obsolescent items90, 
and changing the status of catalogued risk treatments ensuring that they are labelled 
appropriately for suitability and applicability. The report recommended establishing an active 
network of public and private sector informants – based on the ‘Delphi’ panel of reviewers – 
who would be polled every six months for changes. Part of this six-monthly gap-analysis 
review would include researching experienced and expected risk realisation to identify 
available risk treatment information and the gap analysis of what needs to be developed. 
3.2.2 Application of the methodology 
Table 12 catalogues the sources of information that I assembled using my knowledge and 
experience of working in the field of IT for 20 years, supplemented with a search of Internet 
pages. The selection was limited to these when it was recognised that there was a 
significant overlap between the sources. 
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 Which could include recommendations for positioning as part of ‘Getsafeonline’ or the UK GovTalk 
repository and links from the sites of other IA stakeholders. 
90
 Where selected risk treatments may not be relevant for current practice but awareness for legacy 
practice is necessary. 
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Table 12: Surveys reviewed for the survey 
Source Description 
Computerworld91 Computerworld, the 'Voice of IT Management,' is a weekly U.S.-
based hub of a 58-edition global IT media network, published by 
the International Data Group (IDG). 
Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cyber 
Crime92 
In view of the increasing use of new technologies, Member States 
pledged to combat high-tech crime and cyber crime in all its forms. 
The Council and Parliament adopted an action plan on promoting 
the safe use of the internet by combating messages with harmful 
and illegal content. 
The Central Sponsor 
for Information 
Assurance (CSIA)93 
The CSIA is a unit of the UK Government's Cabinet Office and 
works with partners in the public and private sectors, as well as its 
International counterparts, to help safeguard the nation's IT and 
telecommunications services. 
The Department of 
Trade and Industry 
(DTI)94 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) aimed to increase 
competitiveness and scientific excellence to generate higher levels 
of sustainable growth and productivity in modern Britain. It 
encouraged successful business start-ups, including small and 
medium-sized enterprises, with practical support through Business 
Link. This included help and advice on best practice, training, 
employment law, and new technology. The DTI also helped British 
firms to export their products to overseas markets. In 2007 its 
responsibilities were split between the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and the Technology 
Strategy Board (TSB). 
Gen-i95 Gen-i helps organisations in New Zealand generate greater value 
from their IT and telecommunications spend, while managing the 
transition from legacy networks and systems to converged 
technologies. 
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 www.computerworld.com 
92
 www.europa.eu.int 
93
 www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/csia 
94
 www.number-10.gov.uk 
95
 www.gen-i.co.nz 
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Table 12: Surveys reviewed for the survey 
Source Description 
The Real Time Club96 The Real Time Club comprises 150 entrepreneurs from the IT 
community who meet for discussion, debate and dinner on a 
regular basis and has done so continuously since 1967. Speakers 
are leaders of sectors including Finance, Business, Education, 
Computer/Telecommunications industries and Government. It 
publishes an annual consideration of risks faced by the ‘IT industry’ 
under the banner of the ‘ICT Banana skins’. 
The National High-
Tech Crime Unit 
(NHTCU)97 
The National Hi-Tech Crime Unit was part of the UK’s National 
Crime Squad and launched in April 2001 as part of the national hi-
tech crime strategy announced by the Home Secretary to 
Parliament in November 2000. The NHTCU was the first UK 
national law enforcement organisation tasked to combat national, 
and transnational, serious and organised computer-based crime 
which impacts upon the United Kingdom. It became part of the 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in 2005. 
PC/Computing 
magazine98 
PC/Computing is a periodical from Ziff Davis Publishing for 
knowledgeable personal computer users who are interested in 
general news and trends in addition to the technological aspects of 
computing. 
SilentRunner Inc99 Silent Runner Inc., a manufacturer of computer security equipment, 
and part of Computer Associates. 
Unisys100 Unisys is a worldwide information technology services and 
solutions company delivering expertise in consulting, systems 
integration, outsourcing, infrastructure, and server technology. 
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 www.realtimeclub.org.uk 
97
 www.nhtcu.org 
98
 www.zdnet.com/ 
99
 ca.com 
100
 www.unisys.com/ 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
94
Table 12: Surveys reviewed for the survey 
Source Description 
The National 
Computing Centre101 
The National Computing Centre is the UK's IT membership 
organisation, serving corporate, vendor and government 
communities. NCC champions the effective use of IT to maximise 
the competitiveness of its members’ businesses. This is done by 
providing impartial advice and support, best practice and standards 
and personal and professional development. NCC is a social 
enterprise. 
To make sense of the rich vein of primary research, I looked for representative groupings of 
particular kinds of risk in the collated body of research with a view to selecting a taxonomy of 
ten headings. I selected groups of risk from the surveys and used a mind mapping tool to 
sort the individual risks from the surveys until the groupings settled into 10, level 1 
categories. These headings are presented here in alphabetical order. It was noted that 
amongst the sources of the reports, no indication was given as to the relevant severity of the 
risks, with the exception of the DTI’s security breaches survey (DTI/Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2004). 
Table 13: Common groups of risk from the surveys 
 Risk or the cause 
of risk 
Definition 
1. Complacency, lack 
of awareness or 
understanding, or 
accepting too much 
risk. 
Unless the chance of a risk can be reduced to zero – at which 
point it may be argued that it is no longer a risk – there must 
be some level of acceptance. This may be a deliberate act or 
through ignorance. 
2. Fraud, identity, theft 
or sabotage of data 
or systems. 
The value of information assets may be measured in several 
different ways varying from the focused total cost of ownership 
of hardware and software (Gartner Group, 1987) to including 
the calculation of the value of intangible assets such as 
intellectual property (Stewart, 1997). This may be extended to 
very personal losses through the targeted theft of very specific 
items of identification that allow inappropriate access to bank 
accounts. 
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 www.ncc.co.uk 
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Table 13: Common groups of risk from the surveys 
 Risk or the cause 
of risk 
Definition 
3. Governance, legal 
and regulatory 
compliance. 
The collapse of major organisations through fraudulent 
financial reporting prompted attention to the internal controls 
that manage operational risk (Armstrong, Rhys-Jones, 
Dresner, 2004) so the implied requirements of good 
governance are now a statute in the US102 and benchmarks for 
corporate regulation in the UK (Cadbury, 1992; Higgs, 2002; 
and Turnbull, 1999). Banking has also introduced its own risk 
management framework103. 
4. Holes punched 
through established 
defences (home-
office 
deperimeterisation). 
Onion-skin models (Alexander, 2007) for access to information 
systems become less effective with the autonomy given to 
legitimate users. People, other systems, or software 
applications that are allowed permission into the defined 
periphery may allow inappropriate traffic through its perimeter 
and cannot easily be differentiated from legitimate activity 
(NCC, 2004 [2[).  
5. Inadequate 
resilience/business 
continuity 
management. 
Business continuity plans should not be expected to pre-empt 
every eventuality (Armstrong, Rhys-Jones, Dresner, 2004) or 
emergent risk but rather provide a framework of mitigating 
action based on the probability (risk) of incidents from risk 
assessment or treatment plans. 
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 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protector Act 2002 (commonly referred to as 
Sarbanes-Oxley). Section 404 requires board level certification of an organisation’s financial 
activity and the effectiveness and status of the organisations internal controls. 
103
 The second Basel Accord of the Bank of International Settlements (Basel II) 
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Table 13: Common groups of risk from the surveys 
 Risk or the cause 
of risk 
Definition 
6. Malicious Software. There are several variations on the theme of malicious code. 
Worms permeate computer systems, changing code and 
erasing files. They are difficult to trace and stop. Macro viruses 
hide within applications files such as spreadsheets or word 
processor documents, and their damage can extend well 
beyond the application. Trojan Horses, like their legendary 
namesake, hold hidden problems within an otherwise innocent 
looking file. They break down defences to enable unauthorised 
access to the network. 
7. Systems life cycle 
management, 
especially 
requirements 
definition and 
testing. 
In 1988, research (Price Waterhouse, 1988) commissioned by 
the UK Department of Trade and Industry, estimated the 
annual loss to the UK economy resulting from defects in 
domestically produced software sold on the open market to be 
£600 million. A complementary report (Logica, 1987) indicated 
that quality risks in software development could be mitigated 
by implementing ISO 9000 (which was BS 5750 at the time 
and is now ISO 9001) for Quality Systems and being 
independently certificated for it – a major endorsement that 
implementing a standard can mitigate risk. The information 
technology certification scheme designed to encourage this 
peaked at a little over 1700 certifications and had dropped to 
less than 1300 by 2005104. 
8. Unacceptable use 
by or through staff, 
contractors, 
partners. 
This category of risk has similar properties to the category of 
‘Fraud etc’. (2 above). It refers to the deliberate or accidental 
misuse of appropriately granted privileges with both innocent 
and malicious intent by those with permission to be where they 
are. 
9. Unauthorised 
access. 
In contrast to the granting of appropriate access in the 
category of ‘Holes etc.’ (4 above), this class of risk is relatively 
short, but only in as much as the opportunities for its 
realisation are clearer: access is gained to places where it 
should not have been. 
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 www.tickit.org 
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Table 13: Common groups of risk from the surveys 
 Risk or the cause 
of risk 
Definition 
10. Wireless networks. Although there are only two examples here, it was originally 
considered that the popularity of reporting concern over 
wireless communication and the blanket banning of their use in 
some significant circumstances (NISCC, 2002) was important 
to reflect here. 
My intention was to restrict the list of ten risks to a clear, general taxonomy which would be 
as inclusive as possible within the constraint of ten items. This would avoid a reader, who 
did not see a risk which they considered important, failing to give the list adequate credibility. 
An example of this was the intention to class the popular concern about wireless networks 
as a manifestation or example of ‘tunnelling’ through other risk-mitigating activity. However, 
the pervasive occurrence of the concerns over wireless data transfer – apparent in many 
conversations (Chapter 4) and in the survey of surveys – indicated that it would be important 
to maintain this as a distinctive class of risk, at least in the initial sorting so that sufficient 
prominence could be given to that risk in the final taxonomy. The components of the 
collected survey were sorted into these classes as shown in Table 14. These are quoted 
verbatim from the corpus of surveys following a short definition of each. (The first validation 
of the ‘top ten’ with the panel of experts supported this view of the original classification 
scheme; wireless network risk became an example rather than a category.)  
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
1. Complacency, 
lack of 
awareness or 
understanding, 
or accepting 
too much risk. 
Concealment of attacks. 
Flawed risk assessment – i.e., 'who would want to attack us? – Not only are 
large multinationals targets, but SMEs are also an attractive target for 
hackers. 
Assumption that virus protection is adequate security – Virus protection is 
seen today as an essential security measure for SMEs in New Zealand. 
Unfortunately for most of these businesses this is their ONLY security 
measure. 
No method of detecting a security breach or compromise – While there may 
be a prevention security system measure in place, more often than not there 
is NO detection measure. This is the equivalent of a bank locking its doors 
but having no alarm system installed. 
Invalid belief that information security is a firewall – Setting security policies 
in a company does not provide the same protection as a company firewall. If 
applicable, these should both be implemented as part of an overall security 
system. 
No procedures for handling security incidents – When a security incident 
occurs there should be a set procedure outlining all possible actions, 
responsibilities and alternatives for the company. 
Placing more importance on ease of use or cost, rather than security – Many 
New Zealand businesses underrate the importance of security measures 
and settle for ‘user friendliness’. 
Don't believe that all sites for shopping are safe. Two very popular security 
methods are the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) or Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL). These methods have security issues that are more trustworthy 
when shopping online. 
Inadequate security policies and procedures. 
Personal websites are easily hacked into. If there is valuable information on 
a website, make sure to have a firewall in place. 
VPN Tunnel Vulnerabilities – If a hacker worms his way into the VPN he can 
have free and easy access to the network. 
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
2. Fraud, identity, 
theft or 
sabotage of 
data or 
systems. 
Theft of data. This can include proprietary information and intellectual 
property such as customer lists, research and development, financial data 
and personal information. 
Corporate web site spoofing attacks. A spoof website claims to be the 
legitimate site of a particular organisation and is set up to look like the 
original. 
Financial fraud, through deception and identity theft, for example: 
• Sabotage of, or damage to, data or networks.  
• Personal ID card fails. Phishing. 
Adoption of federated architectures for identity and access management will 
accelerate. 
Browsers can give out information about people by the settings they choose. 
They start with names and e-mail addresses usually, and these are sold to 
companies. 
Computer related forgery. Computer related fraud. 
Credit reporting agencies will become more involved in managing the 
consequences of identity theft. 
Criminals can impersonate you and get valuable information about you. Use 
digital signatures for authorization. 
Data interference. Don't let personal information get out to the public. Once it 
is publicized, it will be sold to companies. If personal information is stolen, 
report it to your credit card companies, banks, and other personal agencies. 
E-mail is not private. Encryption and decryption is recommended for high 
security e-mails. 
Enterprises will revisit role-based access control for identity and access 
management. 
Internet relationships are not always private. People can hack into chats and 
files; so don't send private information online. 
Internet sites sell personal information. Report privacy issues to government 
agency. Get a free e-mail account from a site like Yahoo or Hotmail to give 
out if you have to.  
Never give out a bank account number under any circumstances. If someone 
gets this number, they can empty the account with no authorization. 
System interference. Theft of data.  
There are many different scams online. Shop at only sites that are reputable, 
and use a credit card to buy online. Most credit companies will charge people 
for only the first $50 charged, if their number is stolen. 
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
3. Governance, 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance. 
Application software breaches will lead to ‘lemon laws’ 
Copyright and similar rights offences 
Copyright law litigation. 
Data protection too onerous. 
European Software Licensing 
Extra-territorialism. 
Illegal interception. 
IPR Enforcement Directive 
IT Governance. 
Offshore outsourcing hits UK 
Online child pornography 
Outsourcing put on hold. 
SCO suit succeeds 
System suppliers in court. 
The Disappearing IT Director 
4. Holes punched 
through 
established 
defences 
(home-office 
deperimeterisa
tion). 
Application risks. 
Music and video browsers – These automatically connect the user to related 
web sites - all without the user’s permission. 
Peer-to-Peer Applications – In a peer-to-peer environment, it has an implied 
trust between servers. 
Using a modem while connected to the LAN. 
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
5. Inadequate 
resilience/busi
ness continuity 
management. 
Damage to reputation. 
Denial of service105 
Disaster recovery found wanting. 
Diversionary Tactics106 
Legacy systems halt. 
National Grid fails. 
Non-resilient systems. 
Not making or testing backups. 
Physical accidents or attacks. 
SPAM halts the Internet. 
Systems failure. 
Websites damage brands. 
6. Malicious 
Software. 
Virus attacks. 2003 brought a variety of new viruses targeting a number of 
software weaknesses. 
Trusting insecure messages, for example, e-mail or phone calls. Phone calls 
or e-mails can easily be tapped or hacked into, for example, the ‘love bug’ 
virus was a good example of a virus using people’s e-mail address books to 
send the virus on. 
Blended attacks. Worms and viruses have become more complicated and 
now a single one can execute itself or even attack more than one platform. 
Computer viruses (‘worms’ or ‘Trojans’). 
Cyber attack styles will become virulent. 
E-mail attachments. Workers opening an attachment could unleash a virus or 
a worm to the network of their employer.  In most cases just opening the e-
mail and not even clicking on the attachment can open the virus. 
Opening unsolicited e-mail attachments. 
Viruses. 
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 Whereby attackers prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. 
106
 Security administrators are busy ‘putting out fires’ that hackers have set in the servers of targeted 
companies. 
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
7. Systems life 
cycle 
management 
especially 
requirements 
definition and 
testing. 
Lack of independent verification of system integrity. Outsourcing to an 
independent security specialist can provide vital checks of the system. 
Having reactive rather than proactive security processes. Businesses should 
not wait for any of their own organisation’s processes to be breached – 
security plans should already be in place to prevent the occurrence, for 
example, companies should have a disaster recovery plan in place in case of 
a fire. 
Systems demographics disasters. 
Users versus IT professionals. 
Enterprises will turn to proactive ‘defence-in-depth’ as business needs drive 
security. 
Errors in systems software or hardware design. 
Microsoft’s SOAP. The Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) doesn't have 
any security specifications built in it, SilentRunner warns. 
Not installing security patches for browsers and mail clients. 
Out-of-date systems and software. 
Virtual directory technology will increasingly become a strategic component 
of identity integration projects. 
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Table 14: Risks from the surveys sorted into the groups 
 Description Examples 
8. Unacceptable 
use by or 
through staff, 
contractors, 
partners. 
Unauthorised access to, or misuse of, the company web site, such as 
accessing secure areas or storing illicit material on the servers. 
Disgruntled IT employee. 
Criminal use of the Internet.  
Implicit encouragement of staff bypassing security measures. Strict 
procedures are required which must be followed at all times. 
Downloads from Web Sites. By misusing the Internet in the workplace by 
downloading games, movies and music; it opens the network to attack and 
sucks up valuable bandwidth. 
Inappropriate use. 
Installing screensavers and games. 
Misuse of devices. 
Renaming Documents. An employee could save a job under a different name 
and e-mail it to someone that shouldn't see the information.  Even though the 
company might have monitoring software, it might not pick up something like 
this since it’s under a different name. 
Supply Chain and Partners Added to the Network. Administrators might 
access the network for a partner company and then, when the job is over, 
forget to close the access. 
Trusted networks involving business partners and others will grow as 
sources of risk. 
9. Unauthorised 
access. 
Unauthorised access to, or penetration of, corporate systems, such as 
hacking or gaining access through social engineering. 
Hackers unite. 
Hacking. 
Illegal access. 
Organized attacks by Internet desperados will increase. 
Unauthorised access. 
10. Wireless 
networks. 
Wireless systems setback 
The mobile realm will continue to grow as a Petri dish for security incidents. 
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Four risks – or causes or risk – remained after this initial sorting and needed careful 
consideration as to whether excluding any of the examples may invalidate the taxonomy. 
The four risks: ‘drive by wire accidents’, ‘cyber terrorism’, ‘unexpected attacks’, and 
‘knowledge economy fails’ had at least the common attribute that they originated in the same 
survey – ICT Banana Skins report. Although excluding them from the taxonomy for this 
reason was not acceptable – because it would question the acceptability of the consideration 
of that whole survey, it was decided that each could be justifiably excluded for its own 
deficiency without damaging the reasoning that had led to the creation of the ‘first cut’ top 
ten list. 
Table 15: Excluded risks 
Risk or cause of risk Justification for exclusion 
Drive by wire accidents A specialised technology. 
Cyber Terrorism Acts of cyberterrorism are adequately covered by ‘component 
risks’ in the rest of the taxonomy. 
Unexpected attacks Too broad a heading. Risk assessment may be regarded as 
sufficiently mature a discipline so that the ‘expected’ outweighs 
the ‘unexpected’. Many effects of the ‘Unexpected attacks’ are 
likely to be adequately covered by ‘component risks’ in the rest 
of the taxonomy. 
Knowledge economy 
fails 
Information systems are not constrained in the generation of 
information for sale alone but form part of larger business 
models. 
This collated top ten list was distributed by e-mail to an internal IT infrastructure manager 
and web hosting provision manager (responded), an IT security expert and former adviser to 
the Commonwealth Games (responded), the former IT director of an insurance company 
(responded), a visiting professor of computer security and forensics (no response), the 
technical director of a penetration testing and computer forensics company (no response), 
systems engineer for a major technology vendor (responded), anti-virus expert (no 
response), the technology adviser for a telecoms provider (responded), the technical director 
of security testing specialist (no response), two lawyers (both responded), a pan-government 
systems accreditor (no response), and the public sector programme manager from a 
government department (responded). 
The responses from the experts comprised general support for the extracted ‘draft’ list, 
comments on how the risks in the draft were prioritised, and some additional risks that they, 
or their clients had had to deal with. Most of the ‘additional’ risks were not new but rather 
fitted into one of the top ten categories. The respondents recognised this. Taking the 
comments and additional risks into account, the final list in Table 16 was established. 
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Although the respondents had not all shown which of all the risks they considered the most 
widespread, this rough order of prevalence was teased out of the correspondence: 
Table 16: ‘Delphi’ panel response 
 Risk or cause of risk 
1. Sabotage of data or systems, malicious software. 
2. Systems life cycle management, poor requirements definition, poor system design 
and inadequate testing. 
3. Unacceptable use by or through staff, contractors, partners, and former employees. 
4. Breaches in established defences, poor/changes to configuration without risk 
analysis. 
5. Governance weaknesses, lack of legal and regulatory compliance. 
6. Unauthorised access, fraud, identity theft. 
7. Loss of key resource – staff/supplier relationships. 
8. Complacency, lack of awareness or understanding of risks, or accepting too much 
risk. 
9. Inadequate resilience, poor business continuity management. 
10. Lack of professional, affordable IS/IT risk mitigation specialists to advise on and 
implement risk reduction plans. 
This collated list was then validated further by engaging with the information system user 
community represented by members of The National Computing Centre (NCC). Recognising 
that users need to engage in dialogue with vendors and that vendors are also a grouping of 
computer user, there is also a category of membership for vendors. These are both included 
in the NCC’s membership and were used as a second sounding board following the 
refinement of the list with feedback from selected stakeholders in risk management. NCC 
was providing membership services to over 700 subscribing organisations107 and the top 10 
list of risks was sent to 1135 member contacts within these organisations with a request to 
review them against the five questions shown below. Typical member contacts have job 
titles such as IT Manager, IT Director, or Head of IS. The membership base is cross-sector 
with a sectoral breakdown shown in Table 17 to illustrate the broad view of risk considered 
for this research: 
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 Survey of NCC’s membership, 2004. Membership is on an organisational basis with an annual 
subscription. 
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Table 17 NCC members by sector 
Industry %  Industry % 
Production 21.3  Government 24.0 
Transport and Communications 4.0  Health and Education 5.3 
Finance 8.0  Other Services 13.3 
Business Services 13.3  IT Suppliers 9.3 
   Other 1.5 
Although in terms of size, NCC Member organisations are predominately of medium to large 
in terms of size of the overall organisation (see Table 18), a member’s IS function itself has 
an SME service model for its size in relationship to the rest of the organisation108 and so was 
considered as an eligible sounding board for validating the opinion in the survey of surveys. 
Table 18: NCC members by IT staff number 
IT staff %  
Up to 10 28.0 
11 to 25 20.0 
26 to 50 18.7 
Over 50 30.7 
Not given 2.6 
The members were e-mailed the list which had been validated by the expert panel. The 
e-mail message included a request to consider the following five questions: 
(1) Are these risks those which concern you most? 
(2) What risks are not listed that should be? 
(3) Which of these risks – from the list or those which you have added – have been 
realised in your organisation? 
(4) Have you any other information, opinion, or experience which you would like to 
contribute? 
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 Which led to the adaptation of the Accredit UK standard (see Chapter 5) for IT Department 
Accreditation in 2009. 
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(5) What have you done to mitigate these risks – from the list or those which you have 
added? 
Members were also offered the opportunity to receive the draft paper which explained how 
the initial list was extracted from the ‘survey of surveys’ and reviewed by the panel of experts 
to derive the list that was released for the wider consultation. Several respondents requested 
the paper but did not voice any opinion in reply to the five questions. 
Responses were received from an automotive components supplier, a borough council, 3 
computer services departments from universities and management colleges, a provider of 
services into the construction industry, an information assurance consultancy, local 
government, a passenger railway franchise, a privatised government agency, a software 
developer for the financial services industry, a unitary authority, and a utilities company. 
Respondents offered broad support to the list and in some cases, showed how they would 
prioritise the list either by concern or by those risks that had been realised in their 
organisations. These results were used to inform the project brief for BSI (project Beta β) 
and the catalogue for CSIA (project Gamma γ). 
Project β was divided into two stages: planning and research. The planning stage set out the 
structure of the work to be completed during the research stage. This comprised outlining 
the background and justification to be included in the project brief, its scope and its structure. 
The objective of the project brief was to set out the background, justification, scope, and 
structure of a framework showing how standards can be used to manage risk and the 
industry benefits with the potential for complementary initiatives (such as new standards for 
risk management) to put the framework in context. The project brief covered the research 
needed to identify which standards to include and provide some quantitative information on 
the scale of guidance that would be required and the number of standards to cover. The 
brief also suggested what information the target audience would need, the content and the 
potential shelf-life of such information because technologies, methods of deployment and 
associated standards continue to change. For this point it was suggested to break the 
information required by industry down into modules, such as ‘stable’ and ‘developing’ and to 
take into consideration the frequency of any change. 
The brief detailed the methods and formats that could be used to deliver the framework, and 
the best methods of getting the information to the target audience, including the presentation 
of the information and navigation through it. As the framework was likely to be extensive – 
resembling the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (IEEE, 2004) – the brief also 
recorded how an overview of the information may be derived and how the framework could 
be supported by complementary products that can be based on, or derived from the code of 
practice. 
Another instruction in the brief was to ‘reverse engineer’ a risk register from standards and 
apply the probability of an occurrence of respective risks to temper the attention given to 
them. The resulting risk guide would assist users with different views and priorities (the 
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weltanschauung of the soft system method) to select the best practice that should be in 
place to mitigate at least the known risks in the information systems life cycle (as modelled 
by ISO/IEC 15288 System life cycle processes). The intention to develop the framework 
from the brief was superseded by the application of its overall concept in researching a 
catalogue of information assurance risk and standards which – according to my literature 
review (Chapter 2) – could mitigate those risks. This research was carried out on behalf of 
the Cabinet Office whose interest lay in reducing such risks in the public sector in particular. 
The desk research for the catalogue (γ) was applied as planned with some struggle to 
involve some of the contributing organisations. This reticence to be involved was evidenced 
in two aspects. Firstly an association of information and communication technology suppliers 
who is seen as the authoritative body representing the good proactive views of those 
organisations took a step back and offered no guidance of their own but referred to other 
sources. Secondly, two organisations that publish standards and good practice took a good 
deal of convincing that their work was only going to be referenced in the catalogue and 
would not be made freely available as a result. The benefit of exposing the existence of their 
own research and development to a potentially new fee-paying audience was not 
immediately understood and it took some dialogue before it was agreed that participation in 
this research had a potential return for both organisations. 
The core of the catalogue manifested as a series of tables. Each table covered a control 
from ISO/IEC 27001 Appendix A109. These are directly derived from, and aligned with, those 
listed in ISO/IEC 27002 (17799):2005 Clauses 5 to 15 where each control objective is 
designed to address a category of risk.110 Each control objective is categorised, in the 
catalogue, as applicable to three areas of context: people treatments, process treatments, 
and technology treatments 
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 The standard notes that the list of controls is not exhaustive and an organisation may consider 
that additional control objectives and controls are necessary. 
110
 Changes to the structure of the Catalogue would be triggered by changes to ISO/IEC 27001 
Appendix A or changes to ISO/IEC 27002 (which may take time to be reflected in ISO/IEC 
27001), or the recognition of new controls which may not be covered by the ISO/IEC 27000 
series. 
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Subclause 
of ISO/IEC 
17799 
Source/ 
identification Description/title Suitability 
7.1 Responsibility for assets 
BS ISO/IEC 19770-
1:2006  Software asset management. Processes B2 
National Computing 
Centre, Guideline 
231 
Asset Management Across The Distributed Enterprise B2 7.1.2 Ownership of 
assets 
National Computing 
Centre, Guideline 
278 
Software Asset Management B2 
 
Control objective
from ISO/IEC 27001
Control from
ISO/IEC 27001
Ranking
 
Figure 19: A sample from the catalogue tables 
In this application of the risk taxonomy of ISO/IEC 27002 (see Figure 19), a control objective 
may appear in one or more categories. Each item of published risk treatment advice is then 
assigned to the relevant controls (for each control objective) and may appear more than 
once within the catalogue, in one or more of the three areas of context – to address risks or 
the causes of risk associated with people, process, or technology respectively. The 
suitability of each piece of advice applies to the thoroughness of the advice for addressing 
the risk in the relevant context for the level of expertise needed to apply it. Hence, the same 
advice may appear in different tables with a different ranking based on the context of the 
risk. 
Because the catalogue would be subject to the risk of becoming too narrowly focused or 
carrying obsolete or at best obsolescent recommendations, the involvement of cross-sector 
researchers and practitioners was considered core to the method compiling the catalogue 
and subsequently keeping it up to date. I also noted in the report for the Cabinet Office that 
accompanied the catalogue that it is only of value if it is accessible and used. However, the 
risk of only engendering a narrow awareness of the catalogue is also mitigated by the same 
principle: engagement with organisations with the objective of promulgating IA best practice. 
This process is based on the work done to compile the first issue of the catalogue. The 
methodical process of creating the catalogue – that was recorded for the purpose of 
updating it too – follows. 
A directory of organisations active in the field of publishing IA standards and best practice 
guidance was compiled111 by reviewing standards and best practice publications (including 
websites) and noting the sources of information and the publishing bodies. The directory 
was validated by the Cabinet Office. Each organisation on the directory was contacted, 
requesting a listing of its relevant publications that may be classified as IA standards and 
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 The intention in the longer term would be to establish an ‘IA Standards and Best Practice 
Observatory’ with organisations who would commit to regular involvement. 
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best practice guidance112. This is where I asked for access to copies of the standards and 
best practice guidance for review for classification in the catalogue. Some organisations saw 
this as a threat to their income, expecting that a reference in the catalogue was part of 
Cabinet Office mandate to issue the documents free of charge beyond their membership. 
The fears of this risk were allayed in correspondence that explained that the ‘publicly 
available’ label of the catalogue referred to information that did not carry the government’s 
protective marking; it was not suggesting that it could not be distributed to a ‘restricted’ 
audience of fee payers. During the gathering of information from these sources, I also noted 
how the catalogue could be kept up to date efficiently recording the existing of updating 
services where available (which would be subject to relevant agreement of the information 
owners). These included the BSI PLUS service which, although available to BSI members 
who buy selected standards, may be negotiated for cataloguing information only, and the 
free e-mail notification of the (American) National Institute for Science and Technology 
(NIST) Special Publications (which themselves comprise a significant amount of free 
information). 
The lists of standards and best practice guidance issued by the participating organisations 
were reviewed to categorise each item in terms of its applicability for inclusion in the 
catalogue by reading with the background question of whether it addresses a risk that 
ISO/IEC 27001 sets out to control, and if so how does it do that? Is the risk controlled by 
attention to people aspects (such as educating users to counteract the human vulnerabilities 
in information systems – see Chapter 4), controlled by defining a process to follow and so 
avoid or reduce the risk, or promote a technology to ameliorate the risk. A positive response 
to this categorisation would lead to the inclusion of a document in the catalogue. It was then 
subjected to the more granular review of its suitability for mitigating the risk (assuming its 
guidance is correctly implemented) either partially or in its entirety, and the level of expertise 
expected of those implementing the instructions of the documentation. A ranking matrix for 
each item of standards and best practice guidance is shown in Table 19. The starting point 
for the classification was the information owners’ suggested ranking. 
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 In the sustained model of the regular publication of the catalogue, the request would have focused 
on the nomination of new or revised risk treatments that they publish, the validation of existing 
information in the Catalogue (either confirming its current relevance, its redesignation as 
obsolescent or obsolete), and a suggested ranking (to be taken into consideration during peer 
review). 
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Table 19: Ranking of the risk treatments in the catalogue 
 How directly applicable is the guidance to the risk 
that it could mitigate? 
A thorough 
approach 
Significant 
guidance 
Some help 
A B C 
No expertise 1 A1 B1 C1 
Some expertise 2 A2 B2 C2 
Expert knowledge needed 3 A3 B3 C3 
The format for the catalogue was established so that future editions would record changes to 
the previous edition of the catalogue in an annex to the main document. To comply with the 
intention of the catalogue being a ‘gap analysis’ for the Cabinet Office and so highlight 
opportunities to seek out (for declassification) or develop more guidance, the catalogue was 
scrutinised for controls that do not have treatments of at least B2, being the core 
classification of providing significant guidance without demanding much expertise to follow it. 
I questioned the completeness of the ISO/IEC 27002 taxonomy because of the risk of a 
taxonomy excluding useful standards and best practice that would mitigate risks that did not 
fit with it. However, all the documents that I found or were suggested to me had a place in an 
ISO/IEC 27002 taxon113. This classification was strengthened further by the agreement of 
the reviewers who carried out a peer review of the draft catalogue and only suggested a few 
additions of documents that should have been included and no change to the positioning of 
any entries in the catalogue. This compilation and review process was documented and 
repeated to issue a second version of the catalogue six months later. The second version of 
the catalogue expanded its field of reference for trawling standards and best practice. The 
work for this catalogue had been commissioned from The National Computing Centre and 
as a result, attention has focused on the information systems standards associated with 
storing and processing information and with the risks concerned with the state of the data or 
information in transit. It did not include publishers of standards that specifically covered the 
field of telecommunications amongst its target ‘observatory’ organisations. This is an 
example of the potential shortcomings in not treating risk associated with a taxonomy based 
classification (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). A view of the wider field of publications – 
telecommunications and computing – was applied for the second edition of the catalogue. 
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 This finding is further validated by a recent (2009) rearrangement of the ISO/IEC 27002 controls 
by the Dutch national standards body which does not introduce new classes into the standard’s 
taxonomy. 
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Figure 20: Creating and updating the catalogue 
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CHAPTER 4. PROJECT DELTA δ: THE RISK OF HUMAN 
VULNERABILITIES IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
4.1 This chapter in context 
ζ
LeGSB
ε
Accredit UK
Case studies
β
BSI project 
brief
γ 
CSIA
catalogue
Identifying 
risk and 
cataloguing 
standads
α 
Top 10 risks
Chapter 2: Literature Review:
Standards to mitigate risk and the propensity of people to use them
Chapter 3: Linking risk to standards
Chapter 4: The risk of human vulnerabilities in information systems
Chapter 5: Case Studies: What are organisations doing to mitigate risk?
Fieldwork: Information
security  management
in the construction (θ) and 
social housing (η) sectors,
security analysis and policy
development in finance (ι)
A view across selected parts of the standards life cycle
Finding the standards needed to mitigate the risk of human vulnerabilities δ
Literature 
review
 
Figure 21: This chapter in the context of the thesis 
In the opening chapter of this thesis I described the motivation for the research and in 
chapter 2, the literature review, explained the supporting background to the research from 
academic literature and industry reports, and the wider motivation for work based on the 
socio-political concerns that are apparent. The preceding chapter – 3 – described the desk 
research carried out to identify the risks and the standards that are to be considered by my 
core hypothesis that standards mitigate risk. The literature review of chapter 2 and the 
cataloguing work described in chapter 3 show that data and information security on 
computer networks is increasingly important to individuals seeking assurances of privacy 
and anonymity, and to governments and commerce seeking assurances of legitimacy, 
accuracy, and control, with the survey of surveys pointing towards concern over information 
system security risks caused by people. This chapter describes the part of my research that 
tested the feasibility of a survey methodology to detect who are the human vulnerabilities in 
information systems so that appropriate treatments – captured in documented standards - 
can be selected and applied to reduce the risks from these vulnerabilities to an acceptable 
level. The project was carried out with the support of the Innovation Platform of the 
Technology Strategy Board which was looking at new ways to reveal human vulnerabilities 
in information systems, and improve organisational risk cultures. 
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4.2 What is a human vulnerability? 
My study refers to a human vulnerability (in an information system or any of its component 
parts) as the vector through which a loss of any single or combination of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability may take place. This is independent of the quality of the information 
system (see 4.4 below). It also makes no assumption that the source of risk may be 
malicious or accidental. An insider threat is defined by CERT (Cappelli et al., 2009) as a 
‘current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized 
access to an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused 
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
the organization’s information or information systems’. A useful definition structure is offered 
by I3P114 which differentiates non-malicious insiders from malicious insiders where the latter 
‘is one motivated to adversely impact an organization's mission by taking action that 
compromises information confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability’. Deliberate actions – or 
violations – particularly as a result of disgruntled employees are seen as a significant vector 
(Cappelli et al., 2005). This study – in its scrutiny of both the organisation and the individual 
– takes account of the organisation’s circumstance as part of the environment that will have 
an effect on the individual’s motivation and affect the risk of disgruntled employees but 
similarly does not downplay the damage that may be done through mistakes of, say, an end-
user which are the result of poor software design. So the research described in this chapter 
considers the seriousness of the effect of the risk or loss and deliberately excludes 
considering whether it is the result of a mistake or a violation, although this is useful 
information for the detection of where a loss may occur. The research concentrates on 
detection with a view to mitigation by releasing knowledge from relevant standards. This 
may result in improved working practices in the operation of an information system of longer 
term changes in the design of systems software (see 4.4). 
4.3 Finding an acceptable level of risk 
The proposal was that wherever risk needs to be managed, that need is second to achieving 
an acceptable level of risk. Could there be a benchmarked, technology-agnostic approach of 
discovering and treating risk that could match the risk appetite in different situations and 
appreciating where – if anywhere – the common level of acceptability (Dresner and Wood, 
2007) applies? If that risk stems from human vulnerabilities, how do you identify them? If you 
can identify them, what can you do to reduce exposure and improve the risk culture? I have 
made the assumption that information security risk may be managed by strong security 
policies – as defined by standards – and that human vulnerabilities may undermine those 
policies. This agrees with the body of knowledge that was analysed for this project which 
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 The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection – a consortium of academic institutions, 
national laboratories and non-profit research organisations addressing cyber security challenges 
affecting the critical infrastructures. 
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records particularly insider threats from human vulnerabilities as bypassing information 
security controls that are defined by specific organisational information security policies. 
This chapter considers the use of information systems by ‘organisations’ which may be 
identifiable by location or some form of branding, and ‘communities’ which may, like the 
organisations, have shared goals and values. For the purpose of detecting human 
vulnerabilities, a view of where the information system is in use is needed to gain an 
understanding of where the boundaries of risk lie. As a benchmark of acceptable risk, the 
risk appetite of an organisation or – where no organisation is clearly defined – the 
community using the information system was selected. The project investigated a technique 
for placing individuals and organisations on a scale of risk with a view to identifying actions 
that would move them to their preferred position (on the scale) if change were needed with 
respect to the business impact of the risk if realised115. The following chapter – 5 – 
comprises case studies that took an empirical view of the literature review (Chapter 2), the 
cataloguing work of Chapter 3, and the appreciation of the need to account for the human 
vulnerabilities in information systems (this chapter) when implementing a security 
management system (as defined by ISO/IEC 27001) looking at how standards emerge to 
treat risk and how well information security policies – as realisation of part or parts of 
standards – are implemented as risk management controls. 
Data collection in the development of a catalogue of risk treatments (Chapter 3) shows that 
security risks in information systems are greater in number than other types of risk. This may 
be because the definition (BS 7799-2:2002) of security risks relates to a wide range of 
losses affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability (a definition of security that is 
sometimes extended to included non-repudiation of the transaction – or transformation – 
under scrutiny. Examples of the risks realised through human vulnerabilities in information 
systems include theft of customer information by a member of staff who passed it to a third 
party who used the information to conduct credit card fraud and where, before leaving 
employment, a member of staff e-mailed a list of minors’ personal details, in relation to a 
sports club, to himself (NCC, 2004). 
I was interested in finding a method that identifies the people most likely to introduce a risk, 
or who would see a risk realised in an information system. Would they know what to do to 
mitigate a risk? If they could mitigate that risk through treatment, would they recognise risk in 
time or be prepared to implement the amelioration? I propose that wherever it is that risk 
needs to be managed, that need is second to the overall need to achieve an acceptable 
level of risk, whether that be a message passing over a telecommunications network or a 
user logging onto a computer to receive that message. Elimination of all risk is impractical 
and unreasonable to expect. So, this research project was fundamentally concerned with 
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Assessment Issue No: 3.51, October 2009’ is the standard to be maintained, there is no common 
model of the effect or outcome of risk realisation. 
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finding a technology-agnostic way of discovering and treating risk that could be taken up as 
a consistently repeatable approach to matching the risk appetite in different situations and 
appreciating where – if anywhere – the common level of acceptability applies. 
4.4 Software and systems quality 
This project makes no assumptions about the quality of the software (which may be 
measured by applying the characteristics and metrics framework of the ISO/IEC 25030 
series). It is does make the assumption that there will be design flaws in the software that 
will require alert users to take countermeasures and will cause others to err through 
incompatibility between the characteristics of security and usability. These less enlightened 
users may place too much trust in the correct function of the system or rely on blame to be 
transferable to it (Flechais, Riegelsberger, Sasse 2005) at best working in an attitude of 
positive expectation that one's vulnerabilities will not be exploited (Riegelsberger, Sasse, 
and McCarthy, 2005). This work is needed because there will be active failures through both 
technical and social vulnerabilities (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes. 2003) – the realisation of 
security risk will result from slips (attention failures), lapses (memory failures), mistakes (rule 
or knowledge failures – intended actions which lead to unintended results), and violations 
(actions that intentionally breach the security of the systems). I define a security risk as the 
cause of a loss of any single or combination of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
It is important to take this work in context. The temptation to label users as ‘the weakest link’ 
(Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich 2001) should not lead to a belief that user education will be a 
panacea (Ranum, 2005). It should however be used to suggest that the portfolio of 
standards may be applied to treat the risks from the detected human vulnerabilities. These 
treatments may include user education but only from the perspective that any education will 
only be effective if users believe in the risk (Sasse, 2003), and cost effective, secure 
systems design (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes. 2003) which sets policies and targets to 
assure risk management within the context of the software in use (the policies and targets 
being the regulators of the protection of information in the system). Reworking the software 
will be desirable but is unlikely to have the speed of return that is needed – standards 
beyond those for good development practices will be required, as well as enticing the 
implementation of the good practices which are already known. 
4.5 Methodology 
It is frequently reported that the most prevalent risk to information security is the people 
involved in the development, deployment, and use of information systems116 (NCC, 2005). 
There is a challenge to find those who do not pay sufficient attention to risk and the very 
human nature of losing their sense of emotional literacy in an effort to achieve personal 
goals or just to get the job done (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). Ignoring risk may have 
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no malicious intent but it may have significant consequences well beyond the immediate 
environment of the individual. Even shocks that can trigger appropriate emotions at one time 
may be relatively short lasting. For example, would-be Liverpool football club spectators who 
wanted to break into the Champions League final against AC Milan (23 May 2007117) where 
a lack of available tickets had lead to their exclusion from the ground. The emotions 
governing their desire to see the game overcame their appreciation of what had happened at 
a match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest when 96 people died after supporters 
tried to enter an already overcrowded stadium (15 April 1989118). The challenge is to 
maintain an awareness of the risks to many when individuals distance themselves from the 
consequences of their actions. Information systems not only need to provide opportunity to 
share and transform information they also need to remind users of the outcomes of their 
actions of using the system. For example, what consideration do people give to the 
consequences of publishing holiday photographs or personal information on a ‘Web 2.0’ 
social network (House of Lords, 2007) and how much thought does a user give to continuing 
e-mail correspondence using the ‘Reply-to-All’ function? At the other extreme, how many are 
prevented from making decisions or taking actions which would be unlikely to lead to a risk 
being realised? There is a tendency for overcompensating day-to-day; to be become 
obsessed with the high impact, low probability risk. For a comprehensive approach, 
sensitivity to the weltanschauung of the stakeholder is required as it has been observed: risk 
is in the eye of the beholder. This spectrum of ‘risk attitude’ is shown in the diagram by 
David Hillson and Ruth Murray-Webster (Figure 22). 
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Figure 22: The risk attitude spectrum (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007) 
I considered the general concept of risk from the two aspects of how risks may be 
categorised and whether there was a model that described how one might react to risks 
which determined how acceptable (that is, the level of acceptability) a risk, or a group of 
risks, may be? Risk acceptance, the decision to accept a risk, depends on risk criteria (PD 
ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002). No differentiation was made between risk and the causes of risk. I 
considered the general concept of risk according to two aspects: how risks may be 
categorised, and a model that describes how the reaction to risk determines how acceptable 
a risk, or a group of risks, may be. The decision to accept a risk depends on risk criteria. The 
categorisation of risk was based on CMU SEI’s taxonomy (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003), which 
describes risks as having one of three characteristics: known risks that are well understood 
and will surface time after time in a risk assessment; unknown risks that did not make it 
into the risk register because the assessment did not call on the right kind of expertise; and 
unknowable risks that could not have been reasonably predicted even with a wide enough 
representation from the contemporary knowledge base. These characteristics may be 
represented in a quadrant (Figure 23) to show the direction risk assessment should take to 
dredge up as many risks as honest governance drives119 120. For example, the risks of 
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 Initially being concerned with capturing any risk without considering likelihood or impact - 
quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. I use the term ‘honest’ to suggest a degree of risk 
literacy where risks – however distracting – are not ignored to get the desired result from a risk 
assessment. 
120
 For example, the risks of placing transient content onto social networking websites 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6929161.stm, 03 August 2007) may result in advertisements 
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placing transient content onto websites may result in advertisements (for example) 
appearing with other material with which the advertisers do not want to be associated. 
Assessing such risk calls for the knowledge of the content owners that such a technology is 
available and could be used and for them to define what is acceptable to them and to the 
website designers and programmers to recognise where constraints can or cannot be made. 
It may be an instance where a risk is accepted or the facility rejected on account of the risk. 
An extrapolation of this example is the lack of control afforded to an advertiser placing 
adverts on a social networking site and the freedom of users to define content outside the 
close control of the website121. 
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Figure 23: Risk criteria 
I looked at how the prevalence of a type of risk may be considered during an assessment of 
an appetite for risk and suggested that the link between the type of risk and its acceptability 
is the trust engendered by how well that risk is treated. That is to say that there is no 
requirement to go to the extremes of being complacent about the risk or calling a halt to any 
activity which may be affected by the realisation of that risk; some pragmatic, affordable 
precautions can usually be taken. The risk is recognised but so is a treatment that has a 
reasonable risk of successfully treating it. Risk treatment is the application of one or more 
                                                                                                                                                      
appearing with other material with which the advertisers do not want to be associated. Assessing 
such risk calls for the knowledge of the content owners to define what is acceptable to them and to 
the website designers and programmers to recognise where constraints can or cannot be made. It 
may be an instance where a risk is accepted or the facility rejected on account of the risk. 
121
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6929161.stm, 08 August 2007 
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risk countermeasures that reduce that risk to an acceptable level. These may include 
prevention (to stop the realisation of the risk), reduction (to reduce the effect when it occurs), 
transference (make the treatment someone else’s problem – for example, outsourcing), and 
contingency (where you must be ready to do something if it happens). Acceptance is 
reached when you decide that you have done enough so that you can live with the residual 
risk. Observing that the risk countermeasures could be described separately in this way, I 
mimicked the layer models of telecommunications and information technology networks 
(Figure 24 and Figure 25) that identify how two communicating entities may transfer 
information and created a tiered model of risk acceptability that may show where two entities 
who want to work together without risk contagion can do so with some confidence. My model 
for the reaction of risk and its level of acceptability is the balance of risk appetite 
(represented by the controls within an organisation or community) and the risk attitude of the 
individuals – how much, and in what way do they feel responsible for protecting the 
information they deal with. 
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Figure 24: Communications models 
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Figure 25: Creating a zone of common acceptance using standards to treat risks 
This is an extension of the Taxonomy-Based Risk Identification archetype and it also builds 
on a tripartite model of core (or fixed) risks, interactive risk, and emergent risk. Core or fixed 
risks, as with the SEI model, are the known risks which are those that one or more 
personnel are aware of – if not explicitly – as risks, at least as concerns. For the individual, 
these are from your weltanschauung. For example, if you are interested in 
telecommunications then you are focused on telecoms risks; if you are not, then you are 
lacking in your profession122. Professional knowledge of the risks in information technology 
may, for example, raise the potential problems related to the integrity of data input. When 
core or fixed risks are dredged up, stakeholders are siloed and are likely to have a degree of 
confidence that complexity can be managed because there are more 1:1 risks and 
treatments relationships. Clearer treatment should lead to trust. 
Interactive risks are similar to the unknown risks of the SEI model. They are those risks that 
would surface (that is, become known) if personnel were given the right opportunity, cues, 
and information. These are less likely than core or fixed risks. They are predicted by the co-
operation of different disciplines. For example, will technology affect the process it is meant 
to ease? Or by allowing for both the physical and environmental considerations for IT, 
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 The first draft of the Catalogue of Publicly Available Information Assurance Guidance (Project γ; 
Chapter 3) was criticised for being too focused on Information Technology at the expense of 
guidance pertaining to telecommunications. The response to this criticism was to include 
telecommunications standards in the revised catalogue but to justify its predecessor on the basis 
that it had been commissioned knowingly from The National Computing Centre and so an ‘IT bias’ 
was to be expected. 
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stakeholders are together but working with less confidence because of the increased 
complexity. Known unknowns are registered when the right disciplines come together. 
Unknown knowns remain uncovered by not including a wide enough set of expertise. There 
are more many-to-many risks and treatment relationships. Trust depends on the complexity 
of risks and treatments that need to be put in place. 
The third type of risk is the emergent risk that is equivalent to SEI’s unknowable risks. These 
are the risks that, even in principle, none could foresee. Hence these risks – the 
management of which are potentially critical to success – are beyond the prediction of any 
risk identification method. Their unpredictability may be the result of the interaction between 
several ‘core or fixed’ risks and/or ‘interactive risks’. That is, this may not be the result of 
something new but rather combinations of ‘known’ risks. Similarly these may result from the 
unplanned effects of risk treatments or a combination of risk treatments. 
Consideration of the prevalence of a type of risk during an assessment of risk appetite 
brings out a link between the type of risk and its acceptability in the trust engendered by how 
well that risk is treated. 
The objective of this research was to determine whether the attitudes of individuals to risk 
may be usefully correlated to the acceptable level of risk that is expected by the ‘risk culture’ 
in which they work. Knowing this to be true, and how so, is a foundation for understanding 
what training, improved awareness, or other mechanisms (namely applying standards as 
regulators (Beer, 1993) or controls) are needed for changes in risk culture or to maintain a 
current, appropriate risk culture. This was to be tested by creating a scale of measurement 
for attitudes to risk. A questionnaire was constructed to determine where on the scale a user 
should be placed and whether they sit within, or outside, the attitude that is acceptable to the 
owner of the network. The creation and refinement of the questionnaire and the evaluation of 
the responses determines the application of the method as a practical tool to evaluate the 
appropriateness of implemented policies (or standards) for risk management in information 
systems. The feasibility study was organised into 8 stages: 
Table 20: Research stages for the human vulnerabilities detection methodology 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
1 
Acquisition of 
data 
Acquire a database of risk and treatment 
as a body of knowledge from which to 
derive bona fida experience of risk and loss 
from exposure to human vulnerabilities. 
Body of knowledge 
about risk and 
treatment on which to 
base the 
questionnaire. 
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Table 20: Research stages for the human vulnerabilities detection methodology 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
2 
Questionnaire 
design 
Analyse the database to create a way of 
gauging user reactions to risks and 
treatments. The levelled answers would 
build up a picture of the users’ sensitivity to  
risk and loss in information systems. 
Questionnaire for 
structured user 
engagement and on-
line to measure 
attitude to risk relative 
to the organisational 
culture. 
3 
Design 
analysis 
method 
Use the NCC Survey of the ‘Top Ten IS/IT 
Risks’ to design the outline ranking scale 
that could indicate the measures of human 
vulnerability within information systems. 
Ranking scale with 
which responses will 
be analysed. 
4 
User 
engagement 
Deploy the questionnaire (Figure 27) with a 
sample of ‘network’ (system) stakeholders 
around the UK, from the wide membership 
of The National Computing Centre. 
Completed user 
questionnaires. 
5 
Collate the 
results 
Collate results to create a body of 
knowledge to test the premise that the level 
of risk culture can be detected and 
improved if necessary, and that ‘weak links’ 
may be identified for tailored attention. 
Collated results ready 
for analysis. 
6 
Evaluate the 
results 
Compare the results with the ranking scale 
developed during stage 3. Look for 
patterns to inject the necessary controls, 
training, or awareness campaigns, check 
the effectiveness of the campaigns, and 
take remedial action for further 
improvement. 
Algorithm or formula 
which would show the 
relative risk that users 
pose. 
7 
Design a tool 
to identify 
Human 
Vulnerabilities 
Use the evaluation and the knowledge to 
design a sustainable tool. 
High level programme 
and tool design 
specification. 
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Table 20: Research stages for the human vulnerabilities detection methodology 
Stag
e
 
Activity Description Stage Deliverable(s) 
8 
Develop 
feasibility 
report 
Prepare and deliver a report describing the 
findings of the research and confirming the 
feasibility of the developing tool. 
Feasibility study 
report. 
4.6 Application 
4.6.1 Acquisition of data 
The acquisition of data comprised assessing a corpus of security (Appendix A) research that 
connected realised risk to human vulnerabilities responsible for the loss, engineering 
questionnaires based on the experience recorded therein, and then using the questionnaires 
in interviews with the objective of validating a way to predict likely human vulnerabilities 
using the vectors recorded in that body of research. The literature considered the context in 
which people use information systems over networks which are expected to be secure and 
the recording of vulnerabilities caused by ignorance and deliberate acts123. 
To determine how to detect human vulnerabilities, this special literature survey – carried out 
in addition to the review described in Chapter 2 – was focused on the security 
expectations/context in which people use networked information systems. The literature was 
reviewed with the questions from Table 21 in mind. 
Table 21: Project γ literature review 
1 Is there a classification/taxonomy of human vulnerabilities? 
2 What are the achievable aspirations for the method of detection? 
3 Is it reasonable to look for vulnerabilities caused by (say) ignorance? 
4 How can deliberate acts be predicted? 
The collected research showed certain recurring characteristics in incidents that resulted 
from human vulnerabilities, particularly those branded by the label of ‘insider threat’.  
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 This relates to a Royal Holloway University of London (RHUL) psychology research project and 
may be an opportunity for some future collaboration. The RHUL Information Security Group 
programme is designed to investigate the human factor in online security threats. The investigation 
looks at Internet users' vulnerability to fraudulent schemes, viruses and hacking, as well helping to 
stop so much of the information theft that could so easily be avoided with the right knowledge. 
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In deliberation of the way that (say) a user may be ‘marked down’ as a risk because of their 
access to highly sensitive information, I sought to create a balance using ‘normalising’ 
factors. A ‘happy’ employee should not be branded as a risk by the questionnaire unless it 
points to (say) a significant likelihood of some accidental realisation of a risk with significant 
impact. Referring to the corpus (Appendix A) I selected ‘risk vectors’ to test for including the 
type of employment contract (for example, full or part time, contractors, partners, 
consultants, ‘Temps’, and even former employees) and the likelihood of layoff. Consideration 
was given to being in a high risk group124 including any intrinsic risk in their role/position – 
particularly any paths to do bad things; how much is open to them? For example the threat 
from ‘critical information technology insiders’ (Shaw, Ruby and. Post, 1998) such as 
computer professionals may be broken down into characteristics of: computer dependency, 
ethical ‘flexibility’, reduced loyalty, entitlement, and a lack of empathy125. Excluded from the 
feasibility study – to enable a pragmatic limitation on the information to be analysed - but 
noted for future consideration were length of service and the greater psychological or 
temporal components including latent risk (related to the activity supported by the 
information system), the propensity to risk, and the variation in how people will behave. 
Understanding who is a ‘human vulnerability’ may be important for the organisation as an 
entity. However, if the investigation and the application of the results are applied with 
insensitivity, then the effects on morale could be devastating. The importance of 
understanding that security awareness must form part of the induction to any information 
network community (which suggests that this technique may be applied to measure what 
needs to be done and suggest appropriate awareness measures to support the desired risk 
culture126) was also noted. For example, allowing access to facilities that are not only 
unrequired but also dangerous suggests an abrogation of responsibility127. 
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 For example, 86% of breaches caused by insiders were from holders of technical positions. 
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 Empathy is one of the five attributes of information system service provision established by The 
National Computing Centre’s benchmarking special interest group [1996]. The five attributes are: 
Empathy – How caring and individualised is the attention from the IT practitioner?; Responsiveness 
– Does the IT practitioner provide a helpful, prompt service?; Reliability – Is the service from the IT 
practitioner reliable and accurate?; Assurance – Does the knowledge and courtesy of the IT 
practitioner staff instill customers with trust and confidence?; and, Tangibility – How do customers 
perceive the communications, appearance of IT equipment, related materials and the IT 
practitioner’s competence and professionalism? (Grafton, Bytheway, and Edwards, 1997) 
126
 I have recently applied the techniques in this chapter to assess the ‘before’ and ‘after’ status of 
delegates at information security awareness briefings. The results show the efficacy of the 
technique with an increase in the appreciation of the risks and the attention that users must pay to 
them in order to avoid them or reduce their impact. 
127
 cf. Manufacturing cars that can travel at twice the highest legal speed limit! IT requirements 
elicitation studies may benefit from understanding why developers allow or include a feature just 
because it can be done. 
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A key ‘rule’ of the method was to recognise that ‘opportunity makes a thief’128. This was built 
into the questioning as a ‘cold’ policy to mean that anyone – absolutely anyone – who can 
access an information system will be tarred with some element of risk as to the damage they 
can do, or may be cajoled into doing. No intended character judgement is made – security is 
regulated by controls (BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005). Although ‘trust is not a 
control’129 it will still be the basis for a final decision as to whether the security culture is 
balanced with the sociotechnical controls that manifest in security policies. Reliance on trust 
is dependent on ensuring that the security policy is neither excessive nor unfair with that 
trust being regulated by avoiding punishment and benefiting from reward (Flechais, 
Riegelsberger, Sasse 2005). The approach to promoting the security culture varies with the 
extent to which the organisation must go to make the recognised security practices that are 
encapsulated in standards part of its modus operandii. The activities around this promotion 
will be governed by the organisation’s idiosyncrasies (Figure 11). 
The formulation of the initial questions considered the granularity of the component vectors 
(and the completeness of the set of vectors) and derived the scoring mechanism to take into 
account competing/conflicting vectors so that being ‘tarred’ with one risk vector may allow 
you to recoup ground if not ‘tarred’ with another. That is, I recognised how the 
interdependencies of risk combine to increase the potential impact. The impact definitions of 
data type\from NIST SP 800-60 [2004] and the GIPSI130 catalogue/table were considered for 
this. For example, does the target of the evaluation have access to trade secrets, human 
resource information, or significant financial information? However, a balance was sought 
using ‘normalising’ factors. A ‘happy’ employee should not be branded with a risk label from 
the questionnaire unless the answers point to (say) the likelihood of some accidental 
realisation of risk.  
Much useful information and points of focus were extrapolated from the research literature 
associating realised risks with those responsible. For example, is an information system user 
disgruntled with the network owners or perhaps the network itself? And does the user have 
good potential to deliver the work required but is a risk because of poor supervision? 
Vulnerability vectors were isolated from the literature, working on the assumption that the 
more vectors examined, the greater predictive accuracy the method would have. A selection 
of vectors was compiled into questions for the one-to-one interviews and (in less detail) for 
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 Francis Bacon 
129
 Gerry O’Neill, former head of information security risk for Barclays Bank plc and Emeritus Chief 
Executive Officer of the Institute of Information Security Professionals 
130
 General Information Assurance Products and Services Initiative (GIPSI). These became the 
Business Impact Tables of HMG IA Standard No. 1, Technical Risk Assessment, jointly published 
by CESG (The National Technical Authority for Information Assurance) and the Cabinet Office. 
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the on-line ‘rapid’ survey131. The method was challenged not to become a vulnerability itself 
by promoting the overall balance between organisational and individual attitudes and 
appetites for risk that may hide the detail of a specific risk vector. This can be seen by the 
clusters of similar, overall results from this study’s aggregated results from very different 
component scores (Figure 30). Part of the challenge in extracting a sensible set of risk 
vectors was a focus of the body of research on deliberate acts132. The papers were 
scrutinised to identify risks realised through non-deliberate action too as a balance. 
Vulnerability vectors included a categorisation of the type of person interacting with the 
information system, the availability to that person of a path to realise a risk (such as access 
to confidential information or the ability to damage required operating capacity of a network), 
and the attitude to risk of the individual. These may include (for example), threat-pair 
vulnerabilities (as defined in Stoneburner, Goguen, and Feringa 2002, Table 3-2) or potential 
disgruntlement at not being allowed (say) to use company equipment for personal 
downloads. 
The method was designed to complement the technical and quasi-technical 
countermeasures deployed for use against well known outsider threats such as hackers or 
the malicious software of criminal programmers. Technical measures would include intrusion 
detection and prevention systems, antivirus or spyware detection and removal programs and 
firewalls (both hardware and software). Quasi-technical measures comprise a technical 
implementation which may, for example, use technology to distract a criminal from gaining 
inappropriate access to a computer network such a honeypot which may imitate a legitimate 
network or part of a network with otherwise redundant information stored thereon. The 
common characteristics were isolated and are represented by the formula in Figure 26 which 
is explained below: 
Vulnerability = Environmental circumstances + Personal circumstance + Path(s) 
+ ICT literacy + Risk literacy + Emotional literacy 
Where 
Risk Literacy = Knowledge of risk + Knowledge of treatment 
+ Willingness to deploy treatment 
Figure 26: Calculating the depth of a human vulnerability in an information system 
                                                                                                                                                      
131
 A rapid survey is a web-based questionnaire methodology used by the National Computing 
Centre. Each survey is developed by a team comprising a market analyst, web developer and 
marketing representatives, and subject matter expert. The on-line survey was used to complement 
the in-depth interviews because of the quality of information gathered in previous on-line surveys – 
in particular Risk Management in IT (2003) and The Security and Information Risk Survey (2007). 
132
 For example, the vulnerability markers identified by Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, 2005. 
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The context in which a type of person or organisational role is assessed for being a human 
vulnerability has the two aspects of environmental circumstances of where they use 
information systems (often a workplace), and a set of personal circumstances or profile. The 
environmental circumstances were considered in the questions (and the rules designed to 
evaluate the results) by taking into account the environment and context in which an 
individual is operating. The method recognises that where a user engages with a network, 
the context of use will depend on the profile of the user in terms of their ICT skills, the tasks 
that the user expects, or is expected, to achieve133, the equipment such as hardware or 
software that gives the user access, the physical and social environments in which 
engagement takes place, and the stability of the organisation in terms of its existence or 
propensity for change. 
4.6.2 Questionnaire design 
The challenge of the questionnaire was to make it practical to use whilst covering a broad 
enough range of risks and risk treatments to be meaningful. There was also a challenge to 
restrain any bias in the questions by leading the interviewees or survey respondents to give 
an answer that they felt was the one that was wanted rather than the reflection of risk 
appetite or attitude no matter how inappropriate to circumstance.  
To effect this independence, the questions were formulated without referring directly to the 
subject areas, covering the undisclosed topics of authentication, authorisation, availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and trust. Anecdotal feedback from NCC 
workshops134 in information security management suggested that security induces more 
cognition and comprehension when it is presented as its three components of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability – particularly the latter where it can be positioned as an enabler 
rather than a constraint. The attitudes to examples of these components were used to test 
directly the individual attitudes to risk in the questions (see Table 22). 
A two-part questionnaire was compiled as a prototype of what an on-line analysis of risk 
appetite and attitude might comprise. Questions were divided into ‘Measuring 
organisational/community appetite’, and ‘Testing personal attitude to risk’. These were 
reduced to two questions (with subparts) for the on-line survey to ensure that it could be 
completed quickly. 
                                                                                                                                                      
133
 For example, appropriate risk taking for a private individual accessing personal e-mail with a 
mobile device is not likely to be appropriate for another user engaging with a network managing a 
safety-critical SCADA system. However, common areas that would secure the use of both would 
appear in the attitude tests for all users. 
134
 Including 3 October 2002, 8 February 2005, 22 March 2006 and 6 June 2007. The first three 
dates were open workshops; the fourth date was a private activity for one of the interviewees of this 
feasibility project 
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There were two types of question in these two categories: contextual questions to put a set 
of the responses into perspective, and questions where responses can be scored to give a 
comparative basis for the evaluation of the questions on risk appetite (the organisation or 
community) or risk attitude (the individuals). In the on-line survey, questions about the 
organisations’ risk appetites were designed to have single answers rather than the two-part 
questions of the in-depth interviews135. 
To understand the organisational (or community) appetite for risk, the following contextual 
question was asked in the interviews to see if knowledge of the individual made a difference 
in corporate decision making. If you had a staff member who you knew to have 
experienced/is experiencing the following, would you alter how they were managed? (For 
example, restrict access capabilities, or monitor their use of the network more closely.) With 
the examples being staff who had ‘Missed a promotion, salary rise, project, or opportunity of 
interest’, ‘Is/has been a candidate for redundancy’, and ‘Is “stable” in his/her personal life’ 
This created a bridgehead between the organisational appetite and individual attitude. 
To enhance the understanding of the organisation in relation to its experience of information 
security, the questionnaire asked other contextual information in the interviews: 
• Has your organisation experienced an information/information system security 
breach in the last 12 to 18 months? (Yes/No) 
• If an information security breach was experienced, was it malware infection, staff 
misuse, attacks or hacks into unauthorised areas, theft or fraud involving computers, 
systems failure or data corruption? 
The answers to these questions were of particular interest as a test to an underlying 
assumption that a high proportion of organisations would have had risks realised as security 
breaches (DTI/Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2006). An organisation which reported itself to be 
free of security breaches was probably not sufficiently aware of its situation or wanted to 
deliberately withhold information for fear of embarrassment. One organisation turned down 
the request to take part in the interviews for fear of the latter. 
An additional question was added for the end of the interviews to investigate if the 
organisation’s perception of risk to its information systems increased or decreased as a 
result of the security incidents discussed during the interview and those which had been 
prevalent in the news at the time136. Interviewees were asked if their awareness of risk 
                                                                                                                                                      
135
 For example, the in-depth interview would ask about the content of a policy and then consider the 
quality of that policy’s implementation. An interviewee could record the existence of a policy and 
the effectiveness of its implementation. The rapid survey would record the content of the policy and 
its effectiveness would be implied by detail in the option selected. 
136
 Such as a building society being fined £980,000 for a laptop theft,  the ‘hacking’ of TKJ (TK Maxx) 
and the theft of 45 million credit card records, or the result of storms in the UK (January ‘07) which 
led to deaths and travel disruption? (It was with a certain sense of irony that this prototyping of the 
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increased, decreased, or had not changed. A fourth option, ‘Time to reconsider our 
exposure’ was allowed too. 
Two opportunities were given to interviewees to answer the scored questions: each 
interviewee was asked how they thought the analysed member of staff would feel if certain 
risks, and their effect on the organisation, were realised (Table 22) with the responses 
tabulated (Table 23). If the respondent could not answer for an individual but could talk 
generally about staff, the same set of questions was asked in that context137. The interviewer 
was recommended to consider asking these too if time allowed after answering the 
questions about a specific individual.138 
Perhaps the most significant component of the questioning was not related directly to the 
quality of an organisation’s security policies (perceived or thoroughly implemented). The 
method built on other methods such as the historical survey (DTI/Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2006) or preparing a semi-predictive state of readiness to handle information 
securely139. This component is the approach to risk that an individual may take when faced 
with a particular problem. For example, how likely is a user to e-mail confidential information 
to the wrong person? Would they rely on the corporate back-ups or proliferate uncontrolled 
information that is stored ‘just in case’? The examples considered are shown in Table 22 
and the response set for analysis is shown in Table 23. 
                                                                                                                                                      
method took place during the July floods of 2007 which presented the realisation of a major risk to 
information systems whose data centres were inundated.) 
137
 With the same scoring template applied to the responses. 
138
 Time did not allow for this but one of the interviewees who completed the questions directly onto 
the interview sheets included answers for both. 
139
 Such as HMG Infosec Standards 1, 2, and 6, and BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005. 
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Table 22: Questions of attitude 
Example of a security issue: Component of 
security at risk: 
Confidential e-mail might be sent to the wrong person/people Confidentiality 
IT equipment is exposed to coffee spills, knocks and drops. Availability 
Data typed in on one day cannot be easily restored from a back up if 
lost. 
Integrity 
Security awareness suggests that measures are common sense 
measures and don’t need to be mandated. 
Trust  
Cables may be unplugged and moved and new cables plugged in to 
get on with work quickly. 
Availability 
Pen drives (USB sticks) are convenient, efficient and made secure 
by their removability. 
Confidentiality 
Legal documents are better provided in hard copy because the legal 
admissibility of e-mail is doubtful. 
Non-repudiation 
Our organisation gives access to all the IT equipment and files that 
you need. 
Authorisation  
Users may share logon details if it helps job-sharing or simplifies 
processes for the organisation. 
Authentication  
A tested plan minimises the impact of a serious incident, e.g. a fire, 
storms, loss of key staff. 
Availability 
Information about our customers can be shared with our partners 
and contractors. 
Trust  
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With the following options for responses: 
Table 23: Attitudes to risk 
Attitude Interpretation 
Threatened ‘Here’s a risk that the user ought to keep an eye open for.’ That is, feeling 
threatened can be positive; it encourages awareness. It should not, 
however, be an inhibitor to efficiency. 
Unfamiliar If they don’t know about it they won’t take any deliberate action to reduce 
the risk. 
Uncommitted They know about the risk but don’t think about it. Perhaps they feel it’s not 
their problem. 
Comfortable They know about the risk but make a deliberate decision to accept it 
without treatment on their part140. 
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 Which may be a reasonable response for those with adequate trust in their environment’s 
information security management system. 
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4.6.3 Analysis method 
Each response to a question had a numerical score associated with it – a value that 
represents the risk that that vector exposes the information system to. These scores are 
shown below in Table 24 and Table 26 with reasoning for the scores in particular cells 
explained as footnotes. The higher the score allocated, the higher the perceived risk. For 
example, it was deemed riskier to have no policy for the use of personal ICT than to have a 
documented policy restricting its use. The judgements on what may or may not be the better 
practice were based on the catalogue of recommended risk treatments in BS ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005. A response to a question describes the quality of risk 
treatment in the organisation. Each reply is given an initial score ranging from 0 
(representing no significant risk) to 3 (representing the most significant risk). That initial 
score is adjusted according to the quality of the countermeasure in place to treat the risk. It 
is increased if the countermeasure does not meet the expectations of BS ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005. It is then weighted for significance according to the ranking of 
the ‘Top 10 IS/IT Risks’ (NCC, 2005). The scores are based on the assumptions that having 
a good, documented policy is a risk treatment and so protects the organisation from risk; a 
maturing information security management system (ISMS) suggests less risk than an 
organisation in and an ‘Initial’ or ‘Ad hoc’ state of maturity (Crosby, 1979); a higher score 
indicates less control of risk and hence a greater appetite for known risk (assumed from the 
greater exposure they leave themselves open to). In this model, appetite for risk may be 
involuntary because it is measured not on perception or feeling but rather evidence that 
acceptable risk controls are in place – a low score suggest that the organisation has 
deliberately or coincidentally implemented significant controls from BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
BS 7799-1:2005 – and as a result has satisfied a lesser appetite for known risk. 
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Table 24: Application of scores to answers 
about their organisations/communities 
Topic 
 
Contribution to appetite 
Tested 
statement or 
question 
Responses141 
 
Classified
 by
 T
op
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r
 
A
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nting
 fo
r
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e
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op
 10
 ra
nking
 
facto
r
 
 
A: This is the risk 
‘value’ or ‘factor’142 
B:143 Information security management 
maturity 
(How established is the policy in the 
organisation?) 
Y
es
 
S
o
m
etim
es
 
N
o
 
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
,
 
co
m
m
u
nicated
 
a
nd
 a
udited
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
 b
ut
 
n
ot
 follo
w
ed
 up
 
Im
plied
 
N
o
 p
olicy
 
O
rga
nisatio
nal
 co
nte
xt/
 
E
n
viro
n
m
e
ntal
 circu
m
sta
nce
 
N/A
 
A 
The organisation 
is undergoing, 
likely to undergo, 
or may be 
rumoured to be 
undergoing 
some merger or 
acquisition or 
internal 
reorganisation. 
3 2 0 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
O
rga
nisatio
nal
 co
nte
xt/
 
E
n
viro
n
m
e
ntal
 circu
m
sta
nce
 
6 B*18 
Information risk 
is regularly 
addressed144 in 
projects, 
operations/IT 
service delivery, 
and at board 
level. 
1 2 3 2 A/4 A/3 A/2 A 
                                                                                                                                                      
141
 Scores are awarded/ranked according how the answers fall into the top 10 categories. For 
example, if staff may change their PC configurations, risk 3 is exposed. 
The organisation's attitude to risk is apparent by the 'Hardness' of their Policy Set. 
142
 Does the organisation/community take the approach of ‘laissez faire’ or lock down? 
143
 ‘B’ is the risk ‘value’ or ‘factor’ ‘A’ adjusted for ISMS maturity 
144
 'addressed' means that there is some form of risk assessment and an implemented plan to treat 
the risks that are not acceptable to the organisation. 
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Table 24: Application of scores to answers 
about their organisations/communities 
Topic 
 
Contribution to appetite 
Tested 
statement or 
question 
Responses141 
 
Classified
 by
 T
op
 10
 n
um
be
r
 
A
cco
u
nting
 fo
r
 th
e
 T
op
 10
 ra
nking
 
facto
r
 
 
A: This is the risk 
‘value’ or ‘factor’142 
B:143 Information security management 
maturity 
(How established is the policy in the 
organisation?) 
Y
es
 
S
o
m
etim
es
 
N
o
 
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
,
 
co
m
m
u
nicated
 
a
nd
 a
udited
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
 b
ut
 
n
ot
 follo
w
ed
 up
 
Im
plied
 
N
o
 p
olicy
 
P
ath
 
3 B*23 
Staff may use 
their own IT 
equipment for 
business use 
(PCs, 
telephones, 
PDAs, USB 
sticks/pen 
drives) 
3 
3
145
 
1 2 
A*4 A*4 A*4 
A*4 
146
 
147
 
A*4 A/3 A/2 A 
P
ath
,
 m
otive
,
 syste
m
 role
 
1 B*28 
Staff are 
screened for 
background, 
qualifications, 
during selection 
and during 
changes of 
employment and 
their access to 
information 
tailored 
accordingly.148 
1 2 3 2 A/4 A/3 A/2 A 
                                                                                                                                                      
145
 Because any usage is a risk 
146
 It won’t matter if there is no policy because it’s a bad thing; will some infer better practice? (A 
positive risk.) 
147
 A bad policy that can’t be scored less just because it’s documented. 
148
 Does the interviewee know that there's a British Standard for screening staff (BS7858:2006)? 
What if an animal rights campaigner works for a furniture company? Not a significant issue but if 
that company made lab equipment…? 
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Table 24: Application of scores to answers 
about their organisations/communities 
Topic 
 
Contribution to appetite 
Tested 
statement or 
question 
Responses141 
 
Classified
 by
 T
op
 10
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um
be
r
 
A
cco
u
nting
 fo
r
 th
e
 T
op
 10
 ra
nking
 
facto
r
 
 
A: This is the risk 
‘value’ or ‘factor’142 
B:143 Information security management 
maturity 
(How established is the policy in the 
organisation?) 
Y
es
 
S
o
m
etim
es
 
N
o
 
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
,
 
co
m
m
u
nicated
 
a
nd
 a
udited
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
nted
 b
ut
 
n
ot
 follo
w
ed
 up
 
Im
plied
 
N
o
 p
olicy
 
ICT/syste
m
s
 Lite
racy
 
3
149
 
B*23 
Staff have their 
work monitored 
for accuracy for 
a period until 
competency 
through 
experience is 
assured or other 
validation 
mechanism is 
deemed 
sufficient. 
1 2 3 2 A/4 A/3 A/2 A 
P
ath
,
 p
rocess
 
3 B*23 
Alterations to 
how company 
equipment is set 
up can only been 
done through 
qualified staff. 
1 2 3 2 A/4 A/3 A/2 A 
                                                                                                                                                      
What if a trusted employee had financial problems and access to company resources which could be 
sold to alleviate them? 
149
 A sound selection process is an established defence which may be undermined by not carrying 
that care through into the induction processes. 
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Table 25 introduces a measure of the caution an organisation may or may not have, to 
individuals who may have their emotional response to risk affected by corporate or personal 
circumstances and asks how – if at all – do respondents adjust their behaviour to others who 
may become vulnerabilities. 
Table 25: Adjustment of risk treatment to account for behaviour. 
M
a
nage
m
e
nt
 of
 destabilising
 activity
 
If you had a staff member who you knew to have experienced/ is experiencing the following, 
would you alter how they were managed?(for example, restrict access capabilities, monitor their 
use of the network more closely) 
 
A150 
Laissez faire or lock down? 
B151 Information security 
management maturity 
(How established is the policy in the 
organisation?) 
Y
es
 
S
o
m
etim
es
 
N
o
 
D
o
n
’t
 kn
o
w
 
D
ocu
m
e
nted
,
 
co
m
m
u
nicated
 
a
nd
 a
udited
 
D
ocu
m
e
nted
 
b
ut
 n
ot
 
follo
w
ed
 up
 
Im
plied
 
N
o
 p
olicy
 
Missed a 
promotion, 
salary rise, 
project or 
opportunity of 
interest? 
        
Is/has been a 
candidate for 
redundancy? 
        
Is your staff 
member’s 
personal life 
‘stable’ 
        
With the methodology set to measure the organisation’s risk environment, the second axis of 
the evaluation was designed to test the personal attitude of an individual to risk. For 
administrative purposes, the affiliation of the people associated with breaches in an 
organisation could be identified by organisation and subject identifier so this traceability was 
removed at the earliest part of the processing to assure confidentiality. 
                                                                                                                                                      
150
 This the risk ‘value’ or ‘factor’ 
151
 This the risk ‘value’ or ‘factor’ adjusted for ISMS maturity 
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The types of security issues experienced by the organisation was questioned but 
respondents were asked to limit their experiences to a 12 to 18 month period which would 
increase the likelihood of more accurate remembrance and keep all interviewees talking 
about the same time period to suggest a similar potential exposure to the prevalent risks. 
This was in keeping with the Top 10 IS/IT Risks survey (Chapter 3) which was used for 
weighting responses. This survey gave a heavier weighting to risks that had been 
experienced directly over risks which were of concern because of the reports of others.  
Having established the context of the information system in use, the questions focus on 
profiling the individual using attributes of those individuals recorded in the literature as to 
whether they have a greater or lesser propensity for being the source of a realised risk. 
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Table 26: Analysis of an individual 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
nts
 of
 risk
 
Situations are scored according to the exposure or likely vulnerability 
recorded. This is derived from research literature (for example, more 
paths, more technical expertise is where insider/human 
threats/vulnerabilities are realised). 
Y
es
 
S
o
m
etim
es/p
a
rtially
 
N
o
 
D
o
n
’t
 k
n
o
w
 
 
(K
n
o
w
ledg
e
 g
ap)
 
P
ath/
 opp
o
rtu
nity
 to
 bypass
 path
152
 
Would you rate your staff member’s ICT technical skills as high? 3 2 0 1 
Does your staff member have day-to-day access to sensitive/confidential 
information? 
3 2 0 1 
Is your staff member able to affect the integrity of information? 3 2 0 1 
Can your staff member affect availability of information assets to others?     
Hardware? 3 2 0 1 
Operating system(s)? 3 2 0 1 
Application(s)? 3 2 0 1 
Data(s)? 3 2 0 1 
Attach
m
e
nt
 to
 o
rga
nisatio
n
 
Is your staff member a shareholder? 1  3 2 
Is your staff member a full/part-time employee? 1  3 2 
Is your staff member a contractor, partner, temporary staff? 3  1 2 
Does your staff member receive pension fund contributions or other 
significant benefits from the organisation? 
1 2 3 2 
Are you describing a former employee? 3  0  
C
o
m
plia
nce
 
Has your staff member been involved with any non-compliances with 
organisational processes raised by internal audit? 
3 2 1 2 
Is your staff member familiar with your ‘Data Protection Act’ responsibilities? 1 2 3 2 
Can you be totally sure that all the software your staff member uses has 
corresponding licences?  
1 2 3 2 
K
n
o
wledge
 
If you don’t know the answers to the above, why don’t you know?153 
The aim – and resulting complexity in the analysis – is the adjustment for policies where 
these policies are known (and whether they are implemented). For example USB sticks may 
not be a threat because there are no working ‘ports’ to connect them to, or because the data 
                                                                                                                                                      
152
 An example comparison: if the risk appetite is low or ‘OK’ then high skills may be less of a threat 
than low skills in an organisation where the risk appetite is high (that is, fewer controls). 
153
 Asked so that the researcher can consider if the response ‘colours’ the ‘Don’t know/Knowledge 
Gap’ factor. 
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held are not confidential, or the malware countermeasures are strong enough to prevent 
programs uploading from portable devices. 
Table 27: Scores for Table 30 
 ‘Free thought’ or policy status 
unknown 
Managed by policy154 
Threatened 1 3 
Unfamiliar 2 1 
Uncommitted 2 2 
Comfortable 3 1155 
In the on-line survey where there is no interviewer to intervene with further in-depth 
questions, the methodology considers a ‘grey scale’ where a policy is in place but 
enforcement of that policy may not be strong. So, to use the USB example, caution may still 
be required with an element of trust. For example, trust that malware prevention is up to date 
or that all USB ports are disabled. Then, who are you feeling worried about – your own 
misuse or that of others? If an area of risk is managed by a strong, followed up policy, the 
actor or customer in the information system shouldn’t feel threatened. 
                                                                                                                                                      
154
 Therefore shouldn’t feel threatened – don’t allow one’s performance to be impaired by 
‘unnecessary’ worry. 
155
 The subject of the evaluation should have some risk awareness to avoid carrying (say, 
information) out of the safe zone. 
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Table 28: Explanation of scores for Table 27 
Scores156 1 2 3 
Threatened 
Acceptable/good attitude 
without controls in place 
Unacceptable attitude 
with controls in 
place157 (but not 
actually vulnerability). 
Unacceptable attitude 
without controls in 
place. 
Unfamiliar 
Acceptable attitude with 
controls in place 
Not a good attitude 
but with a hope of 
improvement – better 
that uncommitted 
May suggest a 
decision to accept the 
risk ‘without’ care. 
Uncommitted 
Rarely acceptable. May be 
acceptable in a highly 
controlled environment  
with negligible risk 
 
Likely to be a 
vulnerability of some 
sort – perhaps not in 
regard to the issue at 
hand. 
Comfortable 
This is good if there are 
tested controls in place [to 
manage risk] 
 
This is bad if there are 
no controls in place [to 
manage risk] 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
156
 Higher scores suggest a less desirable situation. 
157
 Higher (worse) score because although the risk is managed, one can assume that performance 
may be impaired by being unnecessarily concerned. 
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Table 29: Second party evaluation of the individual  
(scored for ‘Free thought’ or policy status unknown) 
Component of 
risk 
How do think the analysed member of staff 
would feel if the following risks, 
and their effect on the organisation, were 
realised?158 
Th
reate
n
ed
159
 
U
nfa
m
ilia
r
 
U
n
co
m
m
itted
 
C
o
m
fo
rtable
 
T
op
 10
 C
ateg
o
ry
 
T
op
 10
 W
eight
 
Confidentiality Confidential e-mail might be sent to the wrong 
person/people 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
Availability IT equipment is exposed to coffee spills, knocks 
and drops. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Integrity Data typed in on one day cannot be easily 
restored from a back up if lost. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Trust  Security awareness suggest that measures are 
common sense measures and don’t need to be 
mandated. 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
Availability Cables may be unplugged and moved and new 
cables plugged in to get on with work quickly. 
1 2 2 3 3 23 
Confidentiality Pen drives (USB sticks) are convenient, efficient 
and made secure by their removability. 
1 2 2 3 3 23 
Non-repudiation Legal documents are better provided in hard copy 
because the legal admissibility of e-mail is 
doubtful.160 
1 2 2 3 2 26 
Authorisation  Our organisation gives access to all the IT 
equipment and files that you need. 
1 2 2 3 7 16 
Authentication  Users may share logon details if it helps job-
sharing or simplifies processes for the 
organisation. 
1 2 2 3 7 16 
Availability A tested plan minimises the impact of a serious 
incident, e.g. a fire, storms, loss of key staff. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Trust  Information about our customers can be shared 
with our partners and contractors. 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
                                                                                                                                                      
158
 See the following table if the respondent cannot answer for an individual but can talk generally 
about staff or members of the community who interact with the information system. 
159
 This is trying to make an honest record considering how the likely attitude may affect the 
organisation; it is not meant to be Orwellian ‘thought police’ dictating how one should feel! 
160
 This may be an area of high risk when secure IT systems remain safe whilst paper documents 
proliferate and are lost. 
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Table 30: Second party evaluation of individuals in general in the community or organisation 
(scored for ‘Free thought’ or policy status unknown) 
Component of risk 
Do you think that your staff care about the 
following?161 
Th
reate
n
ed
 
U
nfa
m
ilia
r
 
U
n
co
m
m
itted
 
C
o
m
fo
rtable
 
T
op
 10
 C
ateg
o
ry
 
T
op
 10
 W
eight
 
Confidentiality Confidential e-mail might be sent to the wrong 
person/people 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
Availability IT equipment is exposed to coffee spills, 
knocks and drops. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Integrity Data typed in on one day cannot be easily 
restored from a back up if lost. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Trust  Security awareness suggest that measures are 
common sense measures and don’t need to be 
mandated. 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
Availability Cables may be unplugged and moved and 
new cables plugged in to get on with work 
quickly. 
1 2 2 3 3 23 
Confidentiality Pen drives (USB sticks) are convenient, 
efficient and made secure by their 
removability. 
1 2 2 3 3 23 
Non-repudiation Legal documents are better provided in hard 
copy because the legal admissibility of e-mail 
is doubtful. 
1 2 2 3 2 26 
Authorisation  Our organisation gives access to all the IT 
equipment and files that you need. 
1 2 2 3 7 16 
Authentication  Users may share logon details if it helps job-
sharing or simplifies processes for the 
organisation. 
1 2 2 3 7 16 
Availability A tested plan minimises the impact of a 
serious incident, e.g. a fire, storms, loss of key 
staff. 
1 2 2 3 5 20 
Trust  Information about our customers can be 
shared with our partners and contractors. 
1 2 2 3 6 18 
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 These are the questions to be followed if the respondent cannot answer for an individual but can 
talk generally about staff. If the questions about the individual were answered, interviewers were 
briefed to consider asking these too if time allowed. 
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And finally, the general questions to investigate the reaction of the interviewee to external 
events were asked. 
Table 31: For consideration of how the appetite score of the 
organisation/community may be affected by the respondent162 
p
e
rceptio
n
 of
 risk
 
Has your perception of risk to your information systems 
increased or decreased as a result of the following . . . 
In
c
reased
 
D
ec
reased
 
N
o
 ch
a
ng
e
 
Tim
e
 to
 reco
n
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e
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o
u
r
 e
xp
o
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As a result of the security incident/breach involving the 
subject above? 
    
As a result of any other security incident/breach in your 
organisation? 
    
As a result of hearing of a laptop theft which led to 
Nationwide Building Society being fined £980,000? 
    
As a result of the ‘hacking’ of TKJ (TK Maxx) and the theft of 
45 million credit card records? 
    
As a result of storms in the UK (January ‘07) which led to 
deaths and travel disruption? 
    
The responses to the on-line survey were similarly scored by assigning a rising scale of 
values depending on the risk associated with the lack of compliance with BS ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005, weighted from the ranked categories of The National 
Computing Centre’s Top 10 IS/IT risks (Table 32 and Table 33). 
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 Originally included to provide deeper interest but not to contribute to the scoring. 
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Table 32: Scores for responses to the On-line survey analysis of an Organisation’s appetite 
for risk 
            
Model Appetite 
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w
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Probably 
understood to be 
the company 
practice, but no 
written formal 
documentation 
No policy/ 
Not our 
policy 
W
eight
 
G
o
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B
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Information risk is regularly 
addressed in projects, 
operations/IT service delivery, 
and at board level 0.25 0.33 0.5 3 18 4.5 54 
Staff may use their own IT 
equipment for business use 
(PCs, telephones, PDAs, USB 
sticks/pen drives) 0.25 0.33 0.5 3 23 5.75 69 
Staff are screened for 
background qualifications, during 
selection and during changes of 
employment and their access to 
information tailored accordingly. 0.25 0.33 0.5 3 28 7 84 
Staff have their work monitored 
for accuracy for a period until 
competency through experience 
is assured or another validation 
mechanism is deemed sufficient. 0.25 0.33 0.5 3 23 5.75 69 
Alterations to how company 
equipment is set up can only 
been done through qualified staff. 0.25 0.33 0.5 3 23 5.75 69 
            
28.75 345 
 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
146 
Table 33: Scores for responses to the On-line survey analysis of an individual’s attitude to 
risk 
  
          
Model 
Attitude 
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Confidential e-mail might be sent to the wrong person/people 1 2 2 3 18 18 54 
IT equipment is exposed to coffee spills, knocks and drops 1 2 2 3 20 20 60 
Data typed in on one day cannot be easily restored from a back up if lost 1 2 2 3 20 20 60 
Security awareness suggests that measures are common sense and don’t 
need to be mandated 1 2 2 3 18 18 54 
Cables may be unplugged and moved and new cables plugged in to get on 
with work quickly 1 2 2 3 23 23 69 
Pen drives (USB sticks) are convenient, efficient and made secure by their 
removability 1 2 2 3 23 23 69 
Legal documents are better provided in hard copy because the legal 
admissibility of e-mail is doubtful 1 2 2 3 26 26 78 
Our organisation gives access to all the IT equipment and files that you need 1 2 2 3 16 16 48 
Users may share logon details if it helps job-sharing or simplifies processes 
for the organisation 1 2 2 3 16 16 48 
A tested plan minimises the impact of a serious incident, e.g. a fire, storms, 
loss of key staff 1 2 2 3 20 20 60 
Information about our customers can be shared with our partners and 
contractors 1 2 2 3 18 18 54 
            
218 654 
4.6.4 User engagement 
User engagement – managed by the process recorded in Figure 27 – was seen to be an 
area of risk to the research itself in terms of consistency of results, particularly as it could be 
skewed by the participant’s willingness (or unwillingness) to talk about examples of risk 
realisation that would be deemed personally embarrassing or embarrassing for the 
organisation. To manage this risk in the method, the interviews were carried out to this 
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method for consistency and using senior interviewers – rather than students – to build on the 
implied trust that ensues from dealing with a qualified individual. Where organisations who 
were invited to take part (in the in-depth interviews) but would not participate, is described 
below. The supplementary on-line questionnaire was posted on the website of The National 
Computing Centre. The questions were aimed to pick up on the end-user perspective of 
human vulnerabilities rather than the technical risks and to support the more comprehensive, 
in-depth interviews. Therefore, technical staff were treated as end-users and their technical 
skills accounted for in the vulnerability vectors that were investigated. 
Get a description
of the
organisation
Get the interviewee to
bear in mind  particular 
individual involved
in the breach
Has the
organisation
suffered a
security
breach?
What kind?
Ask questions about
the individual's status
Ask questions about
the individual's attitude
Part 2
Part 1
How have answers to
the ‘’What kind?’
questions affected
the interviewee’s
perception of risk?
30 to 45 minute 
interviews
If no one else 
involved in the security
breach can be
identified
If others
who have been 
involved in the
security breach(es)
can be
identified
 
Figure 27: Interviewee engagement process 
To scrutinise the type of individual whose risk appetite may affect an information system I 
selected the taxonomy of IS/IT roles used annually in The National Computing Centre 
benchmark of ‘Salaries and Employment Trends in IT’ (see Table 34). Because of the limited 
contact time with interviewees and the number of different roles that they would have to 
select from to describe the potential human vulnerabilities to be studied, the NCC 
benchmark model was simplified to IT management; those involved in systems analysis, 
design, development, and testing, user and technical support; IT operations/service delivery; 
and end-users. 
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Table 34: IS/IT roles 
Management 
Systems Analysis 
and Development 
User Support Operations 
Head of IT/IT Director 
IT Manager 
Systems Development 
Manager 
Operations/Data Centre 
Manager 
Network/Communications 
Manager 
User Support Manager 
Technical Support Manager 
Client/Account Manager or 
Service Delivery Manager. 
Contracts Manager 
QA/Testing/Systems Change 
Manager 
Project Manager 
IT Consultant 
Project Leader/Senior 
Analyst 
Systems Analyst 
Business Analyst 
Senior Systems Developer 
Systems Developer (over 3 
years) 
Systems Developer (under 3 
years) 
Systems Testing  Engineer 
Help Desk Team Leader 
Help Desk Staff 
IT Trainer 
PC/User Support Analyst 
Technical Support Group 
Senior Technical Support 
Staff 
Technical Support Staff 
Systems Administrator 
Database 
Controller/Administrator 
Web Administrator 
Communications and 
Network Support Group 
Network 
Controller/Administrator 
Network/Communications 
Analyst 
Network/Communications 
Support Staff 
Technician/Engineer 
Senior Operator/Shift Leader 
Operator 
Trainees 
Non-graduate IT Trainee 
Graduate IT Trainee 
Part of the inherent risk (sic!) of collecting information for this type of analysis is in the 
accuracy of the responses and hence the quality of information collected. Table 35: Options 
for investigation, shows how segregating the respondents considered the quality of 
information by providing some independent judgement. This control is centred on having 
someone profile the respondent to questionnaire first. This improves quality of the analysis 
of the responses based on the assumptions163 that the supervisor and the individual will not 
collude, or that the response should not be an opportunity to transfer risk from supervisor to 
individual. (Again, quality assurance would expect the supervisor to undergo the same 
scrutiny164.) 
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 That is, acceptable risk. 
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 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes – Who will keep watch over the guardians? 
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Table 35: Options for investigation 
O
ptio
n
s
 
Questions answered by: 
Relative 
quality of 
data 
expected165 
(a) Questions about 
the Organisation 
(b) Questions 
about general 
network users/ 
stakeholders 
(c) Questions 
about 
specific 
individual(s) 
1 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A 2 
2 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer N/A 
Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk 
officer 
3 
3 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A Specific individual 4 
4 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A 
Profile information 
by the Supervisor, 
Security or Risk 
officer; Purely risk 
attitude questions 
by the specific 
individual 
5 
As the study was timebound, interviews were limited to the supervisory actor. There was not 
enough time to include more than one representative from each organisation. 
The targets for evaluation were selected from the membership database of The National 
Computing Centre. Several ‘direct marketing’ e-mails were sent, supported with a more 
detailed article in NCC’s ITadviser magazine. First priority was to contact respondents who 
expressed an interest following the e-mail campaign. After this first tranche was contacted, 
the types of organisation who had agreed to take part were reviewed and a list drawn up of 
industry sectors that were under-represented or where a second example may validate (or 
otherwise) the results of the first. Those identified in these first two tranches were then 
contacted by telephone for appointments. 
4.6.5 Results 
Telephone interviews lasted between 45 minutes and an hour (longer than the expected 30 
to 45 minutes). Interviewees demonstrated a willingness to discuss their experiences in 
detail. The intentions of the research were discussed. Although the original plan was to 
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conduct all the interviews by telephone, some of the interviewees preferred to complete the 
questionnaire documents themselves. This self-examination worked and well and acted as a 
prototype of the remote questioning of the on-line environment in the planned, fully 
developed methodology. The informative results of the on-line survey also provided this 
proof-of-concept with a greater number of respondents. 
Several organisations who were invited to take part (in the in-depth interviews) would not 
because (for example): 
• ‘I respect what you are doing’ but am too busy completing work before a holiday 
• They have a policy of not taking part in research. 
• The research period (June-July) is the busiest time of year for rolling out new 
information systems. 
• ‘I fear that it would ultimately be unwise for <a type of organisation> to reveal their 
appetite for risk. Think about the fear of being quoted in subsequent litigation, for 
example: the difference between a big appetite for risk and recklessness is a fine 
one.’ 
It is interesting to observe in that last response, this considered policy was not followed by 
another member of staff from the same organisation who took part in the on-line survey as 
did several other people from the same type of organisation. The implied connections 
between ‘branches’ of this type of organisation suggest that they would have a common 
policy against divulging this type of information. This is an example of the complexity being 
compensated for in this analysis of human vulnerabilities. That is, one person in the 
organisation has a good attitude to risk which holds him back from taking part in the study. 
Another has a good attitude to risk which encourages him to contribute. The contributor is 
compliant with their policy which does not prevent taking part; the non-contributor actually 
formulates his own policy. 
Output from the detailed user engagement comprised the two-part questionnaires completed 
by one of three researchers, and the two-part questionnaires completed directly by the 
respondents to the invitations to take part in the research. The responses comprised tick-box 
responses to the questions and some commentary added to inform about the context of the 
response, or partially filled in tick-boxes and notes about the background and context of the 
responses to the questions which could be used to complete the tick-boxes, and in some 
instances, tick-box responses only. The on-line survey provided a greater volume of 
responses for analysis using the scoring mechanism. This was carried out using packaged 
SPSS analysis software166. 
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13 organisations from the following domains took part in the detailed investigation: 
• Charity • Construction • Education 
• Entertainment • Government Agency • Health 
• Housing • Insurance • Law 
• Local Government • Software Development • Utilities Related 
As part of setting the context of the interviews, interviewees were asked to list information 
security breaches their organisations had experienced during the last 12 to 18 months. This 
ensured that interviews were grounded in experience rather than conjecture. The 
assumption was that for a respondent to discuss exposure to risk, they – or their staff – 
should have had some exposure to realised risk rather than basing their responses on 
conjecture. It also strengthened the responses to questions which were scored on the 
results of previous research where human vulnerabilities had manifested. The catalogue of 
realised risks below indicates that our interviewed sample has a significant contribution to 
make to the research. Their responses are not based on ‘what if?’ scenarios and can 
therefore be assessed without regarding the emotional literacy of the respondents (Hillson 
and Murray-Webster, 2007). There is no requirement to adjust their scores for (say) vested 
interest in the outcome of a possible breach. For example, as security manager, they may 
be tempted to downplay a threat for which they should have effective measures in place. 
Participation in the on-line survey was primarily by invitation. NCC members and contacts 
were e-mailed an invitation to participate in the research. A further reminder e-mailing was 
dispatched to members one week before the survey closed. The survey was open for 
responses from 13 July 2007 to 14 August 2007 (just over four weeks). 
From the 13 detailed interviews: 
• 4 had suffered a malware infection 
• 8 had encountered staff misuse 
• 1 had detected an attack or ‘hack’ against the authorised network privileges 
• 6 reported theft or fraud involving computers 
• 5 had suffered systems failure or data corruption 
Some of the respondents gave more detail about the security breaches they had 
experienced: 
• Testing procedures were not followed before software was released into 
production167. 
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 With the developer’s privileges being downgraded as a sanction. 
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• A member of staff sent a sensitive internal report to a Sunday newspaper. 
• A senior member of staff was of the opinion that more information was required for 
their job and obtained it by gaining unauthorised access to a financial database168. 
• Several distributed denial of service attacks were experienced with at least one being 
directly attributed to blackmail. 
• An IT staff member worked to a personal agenda, unaligned with corporate 
objectives but with a spirit of ‘knowing best’; systematically ignoring back-up 
procedures. 
• When a ‘phishing’ incident raided the bank account of an employee taken in by 
messages received through the company e-mail, performance was impaired by the 
individual’s subsequent concern even though the loss did not directly impact on the 
corporate resource (that is, a loss of company funds). 
• Some respondents mentioned small losses to data integrity or minor losses of data 
which presented small but almost acceptable – from a perspective of risk – 
inconveniences. 
• Occasional problems with change control affected the availability of some network 
resources for one respondent. 
• The police were involved with the misuse of a laptop for storing pornography (and the 
employee in question was dismissed). 
• Confidential documents were stored in a less secure area than they should have 
been. No evidence was found of unauthorised access other than by the finder who 
came across them by accident. 
• An outsourced IT ‘partner’ granted permissions to staff to which they were not 
entitled. 
• One organisation suffered an unintentional denial of service when a legitimate 
customer set up a monitoring routine that polled their services to check availability. 
The server involved could not cope with the additional load of the monitoring. 
The following paragraphs describe the responses from the interviewees to the risks 
questioned, against the topics in Table 22. This started with e-mail going astray as very 
much a human vulnerability, given the ease of sending e-mails and the tendency of users to 
send e-mails hastily (particularly in reply). This means that the consideration traditionally 
given to composing a letter is not applied. Anecdotes were told about usability features such 
as the autocompletion (of names) and ‘Reply to all’ functions which reduce the sender’s 
verification of e-mail metadata before it is sent (Armstrong, Rhys-Jones, Dresner, 2004). 
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Respondents suggested that damage to hardware was of little concern to users so their 
responses fall into the greater (weighted) risks. This may be related to an increased 
awareness of the anecdotally reported paradox of concern for the physical medium being 
stronger than concern for the intangible data stored on it169. I expected some moderate 
concern over users’ own activities but realised that this may already be reduced to an 
acceptable risk by some countermeasure. For example, changes to IT equipment being 
restricted to dedicated IT staff170. 
Availability – a system characteristic covered originally by the business continuity clause in 
the ISO/IEC 27001 standard and more recently in its own dedicated standards (BS 25999-
1:2006; BS 25999-2:2007; BS 25777:2008) – is where business could not be continued as a 
result of a realised risk. I expected a high level of perceived risks in the event of an incident 
invoking a business continuity plan although this was not voiced in the concerns at the NCC 
workshops. This is indicative of the human vulnerability of complacency identified in the top 
10 risks (NCC, 2005). In contrast to this, a good sense of the consequences of risk realised 
by inadequate back-ups was reported. Most organisations felt the measures in place would 
manage the risks and that their users concurred with this. 
Removable media – channel for the risk of data loss – had the interviewees almost equally 
split between those who cautiously allow removable media such as pen drives and those 
who have put in measures against them. One exception – from the insurance industry – 
expressed concern because of a perceived lack of implemented controls. 
The two questions examined the difficult-to-quantify concept of trust – the idea that network 
users should not be inhibited to use a network if they are aware of security measures being 
in place. That is, they should not be naturally risk averse rather than show a commensurate 
degree of caution during their interaction in the information system. 
Reports about individuals’ attitude to legal risk tended to score highly (that is, the risks were 
greater) in most of the interviews. This suggests the strength of the interview format because 
this level of response could have been predicted given the frequent doubt and uncertainty of 
callers to The National Computing Centre help desk. Although statistics for this are not 
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 In the developing methodology this could point us towards refining the question or scoring it 
differently because it could suggest good risk awareness. 
170
 This balance of risks and treatments for areas taken for granted was observed during the 
certification to BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005 of a major corporate organisation the 
Spring/Summer of 2010. The auditing certification body was content with the risk assessment for 
new risks but raised a note of non-compliance for the standard because the organisation had not 
included the well known risks that had beed effectively treated before the formal ISMS had been 
developed. The risk assessment before the auditor’s scrutiny suggested that only new and 
emerging risks were being dealt with and no credit was being given to areas where risk had already 
been reduced to an acceptable level. For example, a new data centre built three years earlier was 
designed so that any water-carrying pipes were routed away from the server racks for fear of leaks. 
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collected, a review of e-mail responses to incoming enquiries show that they are about legal 
issues regarding information systems (such as contractual issues with service providers, 
data protection, and the desire to ensure that any monitoring of communications is carried 
out legally). 
More anecdotal feedback from discussions at NCC workshops suggests that there is often 
confusion between authentication (proving who you are) and authorisation (what you are 
allowed to do [on a computer network]). Interviews suggested that authentication information 
may be shared for positive motives. One respondent reported a breach where unauthorised 
access was gained with the genuine belief that restrictions were not taking account of his 
business case for access. 
The responses for both the in-depth interviews (Figure 28) and the on-line survey (Figure 
29) were benchmarked against 4 model answers which were derived by completing the 
questionnaires with worst and best case results (not pertaining to any organisation in 
particular). These 4 combinations were: 
• Good appetite in the organisation/good attitude amongst individuals 
• Inappropriate appetite in the organisation/good attitude amongst individuals 
• Inappropriate appetite in the organisation/inappropriate attitude amongst individuals 
• Good appetite in the organisation/inappropriate attitude amongst individuals 
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Figure 28: In-depth interviews: organisational appetite compared with individual 
attitude 
Although limited to 13 points, a normal distribution of responses can be seen to be 
emerging. This evaluation is supported by a similar pattern being discernible for the on-line 
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responses. The on-line survey – although based on fewer questions – used the same 
weighted scoring structure as the in-depth interviews. This realisation of a normal model 
implies that the question structure and scoring of the methodology’s questions have merit for 
detecting an anomaly – a human vulnerability. 
 
Figure 29 A comparison of organisational appetite with individual attitude from the 
on-line survey 
82 responses to the on-line survey were received by the closing date of which 73 were 
useable responses - duplicate or hardly completed responses were not collated for analysis. 
The basic analysis includes all 73 responses, however, analysis by Size, by Scores and 
Weightings includes 72 responses (one respondent did not indicate the number of end-users 
in their organisation so they could not be included in analysis by size). 
The number of end-users in the organisation was used as a measure for the size of the 
organisation. Almost half (46%) of the respondents to the on-line survey are from 
organisations with over 1,000 end-users. However, it must be remembered that these are a 
self-selecting group. 
In questions about organisation or community, respondents take a serious view when it 
comes to only qualified staff altering how company equipment is used. 58% of respondents 
indicated that this is documented, communicated and audited. Over half of respondents 
indicated this was a formal policy. In smaller organisations (under 100 end-users) 50% 
indicated a formal policy, however, a quarter said they had no written formal policy and the 
remaining quarter had no policy at all.  
It is interesting to note the high proportion of organisations that have no policy on screening 
staff for background qualifications during selection and changes of employment and once in 
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position only a few monitor their work. This tallies with the general unawareness (amongst 
those interviewed in-depth) of an up to date standard for screening. 
With the introduction and accessibility of new devices to the general public, there has been 
an increased trend of staff (end-users) being allowed to use their own IT equipment for 
business use. For some organisations this has been a problem in terms of a policy for 
supporting this equipment. For this survey respondents were asked if they had a formal 
policy. It appears black and white – they either have a documented and formal policy or no 
policy at all. 
Information risks are regularly addressed in projects, and in operations/IT service delivery at 
board level and are formally documented, communicated and audited by 47% of 
respondents, as part of their security policy. Larger organisations are more likely to report 
this as a formal policy. A quarter of responding organisations do not have any formal written 
documentation but it is understood to be company practice.  
Very few respondents expressed the opinion that the ICT technical skills of their end-users is 
high (11%). The majority of respondents (64%) think the ICT skills of end-users are 
‘sometimes’ high. It may be that this current picture – across all sizes of organisation – is the 
one that respondents want; after all they may not want or find it more challenging on their IT 
team if all their end-user ICT technical skills were ‘high’ thus increasing the likelihood of risks 
caused by unofficial intervention. 
Respondents also indicated that end-users are more likely to have access to sensitive or 
confidential information at least sometimes rather than never. 
It is encouraging to see that the message about Data Protection responsibilities seems to be 
getting through, with very few respondents indicating that they had end-users unfamiliar with 
the policy. All organisations with fewer than 100 end-users said that all their staff were 
familiar. 
It is interesting that of all the questions in this section only the question about software 
licences reported some ‘don’t know’ responses. Organisations with up to 1,000 end-users 
were more likely to report that all the software used by their end-users has a corresponding 
licence. Only a third of responding organisations with 1,000 to 5,000 end-users were 
confident that all the software used has corresponding licences, and 40% indicated that they 
‘sometimes’ have a corresponding licence. 
Looking at risks and how end-users would react and understand the effect on the 
organisation, it is clear from the results that respondents view end-users as more threatened 
when it comes to issues with their day-to-day work-related tasks. They were more likely to 
feel threatened by the following: confidential e-mail sent to the wrong person (68%), data 
cannot be easily restored from a back up if lost (55%), sharing logon details (49%), and 
customer information can be shared with their partners and contractors (50%). However, 
respondents indicated that end-users are more likely to feel comfortable with unplugging and 
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moving cables (34%), that pen drives are secure by their removability (46%), that the 
organisation gives access to all the IT equipment and files that they need (55%), and that a 
tested plan minimises the impact of a serious incident (50%).  
They are more likely to report end-users are unfamiliar (39%) with the legal admissibility of 
legal documents in hard copy rather than by email. 
Respondents are more likely to indicate their end-users were ‘uncommitted’ when it came to 
IT equipment being exposed to potential damage (37%), and security measures are 
common sense and don’t need to be mandated ( 34%). 
4.6.6 What may be derived from these results? 
Two key observations may be made on the frequency of scored responses shown in 
Figure 30: that the scores for the organisational appetite tend towards bimodal distributions, 
that is, individuals are scoring their organisations at extremes on the scoring scale, and that 
the scores for the risk attitude of individuals tend towards normal distributions, that is, 
individuals tend to rate themselves as being in the middle of a scale range. 
 
Figure 30: The frequency of scored responses (scores rescaled to 0 – 100 range)171 
The bi-modal distribution of the risk appetite score is likely to be the effect of the highly 
differentiating questions about the use of uncontrolled (from the aspect of security policy) IT 
equipment. Where such use was permitted, a risk without reasonably expected security 
countermeasure greatly increased the risk score for a ‘big’ appetite for risk. Organisations 
generally had this under control or allowed it. 
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The aggregated score of all risk vectors contributing to the measure of an organisation’s risk 
appetite – real or implied – only showed significant variations when uncontrolled (for 
example, personal ICT was in use for official business). I have described the attitude as real 
or implied because I am measuring this from an objective comparison of what the 
organisation expects to do about a risk. Therefore its appetite may be affected by a light 
policy implying that it has a big appetite in allowing exposure to certain risks. This pattern 
supports the scoring method for the methodology because the ranked scoring makes an 
area of risk (uncontrolled ICT) stand out. 
The stability of the organisation – represented by for example uncertainty of employment 
prospects that are felt around the time of mergers and acquisitions – may result in divided 
loyalties, loss of corporate knowledge or leakage of information to inappropriate destinations 
(the export of a customer details database for example). This factor is therefore included in 
the risk profile. An organisation that is undergoing change to do with the allegiances of its 
stakeholders is likely to be at greater risk of an information security breach than its ‘stable’ 
counterpart. This was usually found to have a major change as the result of a merger or 
acquisition or no expected change at all. A notable exception was a Health Service 
department which, although clearly excluded from the expectation of takeover, considered 
reorganisation to be endemic and therefore expected to suffer from that instability. 
Organisations with no reasonable expectations for major change of this sort (that is, likely 
mergers, acquisitions or root and branch reorganisation) scored zero risk for this question. 
This ‘zero’ score was allowed to reduce the complexity of the feasibility study. A full tool 
would ask for more detail to assure a completely realistic response172. 
Most organisations felt that they had board-level risk governance actually in place. This is 
perhaps unsurprising considering that the survey sample was derived from The National 
Computing Centre database and that respondents came from reasonably active member 
organisations. This suggests that those listed in the database may already show some 
attention to IT risk though there is a desire to receive the regular knowledge transfer 
packages from the National Computing Centre to benchmark or improve practices. 
The interviewees were all senior ICT staff with typically 15 to 20 years of experience. I 
believe that this profile of the interviewees endorses the high quality of this survey’s content 
because of their awareness of risk issues and their confidence in sharing information about 
their organisation’s approach to risk that others – without whom a relationship had been 
established – may have proven reticent to elaborate on. Interviewees referred to the need to 
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 An additional feature of a tool based on this methodology could be to ask more detail for such 
questions so that the tool could recognise periods where risk is greater – a risk profile lifecycle. 
This is similar to risk management decisions made by Channel 4 television who have regular 
penetration testing of their website over a period of months. However, when broadcasting shows 
with a high interactive Web element, this penetration testing is carried out at least weekly. 
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address risk at board level and how standards for this are set by corporate regulations 
(Chapter 2). 
BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005 makes clear recommendations for the security-led 
control of ICT equipment. Where rules for these controls may be enforced within the 
jurisdiction173 of the organisation, it is unlikely that the corporate controls will be kept 
sufficiently up to date on personal ICT equipment. 
The prevalent restriction of having people with specific ICT roles as the only one allowed to 
implement ICT installation and change is a strong control with the caveats of the 
vulnerabilities of skilled insiders (Shaw, Ruby and. Post, 1998). This highlights the need to 
focus on human vulnerabilities as the path to information systems breaches. One 
respondent referred to the opportunities to deliver some of their products and ‘services’ on-
line had opened new paths for the fraudsters already prevalent in their industry but the new 
technology also presented its own technical solutions with no net gain or net loss being 
apparent as a result (but much more work). 
Because the methodology is looking for human vulnerabilities in information systems, I have 
regarded the potential of screening and monitoring of staff as a powerful tool for matching 
information system users with the roles and access commensurate with their background, 
situation and skills (with a good human resource development programme to develop users 
accordingly). This is exemplified by the highly publicised174 need to carry out CRB checks 
(as would be required for certain network users in the sample of survey respondents). The 
risk treatment (BS7858:2006) for ineffective screening – which goes into greater detail than 
the outline recommendations of BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005  – was revised 
and reissued within two years of its original publication rather than the 3 to 5 years or more 
that is usual for similar standards. 
Monitoring was reported unanimously by respondents as being an issue for the 
consideration of line managers and although it did not seem to be in use, the potential for it 
to be used remained. This was reinforced by interest from two of the respondents in having 
their monitoring processes vetted for compliance with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act (RIPA)175. Notably one of these responses has an active programme of making their 
operating environment a ‘good place to work’; their objective is partly to reduce any 
temptation for inappropriate use of the network by engendering personal commitment to the 
organisation. There is a lesson to be learnt here with the application of what the 
methodology may detect. Its use should not be one of monitoring and control but rather 
measuring and encouragement. 
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 That is the ‘electronic airspace’ or sovereign territory. 
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 Including http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/6678827.stm, and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/mid/6386431.stm 
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 One of whom has subsequently had this done. 
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4.6.7 A tool to identify Human Vulnerabilities 
To create a tool to identify where an organisation’s culture signifies human vulnerabilities in 
its information systems, the tables with questions were transposed into a spreadsheet with 
the responses marked in the relevant table cell. Each cell had the corresponding score from 
the tables assigned to it so that an x in the response cell called in the relevant weighted 
score. Two sheets per organisation were created: one with the totalled appetite score from 
the questions about the organisation’s risk appetite, and one with the totalled attitude score 
from the questions about the risk appetite of individuals that the organisations representative 
had described. The totals from the two sheets were plotted on a graph where the x axis 
represented a scale showing the individual’s attitude to risk and the y axis represented the 
organisation’s appetite for risk (Figure 31). The range of the scales on the two axes was set 
by the model answers comprising the good and inappropriate appetites and attitudes 
according to the worst and best case results. Higher scores represent greater exposure to 
risk. A green-red background was created for the graph to highlight the relative 
risks.
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Figure 31: The proforma chart of appetite and attitude scores 
The chart was tested with the results of the 13 in-depth interviews showing that it was 
sufficiently reliable to be used in the field. 
4.6.8 The application of the method in establishing improvements in risk awareness 
4.6.8.1 The test environments 
None of the field work case studies (Chapter 5) required the deployment of the methodology 
however its value, usability, and accuracy have been shown in two recent projects. In the 
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first (December 2009 to March 2010), I was tasked to train an IT department in information 
security awareness at a level that fitted with their responsibilities as system designers and 
implementers handling sensitive information up to Business Impact Level 3176. This 
programme was requested by the organisation’s information security officer so that he could 
discharge its obligations under government requirements for mandatory information 
assurance training. Information assurance is defined by CESG as ‘the confidence that 
information systems will protect the information they carry and will function as they need to, 
when they need to, under the control of legitimate users’. The training was designed 
specifically for the IT department. This realised the responsibility of system developers to 
create systems where usability would not be compromised by the poor design of the security 
controls (Flechais, Sasse, Hailes, 2003). Each session comprised a presentation with an 
exercise to test the risk awareness of the staff. It is worthwhile noting that the IT department 
agreed to the training under sufferance as it was not seen to be a priority. 
In several training sessions the questions measuring risk attitude were completed at the start 
and end of the session and benchmarked against the original answers. The results were 
used to see if the training had improved the attitude of those attending by increasing their 
awareness of risk and what was considered as acceptable treatments for those risks. ( 
The ‘look and feel’ of the spreadsheet implementation from the feasibility study was 
improved so that it could be displayed publicly during exercises involved with the 
improvement of information security in an organisation. 
4.6.8.2 How the tool was deployed 
The IT department comprised 83 staff who were involved with the development, support, 
and maintenance of information and communication systems for the organisation, and 
administrative support for the department. The staff attended the training sessions in groups 
of 12 or less with little or no knowledge of why they were required to attend. Each session 
started with an explanation followed by a review of their information security attitude. This 
was taken with the risk appetite measure for the organisation (which had been calculated by 
interviewing the information security officer using the questions about the organisation’s 
status, and the content and quality of deployment of the organisation’s information risk 
management policies. His responses were added to the spreadsheet, leaving the questions 
about the local attitude to risk to be asked during training sessions with the IT department. 
This plot was made with the version of the questions used by the in-depth questionnaire so 
that the trainees could not only see where they were placed in relation to themselves before 
and after the training but also with respect to other organisations. An example from one 
session is shown in Figure 32.The objective was to show the collective risk attitude of each 
group. 
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 That is, confidential according to HMG Infosec Standard No. 1 (CESG, 2009). 
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4.6.9 Training content 
The training session for each group contained material to educate attendees in the basics of 
information assurance, teach them how to apply proportionate treatments to information risk, 
and help them appreciate the stakeholders who will make risk treatment effective. This was 
exercised with a fictional case study about handling sensitive information to which the 
controls of BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 had to be applied to link risks with policies and 
countermeasures. 
4.6.9.1 Results 
Seven sessions were run which included most of the department in the training. As the 
programme was run, it became more and more challenging to deliver the sessions with 
some of those attending being distracted by their perception that the training was a low 
priority in relation to their day-to-day responsibilities. Priority was given to delivering the 
presentation material and encouraging participation in discussion and the risk treatment 
exercise. Only three of the seven sessions completed the benchmarking exercise. The 
results are shown in Table 36. 
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Table 36: Before and after training – measures of risk attitude 
 
Appetite 
Score 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Attitude 
Score 
Appetite 
Score 
Attitude 
Score 
Training session: first measure 301 324 486 287 
Central Government 424 1698 1698 1698 
Construction 396 861 861 861 
Law 426 1797 1797 1797 
Registered Social Landlord 442 1854 1854 1854 
Local Government 434 886 886 886 
Insurance 675 752 752 752 
Education 432 803 803 803 
Software 613 694 694 694 
Utilities 463 886 886 886 
Gambling 460 848 848 848 
Local Government 512 800 800 800 
Charity 403 800 800 800 
Healthcare 473 925 925 925 
Training session: second measure 301 209 137 137 
4.6.9.2 Analysis of the results 
In all sessions, the coordinates of the group under scrutiny were moved further into the heart 
of the green zone of the chart. Figure 32 shows the improvement measured from the first 
session. It is worth noting that the organisation scored well from the outset with regard to 
both risk appetite and risk attitude. This is likely to be because of the nature of the 
organisation’s work which require it to habitually regard security as important as part of its 
business which often requires it to enforce security for others. This is further exemplified by 
the existence of the full time information security officer and the mandate for the information 
security awareness training. 
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Figure 32: Improvement in risk and treatment awareness measured in the first session 
of training 
4.6.10 A second test of the tool 
Another test of the tool was used for a government agency (June/July 2010). This test was 
better because I completed all the results to input into the tool independently following 
several days of structured interviews of representatives from the agency’s field workers and 
their management, local authority liaison, human resourced department, and their policy, 
communications, and strategy divisions. 
The results of these interviews were recorded in a report making a set of recommendations 
for improvement. Implementation of the recommendations was begun at a workshop of top 
security management staff from the agency who concurred with the point on the chart where 
their agency and colleagues were placed. 
4.6.11 The feasibility study report 
Two reports were written. The first was a short report to fulfil the mandatory requirement of 
the funding grant. This covered the technological and socio-technical innovation of the work, 
its economic, environmental and societal benefits, supply chain impacts, and opportunities 
for further development and exploitation. The later considered further research and 
development, trialling the tool and for delivering project benefits and diffusion commensurate 
with the investment. The second, detailed report is mostly encapsulated in this chapter with 
the analysis of the project’s outcomes, and future work as described in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES: WHAT ARE 
ORGANISATIONS DOING TO MITIGATE RISK? 
5.1 About this chapter 
This chapter extends the literature review of Chapter 2 by describing a rich set of action 
research case studies that show how standards are developed and selected – for example 
from the body of knowledge described in Chapter 3 – and implemented to treat risk in 
information systems. The case studies are a catalogued in Table 1. In the literature review, I 
discussed the methods of how standards are set and the differentiation of the standards as 
set, and the standards as implemented. These case studies track the parts of the life cycle 
of standards in development and standards in use that demonstrated some of the realisation 
of that process. 
ζ
LeGSB
ε
Accredit UK
Case studies
β
BSI project 
brief
γ 
CSIA
catalogue
Identifying 
risk and 
cataloguing 
standads
α 
Top 10 risks
Chapter 2: Literature Review:
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Chapter 3: Linking risk to standards
Chapter 4: The risk of human vulnerabilities in information systems
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security  management
in the construction (θ) and 
social housing (η) sectors,
security analysis and policy
development in finance (ι)
A view across selected parts of the standards life cycle
Finding the standards needed to mitigate the risk of human vulnerabilities δ
Literature 
review
 
Figure 33: This chapter in the context of the thesis 
In this chapter I describe the methodology and the recommendations of the action research. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss how these recommendations are examples of how standards are 
adapted to mitigate risk whilst retaining their characteristics and desired degree of 
uniformity. 
5.2 Why were these case studies chosen? 
The case study projects (Table 37) were selected as the theatre of observation to look 
across the standards lifecycle. Projects investigated the setting and selection of standards 
(Accredit UK – ε, LeGSB – ζ) and the deployment of standards in three different 
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organisations (a housing association – η, a construction firm – θ, and a financial services 
firm – ι). This action research set out to observe the process suggested in the literature 
review (Figure 11); that tacit know-how is codified as explicit knowledge in standards, 
released by the organisation implementing a standard. Yet despite the idiosyncrasies in the 
way that this is done, compliance with the standard is still respected. The organisation takes 
on board, explicitly or implicitly, the policies set out by the respective standard with the 
organisations own idiosyncrasies that make the implementation of that standard particular to 
that organisation. The overall ‘standard’ of the standard remains intact (Figure 14). This is 
closely connected with the methodology of Chapter 4 where the risk appetite of the 
organisation is measured according to the quality of policies implemented to protect its 
information. (This is shown on the risk appetite axis of the scatter diagrams in Figure 28 and 
Figure 29.) 
Table 37: Case studies documented in this chapter 
Label Case Study 
These case studies comprise (a) two projects about the development of standards for 
information systems: 
Epsilon 
ε 
The development of the Accredit UK (AUK) General Segment – a standard to 
manage the risk in the supply of ICT by small to medium-sized ICT suppliers177. 
Zeta 
ζ 
Work with the Local e-Government Standards Board (LeGSB178) to define a 
process for the development and adoption of standards, and to pilot a process 
to ‘certify’ the acceptance of standards. 
(b) three pieces of fieldwork which analyse where standards are applied to treat risk: 
Eta 
η 
Recommending an information systems risk (security) strategy in a housing 
association. 
Theta 
θ 
Supporting a construction firm in its identification of risk and the selection of 
controlling treatments to mitigate them. 
Iota 
ι 
A review of risk management (information security) policies in a financial 
services firm delivering pensions and actuarial products. 
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 A segment is an ICT discipline such as network design and installation, software development, or 
ICT consultancy. Each discipline is expected to manage risk by carrying out its own specialist 
activities and a set of activities that are carried out in every ICT business. It is the latter set of 
common activities that are defined in the ‘General Segment’. 
178
 Eventually becoming the e-Standards Body (e-SB) 
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5.3 Developing standards to treat risks: defining a collective methodology for 
investigation 
This section of the chapter considers two action research projects which directly involved 
managing or influencing different parts of the standards development life cycle. They are 
significant parts of the research because they show how standards are developed in 
response to a particular risk (such as Accredit UK and the purchaser’s risk of selecting a 
supplier of inadequate competence) and how existing standards may be selected as risk 
treatments for specific problems (such as testing Local e-Government Board’s ratification 
process for standards that it wished to endorse). The methodology (Table 38) emerged from 
the creation of a way to observe the take up of standards in three organisations (a housing 
association, a construction firm, and a financial services firm delivering pensions and 
actuarial products.) 
Table 38: The development of the action research methodology for this study 
 Method Methodological reasoning Relevant project 
1 Facilitate a series of 
stakeholder meetings to 
understand the requirements 
of a standard from the point 
of view of those who will 
implement it and those who 
will benefit from its 
implementation. Draft the 
standard in response to the 
contents promoted by the 
two views and use the same 
stakeholder group to review 
the emerging standard until 
its text is agreed. 
The definition of standards 
(Table 5) involves stakeholders 
who must implement the 
standard, those who will 
benefit from the 
implementation of the 
standard, and those who may 
be charged as the independent 
facilitators who reconcile the 
viewpoints into a synthesised, 
agreed way of working. This is 
required to increase the 
likelihood of the standard being 
accepted by those who apply it 
and those in the thrall of its 
results. 
ε The development of 
the Accredit UK (AUK) 
General Segment – a 
standard to manage 
the risk in the supply 
of ICT by small to 
medium-sized ICT 
suppliers. 
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Table 38: The development of the action research methodology for this study 
 Method Methodological reasoning Relevant project 
2 Propose – or invite proposals 
for good practice to be set as 
the standard way of working 
for a specified scope. 
Where there are a number of 
candidate standards, each 
needs to be assessed for the fit 
with its practicality to 
implement and the likelihood of 
its implementation being 
accepted. 
ζ Work with the Local 
e-Government 
Standards Board 
(LeGSB) to define a 
process for the 
development and 
adoption of standards, 
and to pilot a process 
to ‘certify’ the 
acceptance of 
standards. 
3 Suggest how information 
security practice – as defined 
by the ISO/IEC 2700n series 
of standards – can be 
applied to mitigate 
information security risk. 
Analyse the current practice 
of each organisation by 
touring a sample of their 
premises and interviewing a 
cross-section of 
management, administration 
and delivery staff. 
Benchmark the findings 
against the recommended 
practices in ISO/IEC 27001 
and ISO/27002 and 
recommend improvements.  
A benchmark against a well-
defined standard and one or 
more recommendations for 
change from the current 
activity of the organisation to 
those which would mitigate risk 
is that it allows a structured 
process for creating an 
observatory on the effects of 
standards implementation. The 
changes to activity are 
identified by the assessed risk 
to the organisation with respect 
to the implemented policy that 
would protect against that risk. 
η Recommending an 
information systems 
risk (security) strategy 
in a housing 
association. 
θ Supporting a 
construction firm in its 
identification of risk 
and the selection of 
controlling treatments 
to mitigate them. 
Ι A review of risk 
management 
(information security) 
policies in a financial 
services firm 
delivering pensions 
and actuarial products. 
4 Analysis Investigation of the results to 
look for supporting evidence in 
answer to three research 
questions. 
The succession of 
projects as the work 
they record spans 
different parts of the 
standards lifecycle. 
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Accredit UK is a standard that was proposed by The National Computing Centre to increase 
the commercial success of small-to-medium ICT businesses179 in the regional development 
zone that is overseen by the Advantage West Midlands agency. The objective of the 
standard is achieved by making the purchasing process successful for both the supplier and 
the customer by managing the risk in the supply of ICT. Compliance with Accredit UK results 
in assuring the successful implementation of ICT supply activities that have been recognised 
as good practice by suppliers and purchasers. Businesses that do not carry out the activities 
to the acceptable levels defined in the standard are suspected of not having a sufficiently 
positive risk of successfully supplying ICT to the satisfaction of their customers or where the 
continuing maintenance and support of the ICT is uncertain as a result of potential instability 
in the ICT suppliers’ business. 
There were two methodologies that were assessed for the research and development of a 
standard that would be acceptable to its stakeholders. Four stakeholders (or stakeholder 
groups – see Table 39) were identified for involvement in the development process to 
assess fitness for purpose of the project’s deliverables and outcomes. 
Table 39: Key stakeholder groups for the Accredit UK project 
Group Profile 
Advantage West 
Midlands (AWM) 
The development agency part funding the development and roll 
out of the standard to SME ICT businesses and their suppliers. 
The National 
Computing Centre 
(NCC) 
The research and technology management organisation that 
invested resources into the development of the standard. 
SME ICT suppliers Businesses who wanted to apply a mark of quality to their 
business to increase the confidence of current and prospective 
customers. 
Purchasers of ICT Public and private sector organisations who want reliable ICT 
from suppliers who deliver value for money. 
Two methodologies were proposed to create and deploy a standard and certification 
framework which would benchmark the ICT suppliers against the adequacy of their risk 
management controls in running an ICT business in their respective field. Both 
methodologies would apply action research in the formulation, refinement, deployment and 
review of the emergent standard. The first methodology considered, involved the selection of 
relevant standards that were already available and achievable by ICT businesses (cf. the 
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 Defined by the then Department of Trade and Industry as a business with less than 250 
employees. 
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project to define a catalogue of publicly available risk treatments – see Chapter 3) but which 
may not be seen to be a clear advantage by the suppliers or their customers. This would not 
create a new standard but rather a ‘meta-standard’ of existing risk mitigation techniques. A 
period of investigation would follow to see whether the businesses applied these standards, 
and then award an AWM mark of quality as relevant specifically to the supply of ICT. These 
standards included – but were not limited to – quality management models such as ISO 
9001 for quality systems, the Capability Maturity Model (CMMi) of the Software Engineering 
Institute of Carnegie Mellon University, and the European Quality Model (EFQM). The 
second option was to develop a bespoke standard for the SME ICT businesses that would 
take the lessons learnt from the quality management models referred to in the paragraph 
above and use SME suppliers and their customers to formally review the standard and 
iteratively improve it based on their feedback. Both methodologies would include a trial 
period whereby SMEs would apply – or benchmark – the standard (or meta-standard) in 
their businesses and use it as the basis of contract negotiation with their customers. 
The two options were reviewed by the West Midlands IT Association (WMITA) which 
represents mostly SME ICT suppliers in that region. WMITA concluded that a single 
standard (the second methodology) was preferred because the ‘metastandard’ would 
presuppose that businesses needed other certifications first – questioning the correctness of 
the AWM standard for the SMEs, the completeness and consistency of a set of certifications 
held by one SME when compared to another, and the need to create a complex 
metastandard to close the gaps. Creating a new, standalone standard would give a simpler 
point of focus for the supplier companies and avoid a confusing ‘certification of certifications’ 
with no added value to the existing market for certification. 
The second project that involved parts of the standards development life cycle (see Chapter 
2) involved the Local e-Government Standards Body (LeGSB) – originally the Local e-
Government Standards Board – which was established to set standards for e-government 
services provided by Local Authorities. LeGSB was a national project of the (then) Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) established to support the transition to the provision of 
local government services on-line by the end of 2005. It ran from 2003 to January 2006. It is 
currently managed by North West e-Government Group (NWeGG) and has set itself the 
wider remit of setting IT-related standards for Transformational Government180. 
LeGSB used a model of standards comprising three classes according to how the standards 
are set: de jure, open, and de facto. De jure standards have some force of law; or are 
approved by one of four recognized international standards organisations (ISO, IEC, ITU, 
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 Transformational Government is a strategy based on the ‘transformation of public services for the 
benefit of citizens, businesses, taxpayers and front-line staff, the efficiency of the corporate 
services and infrastructure of government organisations, thus freeing resources for the front-line, 
and the steps necessary to achieve the effective delivery of technology for government’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2005). 
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UN/ECE). It is usual for each standards body to have a process whereby they will 
(sometimes mutually) recognise the standards of others. The British Standards Institution 
(BSI) for example, has several categories of ‘liaison’ (BS 0:1997) defined for the adoption of 
standards from other bodies. Secondly, an open standards model where standards are 
approved under an open process where all interested parties have input, results are publicly 
viewable, etc.; the organisation that developed the standard may be de jure or not. This may 
be extended in some models where to contribute directly to the development of a standard 
(for example, ISF, 2007), individuals or the organisations for which they work, must pay a 
membership fee. The third class of standards considered by LeGSB are de facto standards 
which are not usually subjected to the rigours of refinement but are declared as a standard 
because of common usage, or by proclamation of a dominant vendor and subsequent 
acceptance by the marketplace. 
Each of these standards may themselves be one or a combination of three types: 
practitioner standards which provide authoritative information sources to support 
practitioners in complying with legislative or regulatory requirements and in delivering 
secure, effective and efficient systems; information standards that clarify data standards, 
schemas, or metadata to support the delivery of information; and technology standards that 
ensure the quality and effectiveness of technology to support effective and efficient systems 
operation. 
LeGSB commissioned the draft of a ‘standard for standards’ to support its operations. The 
requirement set was to define a standard process by synthesising existing ‘best practice’ 
advice and guidance for setting standards (W3C, 2003; BS 0:1997; Cabinet Office, 2005; 
NCC, 2000; ISO/IEC 9126-1:2001) by developing new standards or adopting existing 
standards into the LeGSB corpus. 
Through desk research, sources were taken from the standards bodies that had 
complementary or congruent objectives. The processes were selected or constructed for 
their appropriateness in managing risk in standards development, notably to: avoid a 
process which is too complicated but with sufficient opportunity for all stakeholders to 
contribute suitably181; avoid standards which do not meet the requirements of those who 
have to implement them or those who need to benefit from their implementation; and 
balance the mix of people, processes, and technology. The standard for standards would be 
compiled from the material gathered during the desk research, peer reviewed by standards 
practitioners within LeGSB and local authority representatives affiliated with it. 
LeGSB also wished to pilot its standards certification process – as defined by their 
‘Certification Process Guide’ – and identified sources of candidate standards for immediate 
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 Sometimes – perhaps surprisingly – this may be a trade-off between simplicity and layers of 
complexity introduced for confidence. The specification for LeGSB concentrates on simplicity and 
effectiveness, and shows where this can be achieved without an impact on confidence. 
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action. The purpose of this pilot was to see how a representative sample of proposed local 
government ‘e-standards’ would progress through the fledgling certification process to gain 
acceptance in the LeGSB community. The LeGSB nomenclature was to refer to the approval 
of a standard for adoption as ‘certification’. It had no connection with the popular concept of 
certification to a standard as a term of compliance which is associated with the term in most 
standardisation processes (particularly those of BSI and ISO). 
These prior project outputs – proposed local government ‘e-standards’ – were the basis of 
pilot Requests for Proposals (RFP) which in turn became pilot Requests for Comments 
(RFC) and pilot trials of standards adoption/implementation etc. Because this was an 
exploration of the mechanics and robustness of the adoption model, it was difficult to be very 
specific about quantitative inputs and outputs beforehand. To cope with this, a short series 
of three work periods with fixed checkpoints (see Table 40) was agreed through which a 
staged view on progress (and costs) to date was taken, and only at each checkpoint would 
the work plan be set in detail for the next period. This allowed LeGSB an opportunity to cap 
its future commitment at each checkpoint. It was expected that the pilot would finish with 
some standards awaiting the field trials before certification. 
Table 40: LeGSB project checkpoints 
Checkpoint Control 
1 A review of progress on getting RFPs and RFCs defined and out for 
consultation or pilot implementations and a plan for the following month. 
2 A review of the interim/first conclusions from the first RFPs/RFCs cycle, a 
review of progress on the second cycle of RFPs/RFCs etc., and an outline 
plan for the following month to bring the remaining RFCs and pilot 
implementations to a close or arrange for their continuing beyond the close 
of this standards process pilot. 
3 Review lessons learnt and present a report to LeGSB documenting them 
with recommendations on how the process could be improved. 
These three check points were the planned project stages of the review process for adopting 
standards to manage risk in the delivery of e-government services, thus forming the first 
tranche of my investigation of the standards life cycle. 
5.4  Deploying standards to treat risk: defining a collective methodology for 
fieldwork 
The next tranche of the standards life cycle – the implementation of standards – was 
investigated in three pieces of field work in organisations engaged in the supply and 
management of social housing (project η), the construction industry (project θ), and a firm 
offering pensions and actuarial services (project ι). 
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An independent, not-for-profit housing association housing association in the South West of 
England had evolved out of the trend for local authorities to delegate their responsibilities for 
social housing to third-party specialists. As a result, an organisation with close public sector 
ties had emerged but whose main objective was to control its affairs independently. The 
result up to the engagement of analysts from The National Computing Centre had been the 
maintenance of two working sites: one focusing on administration and the other as a depot 
for staff and contractors who deliver the association’s services. This had left the association 
without an IT strategy that it could own and created the opportunity to draw one up with the 
treatment of information security risk in mind. The purpose of this project was to design and 
document this strategy. 
The association managed over 3500 homes and 130 staff of which 80 were office based and 
50 involved in property maintenance. The project was established to research and develop 
an information security strategy because information is critical to the association’s 
operations and the security of that information is paramount for the confidence of its 
customers and legal compliance. The DTI Information Security Breaches Survey (2006) 
suggested that the high probabilities of incidents mean security may no longer be perceived 
as an additional option but must be an embedded part of the housing association’s culture. 
This was true for the housing association’s obligations at the time of the analysis and was 
becoming even more so as the housing association’s information landscape became more 
complex, for example with the integration of the service with other public service providers 
such as fulfilling the local council’s obligations to house vulnerable people. 
Security was defined as protecting the information handled by the housing association from 
risks in three key areas (Table 41). 
Table 41: Risk attributes for housing association information  
Attribute Definition 
Confidentiality Some information is suitable for dissemination to the public or to tenants; 
other information may be highly confidential to a few individuals. It is 
necessary apply a system for setting a level of confidentiality on all 
information, labelling it in a consistent and visible manner, and ensuring 
that those without the appropriate level of privilege cannot access the 
information. 
Availability Information owners are expected to put measures in place to ensure that 
their information will be available as staff and tenants legitimately expect it. 
Integrity Staff, tenants, and other stakeholders must be able to trust the information 
that they are basing their decisions on to be accurate, complete and up-to-
date. 
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In the second case study project (θ), where I investigated the implementation of standards 
for information security, a construction firm specialising in property fitting, support, and 
furniture making was improving its information technology network architecture and 
infrastructure with a centralised data centre in its main Scottish office with thin client links to 
its two satellite offices. It had approximately 300 network nodes (150 office based and 150 
site-based) running its main applications of Microsoft Office/Outlook e-mail and its financial 
system. Some specialised software was used by its architects and surveyors. The firm had 
no formal security policies in place and although a disaster recovery plan was outlined, a 
complete business continuity plan needed to be developed. The changing infrastructure 
provided an opportunity to develop and implement an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) and the firm agreed that that the advice encapsulated in ISO/IEC 27001 – as 
the recognised industry standard for best practice information security – would provide a 
suitable template182. 
I looked at how the methodology – governing the choice and selection of contact with the 
organisations through the medium of action research – could be carried out, taking into 
account the associated risks and costs of each (Table 42). This standardisation (sic!) of 
approach defined for the housing association (η) was then used to guide the subsequent 
projects with the construction (θ) and financial services organisations (ι). 
Table 42: Possible action research approaches to ISMS implementation 
Method Reasoning Associated risks Associated costs 
1. Prepare a 
prescriptive course 
of action to develop 
an ISMS that 
complies with good 
practice. 
The research that 
underpins the 
instruction to the 
target organisation 
has been 
developed with 
rigorous scrutiny 
from peer 
organisations and 
subject matter 
experts. 
Requires a high 
degree of trust from 
the business 
owners. The ISMS 
is likely to be 
developed with a 
lack of ownership 
because the 
components will be 
extracted from a 
book rather than 
developed with the 
understanding of the 
business process 
owners. 
Lowest outgoing 
cost for the time of 
the action 
researcher and the 
lowest cost for the 
effort from the 
organisation, 
assuming a quick 
understanding of 
the prescriptive 
material. 
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 Such an approach also had the future option for formal certification to the standard if the three 
organisations of the implementation case studies demanded it. 
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Table 42: Possible action research approaches to ISMS implementation 
Method Reasoning Associated risks Associated costs 
2 Prepare a 
framework of 
baseline actions 
that can be 
developed into 
specific ISMS 
components with 
the business 
process owners. 
This brings the 
prescriptive 
elements to the 
business owners 
whilst accounting 
for their learning 
curve in adopting 
them. 
This still requires a 
high degree of trust 
from the business 
owners. As the 
ISMS becomes 
customised for that 
organisation, there 
is a management or 
facilitation overhead 
to keep the 
development on 
track rather than 
allow it to become 
bogged down in 
organisational detail. 
The action 
researcher will 
spend more time 
training staff from 
the organisation. 
The organisation's 
staff will spend 
more time 
understanding 
ISMS principles 
rather than 
developing an ISMS 
deliverable. 
3 Precede any 
detailed contact 
with business 
owners that may 
lead to 
development of 
ISMS deliverables 
with a period of 
analysis that looks 
at what de facto 
elements of ISMS 
are established 
already. 
An experienced 
action researcher 
in the ISMS field 
can match the 
elements of the 
implied ISMS with 
the requirements 
of ISO/IEC 27001. 
Subsequent work 
can then build on 
this gap analysis. 
The negative risk of 
the action 
researcher being 
unable to discern a 
suitably wide picture 
of the ISMS 
components in place 
is overshadowed by 
the positive risk of 
building an ISMS 
that is not only 
tailored for the 
organisation but 
also gives the 
stakeholder 
business process 
owners an early 
opportunity to take 
ownership. 
This will not only 
require investment 
in time from the 
organisation's staff 
to be interviewed by 
the action 
researcher, it will 
also cost additional 
time for the action 
researcher in the 
collection and 
analysis of data 
from the interviews. 
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The case study (ι) where I investigated risk management for the company dealing in 
pensions and actuarial services was an interesting hybrid of the issues regarding the 
selection and implementation of standards because it involved benchmarking documented 
and perceived practices with a known standard (ISO/IEC 27001) as well as keeping the 
company’s implementation of information security practices aligned with the standard(s) set 
– as documented by security policies – by the holding company (essentially the fourth 
category of standards described in the LeGSB183 discussion above). 
The pensions and actuarial services company had been bought by a larger organisation with 
a complementary service portfolio. The holding company had components of a relatively 
mature ISMS and dictated the requirement of compliance with good practice in information 
security to its subsidiary. The subsidiary company commissioned a short action research 
programme to analyse its current practices, review the holding company’s security policies, 
identify any gaps or weaknesses compared with good practice and tailor them to be applied 
by the subsidiary. 
The requirement for using accepted good practice as a benchmark was the driver for taking 
the standard BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005 as the benchmark against which the 
company activity in information security could be compared. Although there are many 
information security standards (as shown by the catalogue of standards and best practice 
advice for effective information assurance – Project γ) only the international standard was 
comprehensive in its coverage and had a widely spread assessment and certification 
scheme associated with it. It was therefore decided to use a series of structured interviews 
with key staff in the subsidiary company to find out what the level of information security 
awareness was, and then edit the holding companies security policies to fit that level of 
awareness to achieve the information security expected by the standard. This was a more 
effective way of getting a set of security policies suitable for the subsidiary that would satisfy 
the holding company, rather than develop a set of policies in isolation from the holding 
companies practices. However the analysis was cognisant of the risk that the holding 
companies policies need to be reviewed with caution and themselves benchmarked against 
the good practice documented in the standard lest they introduce ineffective measures. The 
source of this risk was the transfer of methods from one organisation to another without 
comparing and adjusting them to a normalising practice first. What was appropriate for a 
larger organisation with American-based management may not be readily accepted by a 
small company based in the UK. The size, structure and cultural differences may result in 
differing attitudes to risk. At the time the research was carried out, there was no known way 
of measuring risk attitude (see Chapter 4). 
So across these five projects I had identified the opportunity to see the efficacy of processes 
to select or develop standards to mitigate information systems risk in general and the 
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implementation of standards to mitigate information security risk in systems in particular 
(Table 43). 
Table 43: Action research across the life cycle of a standard 
Life 
cycle 
stage 
Project Objectives Contribution to research 
Sta
nd
a
rd
s
 d
e
velop
m
e
nt
 
ε - Accredit UK New standard to be 
developed 
What is done to define a new 
standard? 
ζ - LeGSB Development of new 
standards or the adoption 
of existing or developing 
standards 
How are existing standards 
adopted for new uses? 
Sta
nd
a
rd
s
 im
ple
m
e
ntatio
n
 
η - Housing 
association 
Benchmark of security 
practice 
How do you compare an 
organisation’s actual or 
implied standards with a 
recognised standard? 
θ - Construction Implementation of an 
ISMS 
How do you steer varying 
levels of practice in an 
organisation into an ISMS? 
ι - Financial 
services 
Definition of local 
information security 
policies 
How do you adapt imposed 
policies (standards) from one 
organisation to another? 
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5.5 Applying the collective methodology to the development and adoption of 
standards to treat risk during the procurement of information systems 
5.5.1 Project ε: Accredit UK 
The method of desk research and stakeholder review was applied to the definition of 
standards for the Accredit UK marque and the LeGSB (project ζ). The Accredit UK standard 
was specified to comprise a generic segment that would be applicable to every type of 
(small) ICT business and a library of special segments that would be applied according the 
type or types of ICT product or service the business offered its customers. 
Segment n
Segment 3
Segment 2
Segment 1Generic
Product/Service
Lifecycle
Performance 
measures
People
Plan
Do
Act
Check
Process(es)
and 
deliverables;
Company 
constants
Section 2
Section 4
Section 3
Introduction Section 1
Glossary and other appendices . . .Section 5
A general part for
all ICT suppliers
A set of specific parts;
one for the suppliers in each
specialised ICT segment
 
Figure 34: The overall structure of the Accredit UK standard 
A specification of the initial generic standard requirements for Accredit UK was prepared by 
a consultancy – Brass Bullet – by developing a process model to allow an author from BSI to 
create a draft standard. The process model was the result of an analysis of a set of 
standards, codes of practice, and sector agreements (collectively known as the ‘domain 
standards’ – see Table 44). The constituent parts of these domain standards were assessed 
by the consultants for their appropriateness for inclusion in the generic section of 
Accredit UK. The BSI author would then draft the standard with its own unique structure that 
included or referred to the relevant elements of the domain standards. 
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Table 44 Source standards for Accredit UK 
Reference: Domain 
BS ISO/IEC 20000-1:2005 Information technology — Service management — Part 1: 
Specification 
BS ISO/IEC 20000-2:2005 Information technology — Service management — Part 2: 
Code of practice 
ISO/IEC TR 15504:1999 Information technology - Software process assessment 
ISO/IEC 15288:2002 Information Technology – Life Cycle Management - System 
Life Cycle Processes 
BCS  Code of Good Practice 
Intellect IT Supplier code of best practice 
e-skills IT 2005-2008 Sector Skills for Business and Information Technology 
Several early drafts of Accredit UK (then referred to as the ‘ICT Supplier Standard’) only 
contained text extracted from the domain standards but did not add value to existing 
standards by addressing the risks in the purchasing process when dealing with SME ICT 
suppliers. NCC and BSI agreed that BSI’s editorial expertise was not established to draft 
new work but rather to manage the process of facilitating subject matter experts whilst they 
did so. The task was therefore handed over to NCC on the merit of technical writing 
experience of drafting standards for ICT quality management, particularly within the 
framework of the BSI committee structure. The result of this was support for BSI – who 
retained an editorial role – with a method comprising: 
• Desk research and writing • Second stakeholder review 
• Stakeholder workshops • Evidence collection 
• Completion of the draft • Scoring/normalisation 
• Stakeholder reviews • Pilot certifications 
• Disposition of comments • Results and feedback 
20 drafts of the standard were written and distributed to stakeholders for scrutiny during this 
process. Desk research and writing involved designing a structure for the standard based on 
the background standards proposed by Brass Bullet. These were supplemented by other 
standards (such as BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005) when it became apparent that 
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certain good practice would be expected from the SME and that good practice was already 
documented elsewhere). 
The first draft was mostly an outline created to settle the introductory elements and the 
contents so that stakeholders would know what was planned for the detail. The stakeholder 
feedback was used to create a draft with improvements to the foreword and introduction, 
general corrections and improved structure, and temporary authoring notes so that 
subsequent reviewers would know the intended content of a section before its development. 
This would provide an opportunity for early correction of any misunderstanding of 
stakeholder views. Some interim drafts were submitted to the project manager as a 
moderator for the interpretation of comments from the stakeholders by the author. The 
project manager provided corrections and direction and accepted comments were worked 
into the text. Disputed comments had counter-comments added that were removed in 
subsequent drafts but provide stakeholders with justification of the comments’ disposition184. 
A challenge at this stage was to create a generic standard for ICT suppliers without knowing 
what the ‘specialist’ – then referred to as domain – segments of the standard would be. 
Throughout the drafting of the standard, mind maps were used extensively to set out the 
structure and ensure that the level of instruction being given to ICT suppliers in each section 
was objective and not too detailed in one section at the expense of another. The mapping 
technique was useful for sorting requirements into two complementary taxonomies of 
requirements: requirements that were categorised according to their instruction of people, 
the management of the ICT supply process, or the measurement of how well the business is 
performing; and requirements that were categorised according to Deming’s plan-do-check-
act life cycle (Deming, 1950) that is applied across management system standards 
published by BSI and ISO185. 
These categorisations gave additional structure to the standard and encouraged debate with 
the reviewers as to where a requirement best fitted or whether a requirement ought to be set 
at all. The need for each requirement was tempered by involving both the suppliers of ICT 
(the business view) and the purchasers of ICT (the customer view). The objective of 
maintaining the standard to be detailed enough for quality assurance, but simple enough for 
the SME supplier to take time to study the contents was challenging. Review comments 
would be implemented by taking out material from the core of the standard (categorised as 
people, process, or performance requirements) to build a new mind map and develop them 
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 Comments disposition is the process of deciding which comments on a document will be 
implemented as received, which will be implemented but modified, and which will be rejected. 
185
 Including ISO 9001 (quality management), ISO/IEC 27001 (information security management), 
ISO 14000 (environmental management), ISO 18001 (occupational health and safety 
management), BS 25999 (business continuity management), and ISO/IEC 20000 (IT service 
management). 
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further. In the early stages of development, impersonal language was used in the process 
titles to ensure that the Accredit UK standard stayed true to its more complex ISO 
counterparts. The titles were simplified in a subsequent draft. The early draft also included 
initial performance measures based on the ‘Balanced Scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), 
and also introduced the ‘people’ measures. The draft was developed taking greater 
cognisance of personnel issues from BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005, explaining 
the SME status; and making copious corrections to the text. Sections bearing ‘signpost’ 
information only were highlighted for more development. These were developed with rich 
feedback from stakeholder reviews. Feedback suggested the need to include more ‘case’ 
examples throughout, more emphasis on the need to keep written records where needed, 
and the need for SME suppliers to formalise ad hoc activity. This information was tabulated 
(see Table 45) to produce a draft of sufficient detail to be worthwhile passing to BSI for its 
first edit. 
Table 45: The core format of the Accredit UK standard 
Stage Activity Result Examples 
Plan, 
Do, 
Check, 
or Act 
What the business 
should do. 
The desired outcome 
of the activity. 
Examples of how the activity 
may be done and the 
evidence that the activity is 
likely to have the desired 
outcomes.  
The first edit of the draft standard by BSI highlighted the conflict of formats demanded by 
BSI’s standard for standards (BS 0) and the understanding by the author that the SME 
audience would prefer direct, personal instructions as more appropriate to them and hence 
the increase successful uptake of the standard. It was agreed that the stakeholder groups 
would decide on whether to use the language of BS 0 which prefers passive descriptions 
with the term ‘shall’ to show mandatory action, or the direct, imperative statements talking 
straight to the reader. The stakeholder groups preferred the imperative language so that the 
edits changing them to passive ‘shalls’ reverted to the original. The justification was that the 
standard takes the approach that if it’s worth doing then it is a requirement of the standard 
and must be done. Documentation of the instruction is a requirement and so referring to it as 
‘shall’ is superfluous. This was the result of creating a standard for small business entities by 
paring the body of knowledge down to some ‘absolutes’ and missing out the potentially 
negotiable. Whether omission constituted a complete failure to comply became part of the 
assessment model which became richly formulaic – supported by good, professional 
judgment of assessors who must pass a benchmarking training course and test – to deliver 
consistent results. 
Several subsequent drafts were then written by completing the requirements for SMEs set 
out in the headings included as outline placeholders in the material passed to stakeholders 
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for the early reviews. Workshops were convened with SMEs suppliers and purchasers who 
agreed the need for more detail on people/ competencies and the assessment regime. This 
wisdom was also incorporated in the developing standard. Significant effort was then put into 
filling in gaps in tables defining the People/Process/Performance activities that should be 
evidenced in an SME, making several typographical corrections, and adding a description of 
the proposed assessment process. An appendix specifying the characteristics that are 
required for assessors was removed because it was not relevant to the requirements placed 
on the SMEs. 
Another stakeholder workshop was held which concluded that much background explanation 
and advice should be removed to make the core requirements more prominent. The Process 
and People sections were reordered to match the order that actions are likely to be carried 
out in, so improving the usability of the document. The use of terms ‘certificate’ and ‘accredit’ 
were changed to conform to accepted practices. Some customer activity references were 
also removed in anticipation of the creation of a separate ‘Customer Code of Practice’. (At 
that stage of development, the branding of AccredITUK was adopted over the holding label 
of the ‘ICT Supplier Standard’.) The review of the more complete draft led to renewed 
debate on the passive versus imperative argument. The compromise reached was to 
change the language of the standard to remove the second person conversational tone and 
replace it with the third ‘person’ so that the text refers to what a business, rather than a 
person, should do. 
Improving the standard continued such as the better use of heading levels to aid navigation 
through the contents and correcting diagrams for consistency with the amended text. The 
layout was harmonised so the graphic designer who would typeset the standard could see 
the relative weight of each section. Some footnote-related defects in the word processor 
document were corrected. The ‘technical’ contents were also improved with clear 
recruitment ideals in the People section and a new introductory section to the Balanced 
Scorecard added. Because the supporting process for how the accreditation body would 
operate had not been defined, holding paragraphs were inserted to explain about the 
recertification period to ensure it would be adequately defined in the standard. This 
supported the general aim that the standard should be comprehensive in its coverage of the 
requirements on the business and how the business should operate. This objective was 
derived from observations of confusions and misunderstanding about documents published 
by national standard bodies which appear the same but have different normative and 
informative value (being labelled, for example: specification, code of practice, and technical 
report). 
Another area of consistent feedback was the concern of the SMEs as to how compliance 
with the standard would be measured, particularly the risk that a business would fail an 
assessment if it failed to comply with a requirement that may be viewed as far less important 
when viewed in the context of absolutely essential business activities. Discussions with the 
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SMEs reviewing the standard, agreed that the standard should be rigorous and that the 
requirements it specified were indeed those which a business must meet to treat the risks 
that an ad hoc business process may overlook. One of the SMEs proposed that the standard 
should be aspirational so that it was not to be an easy ‘tick box’ exercise to measure a 
business against. This presented the paradox that an SME should not ‘build a reputation on 
what it is going to do’ and so increase the number of SMEs who would fail an assessment. 
The solution to this problem was to continue to define all the requirements of the standard as 
mandatory but to get the SME reviewers to work with the author of the standard to identify 
the minimum set of requirements that would indicate clear non-compliance with the 
standard’s objectives if not in place in the business. The result of this was to define the 
requirements in assessment terms as ‘Lines of Enquiry’ (LoE) that an assessor would follow 
when looking for evidence of the requirement being met. A set of ‘Key Lines of Enquiry’ 
(KLoE) were identified as the core or baseline for compliance. A business that could not 
provide documented evidence of a process being managed to meet a KLoE would fail an 
assessment. Although there was no numerical basis for comparison, the Accredit UK Project 
Office agreed with the SMEs that a business could fail to show evidence for up to 5 LoEs 
and still be deemed as compliant. Compliance with a LoE or KLoE was set according to a 
maturity model scale shown in Table 46 where the score of 3 was set as the minimum level 
of compliance expected. 
Table 46: Accredit UK Maturity Model for Process Evidence 
Score Interpretation 
1 Unacceptable 
2 Improvement Required 
3 Acceptable 
4 Good Standard 
5 Ideal 
The activity of the Accredit UK Project Office – which had worked through the process of 
engagement with the selected assessors – and the SMEs who had volunteered to take part 
in pilot assessments of their businesses against the standard were then monitored in the 
context of this research. The activity involved assessors visiting the SMEs and finding out 
what evidence they would present to an assessor to show compliance with respective 
clauses in the standard. The assessors then met to compare the range of evidence that an 
SME would be likely to present during an assessment so that it could be scored in relation to 
the model shown in Table 46. This maintained the aspirational objective of the standard 
because it allowed scope for improvement for SMEs who may just meet the ‘Acceptable’ 
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level. This maturity model also satisfied the SMEs reviewers who were concerned that there 
may be certain requirements which would not be applicable to a particular business, which it 
would then be expected to carry it out for the sole aim of being able to say it complies with 
the standard rather than meeting the objective the standard itself (the management of risk 
during the supply of ICT products and services). If an assessor agreed that an activity was 
not relevant to the respective SME, then they would be scored as ‘Acceptable’ – the 
minimum requirement (level 3). 
The result was an assessor’s handbook that documented sample evidence across the 1 to 5 
scale for each LoE and KLoE. This provided a benchmark for assessors to manage the risk 
of different assessors awarding different scores to KLoEs or LoEs at the same level of 
maturity in different SMEs. Assessments of the pilot group of SMEs could then be carried 
out as a vanguard for the full scheme. 
Table 47 summarises the results and interpretation of Project ε (Accredit UK). 
Table 47: Results and interpretation of Project ε (Accredit UK) 
Results Lessons learnt Evidence and 
organisational 
idiosyncrasies observed 
This project yielded a rich 
record of stakeholder views 
about the content of a 
standard and the process for 
reviewing that content for 
acceptability by the 
stakeholder groups. These 
included representation from 
small businesses that would 
be expected to comply with 
the standard, their trade 
bodies and regional 
development agency, and 
the customers whose 
demands were expected to 
be met more readily through 
their supplier compliance 
with the new standard. 
This project shows what is 
done to define a new 
standard. Confidence in the 
standard moves from 
uncertainty to assurance as 
stakeholders are involved.  
The interaction of 
stakeholders in the 
determining of what needs to 
be captured in a standard to 
mitigate risk in the 
procurement of ICT from 
small to medium-sized 
enterprises. 
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5.5.2 Project ζ: The Local e-Government Standards Board 
The work on Accredit UK served to investigate and validate the processes involved in setting 
standards and creating a certification process to benchmark organisations against a set 
standard. The LeGSB case study was interesting from two aspects. The first was that the 
case study did not just involve defining a standard for the organisations delivering a service 
themselves to meet, as in the Accredit UK example, but that the artefact to be created was a 
standard about standards – a metastandard – that set out how other standards should be 
defined. The second aspect that made this case study of particular noteworthiness was the 
process of testing the efficacy of a standard for standards in its ability to define or select the 
actual standards to be adopted by a community. However it must be noted that during the 
interregnum between the definition of the standard for standards and the test of the process 
for adopting standards, the commissioning body lost sight of the metastandard and created 
a second document based on their assumptions of practices in standards development and 
without the rigour applied to create the original. For example, in isolation from references to 
accepted practice amongst standard setters, the owning committee of the developing 
standard defined the term ‘certification’ as the acceptance of a standard into its corpus 
rather than the accepted definition of it referring to the benchmarking of an organisation 
against a standard where certification refers to the granting of a certificate of compliance. 
The early desk research involved looking to see what other standards bodies did to assure 
sufficient rigour in the assurance that the standards that they set are likely to solve the 
problems that they have been allocated to manage. These methods are discussed in 
Chapter 2. A process was defined using the basic ‘BS 0’ method but tempered for the size of 
LeGSB and the likelihood of it being able to convene enough subject matter experts to 
review standards in specialist areas as is carried out by BSI. 
The first draft that was sent to LegSB for review included introductory material such as 
definitions of the life cycle and scope of the LeGSB standard for standards document and 
how it would be applied to the taxonomy of LeGSB work. This involved the opportunity to 
define work streams for each standards-related area and the proposed life cycle for each 
standard from a proposed need to a standard through to its obsolescence or withdrawal from 
the LeGSB corpus of standards (see Figure 35). 
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Figure 35: The LeGSB standards life cycle 
Six iterations of the standardization definition document were produced in response to the 
initial commission and the comments received from the reviewers. Process diagrams were 
added and the imperative tone of the text expanded to more descriptive text. Some 
pagination improvements were made and some small changes to terminology for example, 
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the ‘Initial Draft’ of a standard was referred to in subsequent revision as the ‘First Draft’. 
Some governance changes were made to the process. For example, acceptance of a 
proposal (for a new Work Stream or standard) became the remit of LeGSB’s Executive 
Board. The term ‘Observer’ changed to someone in receipt of ‘Information Only’ to 
differentiate the role from a proposed Technology Observatory that would look for areas of 
developing technology where standardisation would be needed. 
The LeGSB development process for creating standards was presented as a single 
recommendation that would make best use of the resources available to LeGSB, adopting a 
sustainable standardization model derived through the desk research of the process 
definitions from existing standards bodies. Two artifacts were created specifically to de-risk 
the standardisation process itself. These were a participation charter for contributors and 
reviewers to agree to, setting out their obligation for timely participation in reviews (to reduce 
the lag between identifying the need for a standard and defining that standard) and a conflict 
of interest declaration to allow controlled access from representatives of vendors or those 
who are, for example, on the standards-making committees of other organisations. The 
purpose of the latter was designed to control the development of standards that favoured a 
commercial offering yet allowed the expertise of the vendor community to be tapped and to 
avoid over-promotion of an existing standard that may not be in the best interest of LeGSB’s 
thrall. 
The completed specification of the ‘Local e-Government Standard Board: Standards 
Development and Adoption Process’ was handed over to the consultant overseeing the 
project in the expectation that this reviewed specification would define the modus operandi 
for LeGSB to build up its own sector-specific repository of standards that would be trusted by 
its stakeholders. However, this was not realised and I was commissioned to test the 
processes defined in a specification of ‘e-SB Standards Certification Process’ (where e-SB 
referred to the e-Standards Board, the successor by name to LeGSB). 
A meeting with e-SB was arranged to confirm the work plan and the methodology with 
particular reference to levels of authority and the responsibilities for granting access to their 
on-line document repository (Custodian) during the pilot. e-SB created the first RFPs and 
handed them over to be driven through the subsequent process steps. Once the first 
candidates for RFPs/RFCs were actually in hand, the degree of rigour to apply to the 
community and stakeholder consultation and the appropriate time frame for any pilot 
adoptions/implementations was determined. For example, reviews of standards that were 
wholly documentation based could be expected to be much quicker than reviews of 
standards also requiring consideration of technical implications (that may have to be tested 
with hardware and software). Similarly, where technical considerations extended as far as 
requiring pilot implementations, it seemed most effective to seek to piggy back on existing 
implementation projects to expedite the review quickly – these had to be found and engaged 
with formally.  
 submissionvi_dgd08 
188 
The initial discussions set the goal of teasing 5 RFPs through the ‘certification’ process to 
get a clear view of how the process would affect different sorts of would-be standards. 
However, the proposal registered as RFP004 was sponsored by a supplier and not by a 
local authority as required by e-SB rules. This was therefore withdrawn. The remaining four 
RFPs (Table 48) were deemed, in discussion with the e-SB Chief Executive, to be a 
representative sample. 
Table 48: RFPs selected to test the standards adoption process 
RFP Proposed standardisation 
RFP001 A set of XML schema to support data integration for Choice-based Lettings. 
RFP002 A set of Data Definitions from GovTalk, a document repository run by the 
Cabinet Office to distribute standards and templates to support the 
e-Government Metadata Standard (e-GMS). 
RFP003 The Local Government Category List for the delivery of e-Government services. 
RFP005 (of which more is said later) was eventually joined by RFPs 6, 12, and 15 as 
proposed standards for data sharing protocols. 
To prompt meaningful discussion and useful commentary from would-be reviewers, a 
detailed review questionnaire for each RFP was prepared. As the work developed, some 
initial delays, (for example, compiling distribution lists of reviewers) were not allowed to 
extend the boundaries of the closed consultation so that it would be apparent how much 
could be done within that period. The Chief Executive of e-SB was kept informed of the 
plans, activities, and issues as the pilot progressed. Issues with individual RFPs were 
referred to the e-SB Standards Consultant (the lead contact for the RFP) championing the 
respective proposal. 
In addition to the framework in the e-SB Certification Process Guide, ‘additional’ activity with 
e-SB to realise the process was agreed; as the process matured with a developed register of 
contributors and reviewers, some of the initial engagement correspondence, to entice 
participants, would not be necessary. The realised method for the trial is set out in Table 49. 
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Table 49: Trialling the standardisation method 
Step Activity 
1 Material for each proposed standard was uploaded to the e-SB website within the 
Custodian library and encapsulated in a ‘Request for Proposal’ (RFP) form that noted 
the content and described the provenance of the material under consideration. 
2 Each proposed standard had an appointed e-SB Standards Consultant who would 
assist in the development of a set of questions that would elicit useful responses 
from reviewers of the proposed standard(s). Each standard had its own set of 
questions – this was based on a proforma outline that was extracted from NCC’s 
document review process, supplemented with ideas drawn from a North West e-
Government Group (NWEGG) consultation which was forwarded by one of the e-SB 
consultants. These were provided to reviewers in Microsoft Word format so that they 
could use the ‘Track Changes’ function to highlight their comments. 
3 The specialised questionnaires for the consultation became the basis of a library of 
editable review documents to be employed according to their type/category in future 
e-SB standards reviews. These were designed to elicit feedback in a familiar format 
for both reviewers (as they become used to the process) and the analysts who 
synthesise the comments into a coherent single strategy to issue, develop, or reject 
the proposal(s). 
4 For each proposed standard, a discussion thread on the Custodian section of the e-
SB website was set up. This comprised a note about each proposed standard, the 
deadline for comments, and a link to the source material. 
5 Each e-SB consultant provided a list of participants for their respective consultation, 
with the support of the local authority sponsor of each proposal. 
6 The Chief Executive sent out a vanguard e-mail ‘warning’ of third-party involvement 
in the review to all participants, and requested their cooperation and participation. 
This was a significant support because of local government practitioners who would 
not readily accept proposals that appeared to come from outside their ranks. 
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Table 49: Trialling the standardisation method 
Step Activity 
7 Following the Chief Executive’s announcement, an e-mail directing each reviewer to 
the material relevant to the proposed standard under review was distributed, and 
included the respective, specially prepared question set. An attempt to create some 
‘momentum’ was put in place by asking for the nominated reviewers to themselves 
nominate other contributors but before they get down to review the material so that 
these additional reviewers could be given as close to the six weeks elapsed 
consultation time as possible. The additional names were added to a register of 
reviewers. With the exception of the data sharing protocol proposal(s) – RFP005 et 
al. – there were few additional names added during the closed consultation period. 
8 A separate e-mail followed the original to persuade closed consultation participants 
to use the on-line Custodian forums. This could have been included in the original 
invitation e-mail but this would have significantly added to the length of that 
communication. 
9 When comments were returned, these were gathered together from the marked up 
review documents and a collated report was sent to the respective e-SB contact for 
each RFP. 
Note:  The original intention of adding in comments from the Custodian forums was 
not necessary with the exception of one comment in overall support of 
RFP001 and general input for the ‘recalled’ data sharing protocol proposal(s) 
as little use was made of the on-line facility. 
10 A summary of the collected comments (for RFPs 002 and 003) was collated and 
reported on a Board Approval form that was introduced into the process, during the 
pilot, for proposals which did not need to go to open consultation/RFC voting, or (in 
future) will have been through the RFC voting stage. (At which point the Board 
Approval becomes a quality control to assure the passage of the proposal/RFP 
through the appropriate open/closed consultation process and the correct disposition 
of the comments received during the consultations.) 
The on-line discussion forums (Step 4 in Table 49) were an isolated facility on the e-SB 
website that used an open source software threaded-discussion application (Snitz). Some 
initial discussion suggested that it may be replaced by a proprietary package from the 
service provider of e-SB’s website but as this was untested, a decision to retain the ‘Snitz’ 
environment was taken by e-SB. This was timely because it meant no delay in activating the 
forums for this pilot, and had no implications on the knowledge of the e-SB technical 
coordinator or myself who were both well versed in the Snitz tool. It became apparent that 
this decision was worthwhile because the lack of response, in this pilot, to the use of forums 
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suggests that they may not be an effective consultation tool in this community. However, 
capitalising on the good experiences of other forums might still have been an option and this 
is discussed below. 
The forums for the pilot were set up in consultation with the technical coordinator of e-SB. It 
was agreed that because the named groups for the closed consultation(s) were on the 
recommendation of board members, the Moderator function did not need to be used for the 
pilot. The moderator function would be used for ‘open’ discussions after the pilot to pick up 
on emotive comments that may arise, and understand local sensitivities. This formed a 
recommendation in the report of the trial and was based on based on experience of 
managing NCC's knowledge network forum. 
The place of the forums in the closed consultation was questioned by one of the e-SB 
standards consultants, remarking that the questionnaires distributed with each proposal 
should promote enough commentary from reviewers. It was noted that the creation of the 
forum facility for each proposal was to allow contribution through as many channels as 
possible. On the whole, the key information came through responses to the questionnaires. 
To ease the burden of administration, and more importantly allow instantaneous access to 
the forums, it was decided to allow participants to register themselves. They could then 
access the closed consultation forums straight away using the password contained in the e-
mail (q.v.) drawing their attention to the facility. The level of confidentiality of the discussions 
was not seen to exclude the traditionally insecure method of distributing passwords in this 
way. 
An occasional user did have problems down loading documents or registering for a forum. 
This had a minor time implication for the convenor of the forums who was expected by the 
users to offer the technical support also. This was a minor distraction for a limited 
consultation but could become more onerous as activity develops. This is not least because 
the configuration of a users own information technology can affect their connectivity and 
there is an expectation that the central facility (in this case Custodian) would either be 
(incorrectly thought of) as the source of the problem or as having the duty of care to provide 
the corrective of workaround for the user. At least one problem recorded during the trial was 
a user unable to read the ‘.zip’ file of RFP material. It was clear that this was a result of 
trying to open the file direct from Custodian (theoretically possible, but not a stable process) 
rather than downloading the ‘.zip’ file first. e-SB already had a clear source of technical 
support and the communications channel between the e-SB technician and the project to 
trial the standards adoption process worked well. 
To get the closed consultations running, some peripheral documentation/instructions were 
created as the various RFPs were distributed for comment. This minimised the time taken to 
follow the critical path. To help to create a repository of products from the pilot, the various 
proforma items created were appended to the project report. After two weeks of no 
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contributions in the forums, it was suggested that each e-SB contact for the respective RFPs 
add an opening message to their forum/forums. This suggestion was not implemented. 
It was useful to create an RFP progress log (as a spreadsheet) to keep track of the various 
proposals, the responses coming in, and the actions upcoming (such as sending out 
reminders to the would-be reviewers). The headings were added as they became apparent, 
and it suggested that a useful, formal tool should be programmed for project management of 
proposed standards through the review process, with traceability to a level of detail that can 
be followed by others staffing the process. This could ensure that leave, sickness, turnover 
etc. would have a minimal effect on the process. It would also be useful for internal audits for 
the quality assurance of the process. 
RFP001 – XML Schema for Choice-based Letting 
The proposal to standardise on XML Schema for Choice-based lettings, RFP001 tested the 
standards adoption process in two ways. Firstly, RFP001 was a specialist technical standard 
for a specialised area of local authority housing activity. It would therefore have to appeal to 
technology specialists (XML) and (indirectly) those who will be serviced by the systems that 
apply the standard. Secondly, it was the most difficult to elicit timely responses from those 
practitioners and local authority representatives that were invited to comment on the 
worthiness of the schema for standardisation. It may be noted that the RFP005 – which was 
coupled with several other RFPs for tiered data sharing protocols – also had few responses 
as compared to the list of names to whom the opportunity to comment was given, but the 
depth of response from the few who contributed delivered significant thought leadership on 
the approach for that collection of RFPs. 
e-SB gave the direction to manage the proposal through a discussion following its receipt 
from a relatively closed source of a few users. It was noted that the material was distributed 
in several files and centred on a ‘zip’ file of 6 megabytes. The proposed standard was well 
recorded from the point of view of the amount of documentation; however where to start, and 
the relevant importance of the documentary items supplied, were not clear to reviewers. 
There was a clearly defined standard up for adoption but there had been no comprehensive 
set of comments about this standard. This might have been the result of (a) insufficient time 
to digest the material and to comment, (b) no interest in the subject, or (c) nothing to add to 
the discussion. If (c) then there should have been better effort to elicit such feedback. 
RFP002 – UK Government Data Definitions 
This proposal was to settle on the use of 8 definitions from the UK Government Data 
Definitions Catalogue from the Cabinet Office e-Government Unit information repository 
GovTalk. As this was from an established, ‘open’ source, it only required the closed 
consultation to validate the adoption. The information was supplied as an HTML page of 
links to the Data Definitions (from GovTalk) being proposed for certification. To send out a 
single document with all the items under review, an Adobe Acrobat PDF file was created and 
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the observation made that there are likely to be many RFPs of this sort. Because of this 
potential proliferation, e-SB should have been proactive in (a) reviewing the GovTalk content 
at the time, and (b) raising RFPs based on collections of relevant/related standards, and 
then maintaining a watching brief for new additions. 
The reviewers for this were drawn from members of the Cabinet Office e-Government Unit 
(eGU) process and schema groups, local government people who had used the definitions 
in schemas, and suppliers to local government projects who had used the definitions in local 
authority schemas. 
RFP003 - Local Government Services List 
This proposal was for the adoption of the Local Government Services List (LGSL) from the 
local government e-services delivery (esd) toolkit as a standard. As with the data definitions 
of RFP002, the ‘open’ source suggested that the proposal only needed a closed consultation 
to validate the adoption, not least because of the trust that local e-government practitioners 
have in the research and maintenance of esd toolkit. However, although the adoption 
seemed straightforward enough in concept, there was a need to keep a close eye on 
‘additional services’ which may need to be added so that they can be recorded separately 
and voted on for standardisation when the list became open for amendment (it had been 
frozen to promote its use as a stable entity). This tallied with a recommendation for a 
proactive standardisation observatory to be operated by e-SB (rather than waiting for 
external proposals from local authorities) which was similar to the proactive review of the 
GovTalk contents referred to above. 
RFP005 et al. - Tiered data sharing protocols 
In hindsight, the effective way of progressing standardisation for this – tiered data sharing 
protocols – would have been to initiate a process that proposed a standard for tiered data 
sharing (RFP) and then settled on the format to be proposed as a standard. This would be 
an example where several RFCs could bud from the proposal with a decision as to which 
one(s) would be adopted. 
From the outset it was noted that this was not a topic area for a closed consultation with a 
restricted number of reviewers; it needed a very wide debate on this to get to an agreed 
position. This was reflected in the growing number of proposed contributors who themselves 
brought forward new, potential protocols as candidate standards (hence the ‘budding off’ 
analogy above). The actuality was that each protocol was registered as a separate RFP so 
that it became unclear as to whether it was an ‘all or nothing’ approach, or whether a 
complete set of proposals had been reached. This problem was exacerbated further by the 
rumour that central government guidelines for data sharing protocols were scheduled for 
release that autumn. The (then) Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) was contacted 
and its representative explained that DCA’s current (2004) toolbox was still valid. However 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
194 
they had intentions to update it but a proposal for this update was still being prepared for 
ministerial approval. 
A more thorough, explanatory questionnaire was prepared for the collection of protocols, but 
this did not foresee (a) the growing number of suggestions that were being brought forward 
or (b) the bias from certain participants who naturally favoured the protocols that they had 
either used or had developed. This latter problem may not always be a problem in the 
assessment of standards but fundamental differences in the number of tiers a protocol 
should have were registered. It was also noted that one was oriented towards a particular 
suppliers ‘solution’. In the light of these variables, the corresponding proposals were 
withdrawn to be used as input to a coherent proposal for standardisation in this area. 
Table 50 summarises the results and interpretation of Project ζ (LeGSB). 
Table 50: Results and interpretation of Project ζ (LeGSB) 
Results Lessons learnt Evidence and 
organisational 
idiosyncrasies observed 
This project delivered 
detailed recommendations 
for establishing a sustainable 
process for setting standards 
that would increase the risk 
of the acceptability of the 
selected standards from the 
viewpoint of the stakeholder 
who would be expected to 
implement them. 
LeGSB required a process to 
select standards to address 
areas of risk and it was 
through this process that 
they would engender a 
consensus view of 
acceptable standards. 
A close-knit community of 
local government officers 
showed a tendency to either 
create their own standards 
and become leaders in the 
field of the standard or 
cautiously work around the 
area of standardisation in 
anticipation of change that 
would be effected by a new 
standard that they foresaw 
as emerging. 
5.6 Fieldwork: the deployment of standards to treat risk 
5.6.1 Project η: Housing association – information systems risk (security) strategy 
The context of information security risk that the housing association required a strategy to 
treat was represented by three information attributes – confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability – that could be managed by the standard ISO/IEC 27001 for information security 
management. Confidentiality in practice would be where some information is suitable for 
dissemination to the public or to tenants yet other information is highly confidential to a few 
individuals. For the strategy – the localised implementation of the standard – a level of 
practical labelling information would be set to show its confidentiality in a consistent and 
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visible manner and ensuring that those without the appropriate level of privilege cannot 
access it. 
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Figure 36: The structure of ISO/IEC 27001 for information security management 
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Availability was referred to the responsibility of information owners to put measures in place 
to ensure that their information will be available as staff and tenants expect it, and integrity 
was the propensity for staff, tenants, and other stakeholders to trust the information that they 
are basing their decisions on to be accurate, complete and up-to-date. 
Table 51: Project η: Method for defining an information systems risk (security) 
strategy in a housing association 
Step Activity 
1 Project planning, organisation, assumptions and risk management 
2 Interview planning and design 
3 Structured interviews 
4 Analysis of information gathered during interview 
5 Preparation of draft information security strategy 
6 Peer review of draft information security strategy 
7 Revision and issue of the information security management strategy 
To ensure an understanding of the research and reporting methods being employed, I 
created a Project Initiation Document (PID) for the association. This provided an agreement 
covering the objectives of the research, the scope of the investigations and the terms of 
reference for the work (BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005); how the research was to 
be carried out – and what artifacts by way of reports or presentations the research would 
produce; the governance of the project defining relationship between the association’s 
management (the project sponsor), other staff across the association, and the researcher; 
the likely risks to the research and how they would be mitigated; the assumptions the 
research would be based on and the pre-requisites to be in place at the association to make 
the research schedule effective. The PID also defined the quality assurance processes for 
the deliverables. 
The sponsors of the project were selected to have sufficient status and authority to ensure 
that the project was recognised as a strategic priority. This led to the establishment of a high 
level and influential Project Board, with reports being received from an effective Project 
Manager. As many stakeholders were involved in the project, a Project Briefing was 
prepared for all of them to ensure that they were informed about the scope, objectives, and 
opportunities. At a practical level this saved the time of the analysts in explaining the 
objectives of the project and what was expected from meetings with each stakeholder 
individually. 
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Information gathering was designed to draw up a comprehensive understanding of the 
business/service context of the housing association. The business/service policies and 
priorities would then be prepared to drive the recommendations for secure exploitation of the 
association’s information technology. This required arriving at a view as to how the housing 
association will operate in business terms in order to propose the optimum systems 
configuration for the future. Clearly the technologies proposed would have to not only 
provide for immediate requirements, but also for future developments. The first stage of the 
information gathering was reviewing available documentation such as corporate/business 
plans, before moving on to IT-related strategies and standards. 
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Figure 37: ISO/IEC 27002 controls for information security management 
A structured programme of interviews for collecting information using the information 
security control objectives of ISO/IEC 17799 (ISO/IEC 27002) was prepared to ensure that 
there would be consistency across the project, in terms of the level of the information 
acquired. The objective of this was to build up a complete store of factual information, 
knowledge of strengths and weaknesses and aspirations. This approach enabled those with 
minimal knowledge of information security to express their requirements in non-technological 
terms. Line managers involved in the fact-finding were selected for their knowledge and 
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representation of strategic and service management requirements. The basic structure of 
each interview examined the closeness of the realized information security risk management 
processes of the association, with the practices defined in the ISO/IEC 27001/27002 
standard(s). This started with asset discovery and asset management, to understand how 
well the association knew about, and kept, records of the information it held to effect its 
business processes. 
 
Figure 38: Structure for the questions repeated across the stakeholders interviewed 
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When information gathering was completed, I compared the current practice with that set out 
in ISO/IEC 27002 and documented the options for consideration for inclusion in a future 
security strategy. These were then presented in a report to provide opportunities to test 
options individually, and in combination to eliminate options that are not feasible and 
produce further options, resulting from the review. The report could then be refined and 
published as the definitive strategy to work to. 
The project set out to mitigate the risks where its method could be affected by the quality of 
information and the availability of stakeholders for interview. These were based on the 
specific project risk which required that all relevant documentation would be available for 
review at the start of the project, and that all relevant staff would be available for consultation 
during site visits. The mitigation of these risks was based on the early identification of 
personnel to be interviewed, any additional documentation required and visits to other 
offices. A project start date was agreed with confirmation that all staff, documentation, and 
access to premises would be available. Relevant staff agreed and confirmed their availability 
during the analysts’ visits. During the early review of the information security related 
documentation that the housing association could show on demand, a selection of 
information handling policies were already apparent that could be extended to explicitly 
direct categorised information to those who need – and have a right – to know (an example 
of the effect of legislation as a standard as described in Chapter 2). This could be 
implemented by an asset/risk/impact-based model to that would treat risks associated with 
business continuity and disaster recovery (as implemented in Project θ). The 
recommendations referred to the establishment of policies – localised standards – that 
would be commensurate with the corporate responsibility that the housing association has 
for the information it deals with. Applying Deming’s management cycle (Deming, 1950) 
favoured by BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005, the extension of the existing policies 
would be carried through to defined processes setting out the method to manage risk (plan), 
introducing a supporting framework of training and awareness (do) and followed up to 
ensure compliance with the policies (check), reviewed to a schedule for continued relevance 
to the association's mission (check) and enforced or amended as necessary (act). 
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5.6.2 Project θ: Fieldwork in construction – risk to treatment analysis 
Table 52: Method for project θ: fieldwork in construction – risk to treatment analysis 
Step Activity 
1 Project planning, organisation, assumptions and risk management 
2 Interview planning and design 
3 Structured interviews to inform the content and detail of the workshop programme 
4 Analysis and design of a workshop programme to support the company in learning 
about and implementing information security risk management 
5 Workshop I: Information security management training and information security 
policy writing 
6 Workshop II: Risk assessment (carried out on two sites) 
7 Workshop III: Risk treatment 
Option 3 from Table 42 was selected because it would provide the client with the best fit of 
the standard to its operations. The methodology was applied by convening a project initiation 
meeting between the action researcher and the organisation’s Director of IT. This meeting 
was used to reconfirm the scope and timescale of the assignment, discuss any sensitive 
issues, identify staff to be involved with the project, and agree contents of a project briefing 
for all staff who will be involved with the project. Site visits to two of the organisation’s 3 
offices were arranged where interviews were convened with business process owners and 
support staff (IT manager, business systems manager, systems administrator, 
representative(s) from operations, quality manager, financial controller, and human 
resources director) who could articulate the detail of the information they handled and the 
need for protection of that information. Three workshops were planned using the information 
from the structured interviews to create ISMS artefacts: to teach the writing of information 
security policies; to design and begin populating a register of information assets and risks to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of those assets; and to develop a risk treatment 
plan to show how the information assets will be protected from the risks identified during the 
preceding workshop. 
After the information security policy writing workshop, staff undertook to spend time using a 
template to complete a first draft of the security policy documentation. This was carried out 
by prioritising about a dozen individual policies to be completed as a basis for working on in 
the context of the second, planned workshop (Risk Assessment). Ownership of the policies 
– to assure that they would be written by those whose area of responsibility they cover – 
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was confirmed. The policy owners were encouraged to get together with their contributors 
within two weeks of the workshop to begin the drafting work whilst their experience of the 
workshop was still fresh. On request of the client’s project manager – who thought the policy 
areas were too generic to inform the owners as to the required content – I prepared 
templates with some sample content. These provided the policy owners with more explicit 
instruction as to what was needed to control information security. 
Although this was done before focusing on risk assessments, it had the advantage that staff 
could immediately bring in known issues within the boundaries of organisations ISMS. I 
reviewed the draft policy documents and prepared and convened a second workshop to 
present feedback and provide risk assessment training based on the client’s business 
activities (as derived from the structured interviews). This second workshop was followed by 
the client conducting a full risk assessment project to produce a report that identifies 
acceptable levels of risk. The draft policy documentation was updated to reflect the findings 
from the risk assessment. I then reviewed the risk assessment report and prepared a third 
workshop covering tools and methods – defined by ISO/IEC 27002 – that may be deployed 
to mitigate the risks. The result of this third workshop was the development of an information 
security policy manual and a statement of applicability (which specifies which controls 
should be deployed where) and a risk treatment plan which applied the following mitigation 
methods: prevent realisation of the risk (stop it happening), reduce the effect it has, 
transference (making treatment the responsibility of someone else – perhaps an outsourcing 
arrangement), contingency (having an alternative way of working if the risk is realised), and 
acceptance (recognising that the risk is just too onerous to mitigate, or its impact too 
negligible to worry about, and so that the organisation will carry the risk and its impact if 
realised). 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
204 
5.6.3 Project ι: Pensions and actuarial services – risk management (security) 
policies 
Table 53: Method for project ι: A review of risk management (information security) 
policies in a financial services firm delivering pensions and actuarial products. 
Step Activity 
1 Project planning and initiation 
2 Short audit of current information security arrangements 
3 Review existing information security policies for the holding and subsidiary 
organisation 
4 Preparation of structured interviews to understand risks and organisation’s culture 
5 Structured interviews with staff 
6 Gap analysis of responses: the difference between actual and recommended 
information security practices 
7 Collate existing information security policies and revise in context of interviews 
and benchmark with ISO/IEC 27001 
8 Review the drafted policies with the company 
9 Revise the policies and issue them for implementation 
5.6.3.1 Review existing information security policies 
A thorough review of the holding company’s documentation was carried out against the 
relevant parts of the BS 7799 (ISO/IEC 27000) standard series. This was repeated for the 
policies that had been drafted for the subsidiary company covering existing, relevant 
subsidiary company IT and HR Policy documents. 
5.6.3.2 Preparation of structured interviews to understand risks and organisation’s 
culture 
Structured, in-depth interviews with staff were carried out to audit a sample of activities from 
different business divisions and office locations to assess what practices were implemented. 
This included the IT support manager, a network support analyst, the human resources 
manager, a senior HR officer, an actuarial services partner, a general insurance consultant, 
a risk-benefit unit consultant, an investment consultant, the facilities administration manager, 
and the IT director. 
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5.6.3.3 Gap analysis of responses 
The records of the structured interviews were analysed to identify any discrepancies / gaps 
between the subsidiary and holding company practices, the requirements of the holding 
company, and industry good practice. 
The company’s existing information security policies were collated and revised in the context 
of the interviews and benchmarked with BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005/BS 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005. The result of this work was a draft report showing 
gaps in compliance with accepted good practice and recommended changes to the 
management of security to comply with the good practice. 
5.6.3.4 Review and revision 
The report was reviewed with the IT manager of the subsidiary company and his feedback 
and the report were used to update the draft information security policy manual for issue. 
5.7 Resulting intervention 
In this last major subsection of the chapter, I consider the instructions given to the three 
organisations who commissioned the fieldwork. The implications of these interventions – the 
lessons learnt from the projects in relation to my research questions – are discussed and 
tabulated in Chapter 6. The details of these interventions show how the clauses of a 
standard may be extracted and applied as specific risk treatments in a rich mapping of a 
standard to the risks. 
5.7.1 Project η: Housing association – information systems risk (security) strategy 
This subsection sets out the implementation of the parts of ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 
standards that would treat the risks to the housing association’s information systems. I 
acknowledge that these address known risks, but note that the handling of emergent risks is 
possible through a generic learning process triggered by incident management (hence 
recommendation about this to the association including counsel to implement the 
international standard – PD ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 – for this discipline). The housing 
association’s aims and objectives were summarised in two core documents. One was 
externally focused for its customers entitled ‘Our Commitments to You’, and the other was 
for internal instruction: a business continuity plan that established the readiness of the 
organisation to continue to meet those commitments when information security incidents 
occur. The following observations and interventions were specified to support the goals set 
out in those two primary documents. 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
206 
© NCC 2007
2. Store
3. Process
5. Dispose
1. Create
4. Transport
 
Figure 39: The organisation’s information life cycle 
In regard to this, a report made the following key recommendations for the housing 
association (Project η), tabulated in Table 54 and detailed below, set out in the ISO/IEC 
27001 taxonomy: 
Table 54: Recommendations for the housing association target of Project η 
 Observation Recommendation from the information BoK 
1 The organisation’s information 
system is a technology-
supported capture, processing 
and reporting mechanism that 
underpins the supply of housing 
and related services within a 
social context (Figure 39). 
Information is a core asset and 
must be treated to the same 
scrutiny as physical assets that 
may be more easily measured in 
financial terms. 
Bridge the gap between the document retention 
schedule and the business continuity plans by 
addressing the risks to discrete and collected 
information assets 
This will support the realisation of business 
continuity which is currently aimed at bringing 
information technology back on-line. It should be 
extended to the appropriate availability of 
information assets. (Figure 40) 
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Table 54: Recommendations for the housing association target of Project η 
 Observation Recommendation from the information BoK 
2 Apply standards to the 
organisation’s goals for the 
security and effectiveness of its 
information systems provision. 
ISO/IEC 27001 (BS 7799 Part 2) Information 
technology. Security techniques. Information 
security management systems. Requirements 
BS ISO/IEC 17799 (BS 7799 Part 1) Information 
technology. Security techniques. Code of practice 
for information security management. 
BS ISO/IEC 20000:2005 Information technology – 
Service Management particularly the section that 
outlines the recommended contents for service 
level agreements (SLAs). 
ISO/IEC TR 18044 Information security incident 
management. 
ISO/IEC 18019 Software and system engineering. 
Guidelines for the design and preparation of user 
documentation for application software186. 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
                                                                                                                                                      
186
 Although this is a work for technical writers, it was noted that the IT team are correcting work done 
following an in-house manual that gave incorrect instruction. This had implications on the time 
taken for the IT Team to correct the database and the time during which the integrity of information 
on a database was not commensurate with requirements. 
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Table 54: Recommendations for the housing association target of Project η 
 Observation Recommendation from the information BoK 
3 There is already board-level 
recognition of information 
systems risk187. Extend this 
throughout the association’s 
management and operational 
staff. 
The ‘Central Services – Information and 
Communications Technology’ section of the RISK 
MAP SIGNIFICANT RISKS 141206.xls document, 
developed and maintained by the association, is 
the foundation for a focused ICT risk assessment 
that would feedback to future board-level direction. 
Base this risk assessment on the information 
assets and carry the respective requirements for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability through to 
the business continuity plans so that the 
investment in business continuity stays aligned to 
the return to the business operations. 
Many projects will share common risks and should 
feed into a project risk register that carries 
respective risks up to the Significant Risks List as 
appropriate. 
4 Build on current IT security 
policies to establish a 
comprehensive set of policies 
that apply controls to mitigate 
risk continuously. 
This comprehensive approach to policy making 
will: 
• Increase efficiency of working practices. 
(No time lost to incorrect recording or 
processing information or retrieving 
information incorrectly exchanged.) 
• Set out requirements for information 
systems that treat risks as a matter of 
course. 
• Make business continuity an ‘organic’ 
component of the organisation’s activities 
rather than an ‘add-on’. 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
187
 The call for the study in project η is evidence for this. 
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Table 54: Recommendations for the housing association target of Project η 
 Observation Recommendation from the information BoK 
5 The current duty of care for the 
information held by the 
organisation on its customers, 
and the growing information 
base with which it will work for 
vulnerable people should be 
based around a data sharing 
protocol. Such a protocol can 
benefit internal communications 
– especially between business 
areas, communications with 
public sector agencies, and the 
organisation’s supply chain. 
Focus on the information requirements of the data 
sharing protocol that will set out business-driven 
requirements for IS/IT out to which the appropriate 
security controls may be applied. 
6 The organisations Human 
Resources Department should 
design and effect an information 
security awareness programme. 
This programme may seem to be in parallel with 
the core business of the housing association. 
However information security management is 
effected by day-to-day operations and these are 
guided by policies/lessons learnt which are used to 
improve policies within the context of risk to the 
organisation. 
8 There are firm foundations that 
can be built on. These were 
manifest in work including: 
• Various methods of asset 
registration including the 
minimum period for the 
retention of financial 
documents, and the 
hardware asset register. 
• A significant risks map. 
Continue with this good practice. 
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Figure 40: Core information assurance strategy for the housing association 
5.7.1.1 Asset management 
Information is an asset of the organisation (Stewart, 1997) and must be treated to the same 
scrutiny as physical assets that may be more easily measured in financial terms. The 
housing association should bridge the gap between its Document Retention Schedule and 
its Business Continuity Plans by addressing the risks to discrete and aggregated information 
assets. This will support the realisation of business continuity which is currently aimed at 
bringing information technology back on-line. It should be extended to the appropriate 
availability of information assets. Section 7.0 of the association’s Asset Management 
Strategy should make explicit reference to the security requirements of the housing 
association for its information assets. This includes the classification and control of 
information. The association should consider rankings of the value of assets to assist with 
decisions for investment in security controls (commodity items such as PCs should be 
regarded separately from the information stored on them). 
The association needed to add a system of security classification to the Document Retention 
Schedule to connect each document explicitly to the rules for handling and sharing. The 
comprehensiveness of this schedule is a foundation to an information security programme. 
This is good for the main documents but will not cover ‘helpful’ uncontrolled spreadsheets 
that may have been created by knowledgeable users. It also needs to cover software in use 
and the development tools. Assets should also be assigned owners. (See Figure 40.) 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
211 
5.7.1.2 Defining information security policies to treat risk 
Information security policies will need to be championed on a daily basis. They will form part 
of the system requirements for current and new systems. The recommended format188 for 
the elements of a central policies document is shown in Table 55. 
Table 55: Recommended contents of an information security policy 
 Policy section Description of the section 
1 Purpose Why does the association need the respective policy and what is 
the risk of not having it? 
2 Scope What does the policy apply to, and what – if anything – is 
excluded? 
3 What the policy is A clear, pithy, and imperative description of what must be done. 
4 How it’s monitored Follow the Deming quality cycle of plan-do-check-act (Deming, 
1950). How is the implementation and the effectiveness of the 
policy checked (monitored)? 
5 What happens if 
the policy is 
breached 
No assumption should be made of 100% compliance so what is 
done if the policy is not followed? What is the corrective action or 
sanctions against those who have not complied? 
6 What to do to 
enforce the policy? 
Technology, awareness, or a mix of both 
Stakeholder reviews were recommended to identify known and currently unknown risks 
(Alexander, 2007 and Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). These should be held for legacy and new 
information systems (reviewing them for compliance to the housing association’s information 
security policies), service level agreements (for example with the IT support company and 
the disaster recovery facilities provider for assurance of the suppliers' commitment to 
security189). 
A review of the current, documented network security policy document noted ambiguities or 
areas of opportunity to remove redundant paragraphs and tighten up the presentation to 
increase confidence of readers and make room for new policies (which are inevitable with 
the changing landscape of threats and technology). For example, clause 2.3 referred to ‘line 
                                                                                                                                                      
188
 Based on the Policies Project at the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute 
(www.sans.org) 
189
 It was recommended that where possible and available, governance may be easier by selecting 
organisations with certification to BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005. A register is 
maintained on-line at http://www.iso27001certificates.com/ 
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manager’ authorisation whereas clause 7.1 referred to ‘Senior Manager’ and at least part of 
the association uses the term Supervisor for the reporting hierarchy. The document did not 
cover: environmental and physical security, risk treatment for mobile workers, or taking a 
proactive approach to building security into the acquisition and development process for 
information systems. 
5.7.1.3 Organisation of information security 
Appropriate agreements with third parties should be established (for example with the 
software house providing the housing management system) to assure the information 
security controls they apply190. This is important given the apparently open, remote access 
they need to supply support services (ref. an association document: Service Level 
Agreement December 2006[1].doc). The security obligations (such as specifications and 
testing) with website developers and package developers supplying the housing association 
need to be defined. Because the housing association will require the use of niche packages 
that may not meet acceptable security standards, penetration testing should identify what 
amendments may be reasonably requested from suppliers or developed as ‘wrappers’ by 
the housing association’s IT team. These wrappers will themselves need testing for 
vulnerabilities. 
5.7.1.4 Independent review of information security 
There were several overlapping internal audit initiatives which would benefit from 
coordination, including a business continuity audit, ongoing internal audits, the governance 
components of an external audit (much of which can be applied by attention to information 
security), the security element of the IT Strategy Review, and initial discussions about 
implementing the BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005 standard. Audit coordination 
should be risk-based to make use of limited, independent audit resources. Recent audits 
have included scrutiny of IT which did not receive attention under the regular audit 
programme. Penetration testing had been carried out two years before these investigations. 
However, the de facto standard for an organisation of the housing association’s size and 
information profile is for penetration test to be carried out annually. This should be 
comprehensive enough to cover current policies but there may be areas that can be tested 
quickly and effectively in-house. For example, it was assumed that the association’s thin 
client terminals are not configured for use with USB memory sticks but this potential source 
of malicious software infection and data loss had not been checked. 
                                                                                                                                                      
190
 This is compliant with Ashby’s requisite variety (Ashby, 1957). Management of risk is distributed 
to suppliers rather than the central recipient of the suppliers’ services being expected to manage 
risks whose channel into the organisation is through each supplier. Standards – such as BS 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005 provide not only a risk management lexicon between 
stakeholders but also a medium for addressing commonly acceptable levels of risk (Wood and 
Dresner, 2007). 
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A third-party provider of disaster recovery facilities had tested the business continuity and 
disaster recovery plan but not all problems warrant the expense of calling on the provider or 
are suitable for the provider to evaluate in terms of the impact of the risks faced. For 
example, what happens when key staff are unavailable or an unplanned power cut tests the 
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) units? The association must schedule its own sequence 
of tests. 
5.7.1.5 Human resources security 
There was a good attitude to starter/leaver induction and exit interviews respectively. 
However little was done in between, so ICT management process needs to be enhanced to 
include changing authorisation privileges when staff move within the association This may 
become more critical as the amount of sensitive information increases (for example, 
information about vulnerable individuals through liaison with the local authority). 
Several agencies were being retained for the provision of temporary staff and the 
responsibility for selection is transferred to them. Requirements for agency staff such as 
security screening and briefing by the providing agency should be clearly specified in the 
mutual agreements. The housing association should make their confidentiality requirements 
explicit, with appropriate confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements carried through from the 
housing association to the agencies and the temporary staff (who also need a security 
component to their induction). 
General awareness of security responsibilities – not currently part of the starter programme 
– should extend beyond the induction of permanent and temporary staff to refresher 
sessions for those who have been with the association for some time. It was suggested that 
staff who had been in post for more than three years would not have benefited from the 
improved security awareness included in the induction for new staff. 
Technical staff should have the necessary training to be aware of the security nuances of 
the technologies with which they are working. As noted, although there was an intention to 
move from bespoke, in-house development, to buying proprietary systems, support and 
tailoring of these systems can introduce vulnerabilities. 
Staff who have responsibility for adding information to housing association databases should 
have their understanding of their tasks verified by an internal qualification or mentoring. This 
will reduce the risk of incorrect information on databases and the need (as experienced) for 
the IT team (as has happened) to make corrections directly to the database. This suggests 
that a tiered privilege access model for end-users may be appropriate so that supervisors 
can make corrections rather than the IT team being responsible for such corrections. 
The association’s policy which sets out the uses of its information system facilities which are 
deemed acceptable covered Internet and e-mail well but did not extend to other potential 
applications of housing association resources (such as printers and copiers) and should be 
updated to do so. 
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5.7.1.6 Physical and environmental security 
The organisation’s headquarters had a straight forward approach to physical security based 
on a reception desk challenging visitors. Standard common-sense security measures such 
as locking windows and a clear desk policy for sensitive documents should be encouraged 
though a security awareness programme. In contrast, it was noted that it may be possible to 
access and move around the housing association's building services premises unchallenged 
through external doors left open or through reception when unstaffed. Plans for a proposed 
new building should include design based on risk assessment of the areas where sensitive 
information is handled and application of the respective risk treatments from NISCC, 2005 
on physical security. 
It was noted that the provision of on-site disaster recovery facilities relied on the availability 
of a suitable power supply but the current site has no contingency for a loss of power other 
than a 15-minute UPS for a fail-safe shut down (which has been tested during power cuts). If 
this risk is acceptable it should be stated explicitly in the significant risks log rather than 
implied. Desktop computers were allowed to be left on standby and in one office a mobile 
phone charger was plugged in but unconnected. The latter was a fire risk but both add 
unnecessary cost through the electricity wastage which did not fit the housing association’s 
ethos.  
Printer output was not always collected which may expose sensitive information to those 
authorised to be in the offices, but not authorised know about the exposed subject matter. 
The ease of printing led to confidential documents being left uncollected from printers (which 
also has environmental considerations). A secure printing facility was available and should 
be rolled out to staff handling confidential information. This was an opportunity to reduce 
waste and improve security simultaneously. Sensitivity to environmental issues may be the 
driver for this risk treatment over the security implications and is an example of harnessing 
risk attitude to treat more than one risk (See Chapter 4). 
5.7.1.7 Communications and Operations Management 
There was a variety of specialist software in use but no central repository for taking care of 
the installation discs so that their whereabouts were subject to individual awareness such as 
a reliance on knowing what had been moved during tidying or office reorganisation. Although 
server data is backed up and an iteration kept off-site, a problem could be the lack of access 
to the original machine and the discs to reinstall the application software to access it. The 
security of back-up tapes was scheduled for improvement with the purchase of a fireproof 
safe. 
Asset management (see above) would be improved with a central, safe repository of master 
discs. 
Amongst the documents reviewed during the research were two versions of the Terms and 
Conditions for Employment (without an indication of whether they were special to certain 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
215 
staff) and the agreement with the third party retained for disaster recovery services. This 
latter document was mainly dated 2002 (with some parts marked earlier) and so lacked 
records of the up-to-date technology configurations to be recovered in an emergency and 
the association’s and the provider’s points of contacts. This was an opportunity to combine 
good practice of current documentation being available, obsolete, and obsolescent 
information being withdrawn or marked accordingly to avoid misuse, and documents to carry 
a security classification according to a preset policy. 
There were no controls to protect information that is kept on portable storage devices which 
tend to proliferate and are easily lost. A policy for authorised use – supported by technical 
implementation – was needed. 
The contemporary responsibilities of the association for handling sensitive personal 
information and the increase of the exchange of this type of information with the inclusion of 
delegated responsibilities from its local authority and interaction with other agencies show 
the need for a tiered, data-sharing protocol. This would allow two-way sharing of information 
appropriately within parts of the housing association and between the housing association 
and the authorities. These arrangements would set out the policy requirements of 
confidentiality and data management for ICT to implement and enforce through technical risk 
treatments. Some guidance was provided by the Department for Constitutional Affairs (which 
became the Department of Justice) although it is often advisable to adopt the controls model 
that other local authorities are already using with similar associations (standards for which 
are governed by the e-Standards Body – see Project ζ). This would support the association’s 
objective (as set out in its Corporate Strategy 2005 – 2010) to ‘facilitate the greater supply of 
housing by working in partnership with the private and public sectors’. 
Risk management for consideration to permit information sharing also included the 
association’s contractors’ programme: what is the level of acceptable risk related to amount 
of IS/IT access and what is the level of detail to be specified for the induction of staff and 
contractors (which may be outsourced to the contracting company)? Risk treatment may 
include a range of measures from the level of training/induction sessions to working terms of 
conditions (including non-disclosure/confidentiality agreements). 
5.7.1.8 Access control 
Processes for granting authorised access seemed to be well covered for full/part-time 
starters and leavers – the latter improving with the human resources department, the line 
managers, and the IT department working on the notification process. The process when 
staff change roles needs to be made explicit to ensure the appropriate removal of old 
privileges as well as the granting of the new access requirements. 
The policy for wireless access to computer networks was defined as 128 bit WEP for 
wireless security. The association should consider WPA or WPA2 which closes weaknesses 
in the WEP standard that could allow unauthorised access. 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
216 
5.7.1.9 Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance 
Although focusing on acquisition and embedding packaged software, there is a risk in 
tailoring (see below). Focus should on developing well-specified and tested end-user 
routines that do not rely on the IT Team to regularly set up and manipulate. One example 
where development policy needs to be driven through, is a suggestion that an arrears report 
is extracted from one database into another before producing letters. This would require 
another technology to maintain and secure. This is also an example of where IT is expected 
to deliver a process that it does not own and therefore struggles to control with confidence. 
Although comprehensive in-house development is being phased out, there are still 
vulnerabilities that can be created during the tailoring and adapting of packaged software 
that will continue to be done by the association’s in-house IT team (for example, the threat of 
SQL injection that can expose confidential information in a database which was highlighted 
during penetration testing). Developers should embed specific security tests in their test 
plans to the standard set out in tests for different technologies at www.sans.org/score 
(Security Consensus Operational Readiness Evaluation). 
The IT team showed good awareness of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
and explained the decision to outsource on-line payments. As a matter of due diligence, a 
statement of compliance to the PCI DSS should be obtained from the third party providing 
on-line credit card payment facilities. The current website developers were keen to provide 
an e-commerce option but this was turned down. The policy should be clearly documented 
to ensure that this policy to outsource credit card handling remains a strategic way forward. 
Support for incident and events relied on the goodwill of staff to work extended hours or out-
of hours. A formal out-of-hours or leave-in-lieu policy should formalise this. The IT team has 
shared core skills that are likely to be sufficient to support the basic technologies in use. 
Incidents involving the need for their specialist skills seem to wait for their availability without 
a serious loss of service. This reliance on individuals should be a documented policy – 
supported by a risk assessment that shows the decisions regarding the availability of skills in 
relation to the reliability and business criticality of the respective service (a business impact 
analysis). 
5.7.1.10 Information security incident management 
Information incident management records noted a good account of the reaction to a major 
outbreak of ‘spyware’ and the subsequent decision to move from McAfee antivirus to 
Kaspersky Labs. The original source of the infection was not determined. A forensics policy 
may have helped. The association should adopt the practice of costing the incident with the 
goal of ensuring cost-effective responses to security incidents. 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
217 
5.7.1.11 Business Continuity 
A ‘business critical’ IT problem can be flagged for resolution within a day but if staff are 
mobile and are only on site for a short time, this may well be too long (and could have to 
conceivably wait a week until back on site) losing the opportunity for preventing the 
occurrence of the same incident with other users or the efficiency of the staff who are 
working away from the association’s premises. The association should adopt a risk-based 
formula to align the IT response time to the business continuity plan (allowing a higher 
priority than 1 day). Reliance on a single telephone line needs to be kept under scrutiny. 
There was no ‘standard’ build for PCs because of the diversity of specialist applications 
required. This strengthens the need for centrally held records of the configurations. Even a 
simple record of (say) the latest, patched version of the operating system and application X, 
Y, Z is desirable so that in the event of a crisis, recovery of the facilities needed is not down 
to personal experience/memory. This also supports any contract staff whose specialist skills 
may be needed in an emergency. 
The business continuity plan had yet to react to the pandemic response planning which had 
had its profile raised by new strains of the influenza virus. The association was directed to 
consider the advice available from public sector websites. Although there is a limit as to what 
could be done in the event of a pandemic, ICT support is likely to be a key issue (with 
problems connected with regular tasks such as the back up routines). ICT may be needed to 
allow more home-working as schools will almost certainly close, with implications on the 
childcare arrangements for some staff. Enough remote working connections should be 
available in advance. The association should carry out an audit to see if staff who may be 
required to work from home will have the equipment and suitable connection to do so. Staff 
working in these conditions will need to be being more aware of teleworking risks (which 
comprise issues equally relevant at home as in the office)191. 
Table 56 summarises the results and interpretation of Project η (the housing association). 
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 for example: the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), screen (VDU) regulations, room 
temperature and ventilation, applying the Working Time Directive or screen breaks, having an 
adequate supply of two-factor authentication devices, the use of unsafe equipment, having 
available sockets and power supply which are adequate for the IT installed, trailing cables that 
might constitute a danger, and how to deal with a security breach away from the association’s 
premises. 
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Table 56: Results and interpretation of Project η (Housing association) 
Results Lessons learnt Evidence and 
organisational 
idiosyncrasies observed 
The project used the 
ISO/IEC 27001 standard to 
benchmark the current 
activity of the housing 
association to secure its 
information systems and 
then recommended an 
information security strategy 
to be implemented as part of 
an information technology 
strategy. 
How a standard for 
information security can be 
embedded into an IT 
strategy to assure board-
level attention to information 
risk mitigation. 
Exposure of employees to 
sensitive information about 
people’s housing 
circumstances was available 
to, but on the whole not of 
concern to, the call centre or 
maintenance staff who had 
access to it. 
5.7.2 Project θ: Fieldwork in construction – risk to treatment analysis 
This project differed significantly from the two other case studies discussed in this chapter. 
In the work with the housing association described above (Project η) a detailed report was 
created to show where the implementation of information security management standards 
was advisable as part of their information systems risk strategy. The client wanted detailed 
instructions of the improvements needed for information assurance. The research phase led 
to intervening advice about how to create an environment where risk is mitigated. In the 
intervention with the firm offering pensions and actuarial services (Project ι) that follows 
below, a set of risk management (security) policies were developed following on from the 
research (see Table 59). The client received elements of their risk mitigating standards as a 
result of the research. By contrast, this fieldwork in with a construction firm (Project θ) 
delivered neither specific standards and policy, nor advice on what was needed, but rather 
facilitated a programme of knowledge transfer for the company to effect its own standards 
adoption, policy setting, and risk mitigation. 
Table 57 summarises the results and interpretation of Project θ (the construction sector 
company). 
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Table 57: Results and interpretation of Project θ (Construction) 
Results Lessons learnt Evidence and 
organisational 
idiosyncrasies observed 
The organisation became 
involved by a series of 
interviews that informed the 
research of the state of 
information security across 
its business functions. This 
became the starting point for 
a knowledge transfer activity 
because the discussion 
during these interviews 
informed the interviewees on 
pertinent risks to their 
business information that 
they were often failing to 
manage. As a result, the 
knowledge transfer process 
was completed with a series 
of workshops that made the 
IT management team able to 
assess and mitigate risk. 
How a standard for 
information security can be 
embedded into the 
management system of an 
organisation to protect a 
business from risks to its 
corporate and customer 
information and the losses 
that would ensue in the 
event of an incident. 
Embedding the expectations 
of the information security 
management system 
standard into the business 
management system of the 
organisation made it 
accessible by default. 
The organisation comprised 
polarised attitudes to 
information security varying 
from tight policies displayed 
by architects and surveyors 
to a lack of awareness of the 
sensitivity of customer 
information by staff charged 
with reviewing the architects’ 
work for compliance with 
health and safety 
regulations. The 
implementation of 
information security policies 
by the supplier to protect 
customer information could 
exceed the protection 
allotted to that information by 
the customer. 
5.7.3 Project ι: Pensions and actuarial services – risk management (security) 
policies 
My initial expectations that the detailed stakeholder interviews would guide an adjustment or 
focusing of the policy documentation imposed by the parent company did not manifest. 
Rather than suggest specific policy recommendations, the interviews showed a low level of 
process maturity (Crosby, 1979) with respect to information security management. Apart 
from some core, good practices from the IT department and the estates management 
representative – both in regards to access control but, contrastingly, logical and physical 
respectively – information security risks were endemic and security measures viewed as an 
inhibitor to work (for example being allowed to download and work on confidential company 
documentation on a home computer that is not subject to the rigorous scrutiny in terms of 
malicious software detection or intrusion detection and prevention). The interviews became 
an opportunity to increase awareness of risk and explain the reasoning for the access 
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controls already in place. For example, a solicitor agreed to reconsider working on company 
documents using a computer used for filesharing by other members of her family when 
learning of an instance where such behaviour had led to the extraction of confidential files 
not intended for access by the file-sharing software. The documents in the example were 
published on a hackers’ website192. 
The considered response to this was to write a set of instructional information security 
policies based around generic good practice (guided by the BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
BS 7799-2:2005 standard). The policy documentation was written to show an understanding 
of the repeated concern that introducing a layer of security would be an inhibitor to getting 
work done. I stressed that security was not a separate layer but rather the enabling 
mechanism for assuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability for work to be done at home 
or outside the office without having the variety of locations compromising the controls of a 
working environment with a definable perimeter. Essentially, policies were being established 
to allow high-risk data processing such as remote and mobile working as long as the risks 
are managed. This is a regulatory approach to risk management beholden to financial sector 
business in particular (See Figure 12). 
Some directional advice was also given with a suggestion to review the company’s 
segregation of responsibilities in the business processes and how the IT may support that 
with sign-on sequences and forensic records of non-repudiation. This may have avoided the 
client’s previous exposure to fraud. To enable this, the client would need to define the 
boundaries of its information assets and assign ownership. This would require, in the first 
instance, creating an information asset register that records the retention and degree of 
confidentiality of information assets such as medical records, policy documents, actuarial 
forecasts and so on. 
Table 58 summarises the results and interpretation of Project ι (the finance sector company). 
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 Examples that made the business team aware of opportunities for improved compliance included 
this external example of an Equifax credit report being stolen over the Internet (where it was 
published for mischief) from the 'private' part of a PC because the wife of the reportee used peer-
to-peer software on her 'private' part of the same PC. Also a local example from the client’s firm 
where a member of staff received a document by e-mail, edited it, saved the changes and e-mailed 
(apparently) the changed document to find that the changes had been ‘lost’. The implications were 
two-fold. Firstly the confidential document was left in a temporary folder of an insecure PC, and 
secondly the user was left fretting and did not call the help desk who would no doubt have been 
able to talk the user through the problem, possibly retrieving the changed version and cleaning the 
cached copy which was leading to a loss of efficiency. 
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Table 58: Results and interpretation of Project ι (Finance) 
Results Lessons learnt Evidence and 
organisational 
idiosyncrasies observed 
Policies from the parent 
company could be localised 
for the subsidiary and remain 
true to the original standard 
from which needed to 
comply with. However, the 
local implementation 
suggested an unfounded 
expectation that the 
subsidiary would be 
complying with something 
other than the view of the 
parent. 
How a set of standards can 
be adapted locally without 
losing their identity and still 
retain compliance with the 
parent company standards 
and an international 
standard for information 
security in order to de-risk 
information systems. This is 
a case study where the 
localisation of standards 
creates their accessibility. 
It was whilst working with 
this company that the need 
for localised interpretation 
became evident. Not only is 
there often a reluctance to 
espouse standards (as 
discussed in Chapter 2) 
when there is a lack of 
external influence 
demanding some level of 
compliance, even the 
pressure of taking edicts 
from a company’s owners 
still leads to compliance with 
the imposed standards 
through the local lens of 
what the individuals there 
agreed were the risks that 
needed mitigating. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the practical implementation of the standards life cycle in the 
identification of the need for standards, the creation of – or adoption of existing – standards, 
and then (Table 59) how standards are implemented in different ways in different 
organisations. I have considered these complementary projects where standards have been 
applied either as frameworks for developing the organisations’ own risk-mitigating practices 
(Project θ: construction), direction about the risks that need to be mitigated, and the 
standards that have been designed to do so (Project η: housing association), or the local 
implementation of a centrally-issued standard that provided a tailored policy set to match the 
culture of the organisation facing the risks (Project ι: pensions and actuarial services). 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
222 
Table 59: Contrasting three types of action research 
Project θ: construction Project η: housing 
association 
Project ι: pensions and 
actuarial services 
Knowledge transfer. Arm’s 
length advice and training 
about how to determine the 
information security policies 
needed. 
Instructional report setting 
out the structure, content 
and management process of 
running an information 
security management 
system,  
Detailed, direct intervention 
of writing security policies 
that set out technical controls 
and behavioural 
improvements. 
Less Intervention More 
Increasing level of granularity and detail in the intervention 
Chapter 6 analyses the results of this action research and the implications of the projects for 
the research questions set out in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE 
WORK 
6.1 About this chapter… 
This concluding chapter of the thesis revisits my research questions and analyses the 
results of the research projects in their context. From the questions and projects’ results, I 
consider the conclusions that may be drawn from the research, the questions still 
unanswered, and look to the future both in terms of work to understand the ‘unknowns’ and 
how the components of the research that have shown positive outcomes can be extended 
and exploited for the effective use of information systems – the mission of my main sponsor, 
The National Computing Centre. 
Because the research was realised by a programme of projects, I have tabulated the 
connections of the research questions to the results (Table 60 to Table 62 inclusive). 
6.2 Revisiting the aims and objectives of the research 
The underlying hypothesis of value in the research described in this thesis is that risks may 
be managed by the implementation of standards to avoid undesirable outcomes. Lessons 
from good practice in information systems development and operations – specifications of 
tools and techniques – can be encapsulated in standards to mitigate at least the known 
risks. In summary: standards mitigate risk. 
My original plan was to test the hypothesis by way of a developmental research project in 
which I would create a framework ‘standard of standards’ as an accessible, scalable route 
map through standards to be usefully applied to information systems to assist organisations 
avoid undesirable outcomes. The motivation for the research was to encourage a beneficial 
environment for innovation, and a stable, sustainable business ‘ecosystem’ for existing 
business practices encouraging trust and security. Reflecting on the core hypothesis – 
particularly in the light of the literature review (Chapter 2) – I began to understand that there 
were methodological considerations behind the hypothesis as I synthesised three research 
questions to investigate it (Table 60). This became an early lesson in learning how to learn: 
formulating the research in a way that it leads to telling investigations. The epistemology 
developed in four ways: the objectives to find and deliver interesting research, the interest in 
risk, the end effect of applying standards to mitigate risk, and the very personal objective of 
learning. This personal objective was given momentum by attention to frameworks 
(discussed in more detail below around Figure 48) as I applied a framework of projects to 
learn about the potential of a framework of standards to mitigate risk. This strongly supports 
my research methodology from the perspective of cybernetics because frameworks and the 
many combinations that their contents can be applied in result in the amplification of variety 
and protect the research from the attenuation of translating real-world situations into static 
models (Beer, 1993). 
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Table 60: Research questions 
Research question Methodological extension 
 Do implemented 'Standards' mitigate 
risk? 
Can ‘Standards’ be implemented to mitigate 
risk? 
How can risk reduction techniques be linked 
to the reduction in risk with surety? 
 Can 'Standards' be made more 
accessible? 
How can 'Standards' be made more 
accessible by relating them to risk and the 
causes of risk? 
What are the barriers? Why don't people 
access standards? 
 How do you link risks to the 'Standards' 
that may mitigate them? 
Do the selected standards affect the 
outcomes of the mitigating action?  
Does the difference in outcomes that results 
from different analysis methods become a 
threat/risk? 
6.3 A personal epistemology 
This seven-year journey has been an exercise in risk management. I set out with three 
research questions, but the methodological approach to answering them became a hostage 
to fortune of the case studies available to investigate - would a variety of projects provide the 
depth of knowledge, or should profundity be risked in a single, ‘soup to nuts’ undertaking? 
Over time, this apparent weakness became a significant strength. The uncertainty of 
applying all the research method to one project was dependent on the cooperation of the 
stakeholders in the scrutinised work (see also 6.7.4). So, rather than hedge all on sufficient 
detail being found in a single case study, I looked for significance across the life cycle of 
standards. A mixed method developed comprising action research informed by desk 
research and surveys in an interpretive approach to learning. 
Re-evaluating my original proposal – the formulation and search for proof of an hypothesis 
that standards mitigate risk – I had intended or expected a positivist study of the cause and 
effect of standards on risk, describing measurable properties independent of the researcher 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). If I regarded risk as ‘loss’ then I could define that loss in 
terms of objective, measurable properties of an information system such as cost, efficiency, 
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quality, and content (Figure 9193) and test the implementation of standards to reduce (at 
least) the loss. However, even the desk research of projects α, β, and γ (see Appendix B) 
were subject to interpretation through the lens of my experience at The National Computing 
Centre and rest on the assumption of value in empirical experience over clinically validated 
wisdom (Schein, 1976). As soon as the action researcher enters the frame – as I did so 
significantly steering the stakeholders in each case study project (Chapter 5) with a proposal 
of how each project should be shaped and managed – the researcher becomes attached to, 
and so part of, the organisation. Hence the organisation is changed by the observer, cf 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, (Heisenberg, 1927). The result – in terms of 
classification and labelling – is that action research cannot remain in the positivist camp and 
must be fleet of foot to make an honest accounting for what the organisation (without the 
researcher) will have to do to sustain the intervention in his or her absence. The expected 
clinical testing of the hypothesis that ‘standards mitigate risk’ became a fuller study of how 
standards coalesce with the expectation that they will treat risk, and how attitudes – strong 
regulators in the arena of research – to risk and standards affect risk management. I had lost 
the positivist grounding in the emergent project opportunities, and found an interpretive 
approach to access reality (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996) through consideration of the 
language of standards, focusing on the full complexity of human sense making (of risk 
attitude and the readiness to espouse the knowledge of mitigation and implement it) as the 
situation emerges (Myers, 1997). This was built into the core project – the research and 
development of a tool to detect where there are risks as a result of human vulnerabilities in 
information systems (δ). The consciousness of the subjects (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994) was 
modelled by investigating and analysing their attitudes to risk and using the shared 
meanings of standards as risk treatments (followed though in the analysis of the case study 
projects η, θ, and ι). But I still question the dependent and independent variables of risks and 
mitigating standards (Myers, 1997). Does a standard-risk treatment pair represent 
dependency? This uncertainty generates the impetus for future research (6.8) into the cause 
and effect of standards and the amelioration of risk. This standard-risk treatment model is 
complex (Chapter 3, project γ). The project (γ) showed the 1:1, 1:M, and M:1 relationships 
between risk and standards whilst project δ brought out the complexity in relating attitudes to 
risk and attitudes to standards. 
I have finished with a critical element to my thinking because standards record knowledge 
and are dependent on an historical epistemology and an historical constitution. The 
evidence for their efficacy is lacking; the effects of their implementation may be initially 
predictive until proven…or not disproved (Popper, 1963) and yet organisations still fail when 
following standards (Seddon, 1998 and Thomas, 1997). Standards are produced, 
reproduced and interpreted (Figure 43) by people who may not openly or even covertly 
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contained to achieve the desirable outcomes, that is, where risk is managed. 
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embrace their advice; elsewhere the standards are the ways of working (as noted by the 
experiences from The National Computing Centre’s help desk in Chapter 1).These 
oppositions and contradictions remain. The future work brings the research full circle to the 
positivist camp and my original proposal. 
6.4 Answering the research questions 
Figure 41 is repeated from the introduction (Chapter 1) to show the connection between the 
research questions (labelled 1, 2, and 3) and the respective research projects. Table 61 then 
goes on to compare the research questions with what has been learnt from the research so 
that one column shows the research questions – and their related methodological questions 
(from Table 12) and matches them with the answers that emerged from the research. 
ζ Defining and piloting
a Standards Development
and Adoption Process
for the Local e-Government
Standards Board
ε Developing
the Accredit UK
General Segment 
Fieldwork: Information
security  management
in the construction (θ) and 
social housing (η) sectors,
security analysis and policy
development in finance (ι)
α Identifying 
the Top Ten IS/IT Risks
δ Are you now, or have
you ever been,
a vulnerability?
Human vulnerabilities
in network security
β Using Standards
to Mitigate Risk
in Information Systems:
Project Brief for BSI
γMaintaining a catalogue
of standards
and best practice advice
for effective
information assurance
31 2
2 3
1
3
3
3
31 2
 
Figure 41: Relevance of the case studies to the three research questions 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
227 
Table 61: Research questions answered 
Research question Learnt from the research 
 Do implemented ‘Standards’ mitigate 
risk? 
• Can 'Standards' be implemented to 
mitigate risk? 
• How can risk reduction techniques be 
linked to the reduction in risk with 
surety? 
The literature review (Chapter 2) and 
continuing involvement in projects to mitigate 
risk in information systems194 suggest – but 
in no way prove – that standards mitigate 
risk. This conclusion is based on the 
consistent opinions expressed in the 
literature that information security and 
assurance come from the implementation of 
standards. These standards continue to be 
defined and refined on the basis that the 
advice therein is effective. 
 Can ‘Standards’ be made more 
accessible? 
• How can 'Standards' be made more 
accessible by relating them to risk 
and the causes of risk? 
• What are the barriers? Why don't 
people access standards? 
Cataloguing work (Chapter 3), work to 
measure risk (Chapter 4), and field work 
(Chapter 5) show that the many standards 
become more attractive to stakeholders 
when they are related to risks – a direct 
benefit of following the advice in a standard 
can be shown to the actors in the information 
system. The linkage of standards to risk 
becomes the method of selection that helps 
to break down real and implied barriers to 
the accessibility of standards. 
 How do you link risks to the 'Standards' 
that may mitigate them? 
• Do the selected standards affect the 
outcomes of the mitigating action?  
• Does the difference in outcomes that 
results from different analysis 
methods become a threat/risk? 
Recognition of the risks, the degree to which 
the knowledge is encapsulated in a 
standard, and the expertise required from 
people to convert that knowledge from 
explicit to tacit allows a cataloguer to place 
standards against a taxonomy of risk with 
some confidence of their likely efficacy. 
Throughout the five-year programme of research projects, I found it challenging to steer the 
interesting research opportunities away from the single goal of each body commissioning a 
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6 July 2010. 
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project, to retain the wider view of the research questions and add value to research for the 
sponsor. In the following subsection, I have again used a table to show the connection 
between a research question, the project applied to find an answer to the respective 
question, and what the results of the related projects show. 
6.5 How do the outcomes of the projects explain the answers to the research 
questions? 
Working for a professional body provided a rich catalogue of opportunities to formulate, 
adapt, or adopt projects which would inform or help to answer the research questions. These 
are described in detail in Chapters 3 to 5 (inclusive). Table 62 shows how the framework of 
projects enlightened the answers to the research questions about a framework of ideas 
(Checkland and Holwell, 1998). 
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Table 62: Research questions: what can we learn from the research projects? 
Research 
question 
Project Shows 
 D
o
 im
ple
m
e
nted
 
'Sta
nd
a
rd
s
'
 m
itig
ate
 risk?
 
Accredit UK (ε) The interaction of stakeholders in the determining of 
what needs to be captured in a standard to mitigate 
risk in the procurement of ICT from small to 
medium-sized enterprises. 
BSI Project Brief (β) The peer review of the concept and utility of 
organising standards into a framework of good 
proactive instructions about how to mitigate risk. 
Fieldwork: housing 
association (η) 
How a standard for information security can be 
embedded into an IT strategy to assure board-level 
attention to information risk mitigation. 
Fieldwork: 
construction (θ) 
How a standard for information security can be 
embedded into the management system of an 
organisation to protect a business from risks to its 
corporate and customer information and the losses 
that would ensue in the event of an incident. 
Embedding the expectations of the information 
security management system standard into the 
business management system of the organisation 
made it accessible by default. 
Fieldwork: finance (ι) How a set of standards can be adapted locally 
without losing their identity and still retain 
compliance with the parent company standards and 
an international standard for information security in 
order to de-risk information systems. This is a case 
study where the localisation of standards creates 
their accessibility. 
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Table 62: Research questions: what can we learn from the research projects? 
Research 
question 
Project Shows 
 C
a
n
 
'Sta
nd
a
rd
s
'
 b
e
 m
ad
e
 m
o
re
 a
cce
ssible?
 
Top 10 IS/IT Risks 
(α) 
That there is a common perception of the most 
prevalent risks threatening information systems and 
that perception can be used to steer stakeholders 
towards standard practice to ameliorate the risks. 
Familiarity with a risk and a link to its mitigation 
makes the mitigating action – included in the 
relevant standards – desirable when explained to a 
practitioner within the business. 
BSI Project Brief (β) Peer review of the framework to improve the 
accessibility of standards as a method of managing 
risk treatment information. 
Fieldwork: housing 
association (η) 
By identifying risks to its information systems in the 
context of its business processes and connecting 
the risk treatments to the use of standards, this 
project made standards more accessible by putting 
them into a business context that was familiar with 
the stakeholders. 
Fieldwork: 
construction (θ) 
How a standard for information security can be 
embedded into the management system of an 
organisation to protect a business from risks to its 
corporate and customer information and the losses 
that would ensue in the event of an incident. 
Fieldwork: finance (ι) By identifying risks to its information systems in the 
context of its business processes and connecting 
the risk treatments to the use of standards, this 
project made standards more accessible by putting 
them into a business context that was familiar with 
the stakeholders and then translated those 
standards into a local governance and management 
framework. 
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Table 62: Research questions: what can we learn from the research projects? 
Research 
question 
Project Shows 
 H
o
w
 d
o
 yo
u
 link
 risks
 to
 th
e
 
'Sta
nd
a
rd
s
'
 th
at
 m
ay
 m
itig
ate
 th
e
m
?
 
Top 10 IS/IT Risks 
(α) 
This was an important scoping study which 
identified a set of risks to focus on during the course 
of the research. 
BSI Project Brief (β) The mission of BSI Standards is the promulgation of 
standards. The project brief specified a programme 
of work that would show how to promote standards 
as risk treatments by associating standards with the 
respective risks that their implementation implies. 
Catalogue of 
standards and best 
practice (γ) 
This was the fundamental realisation of an answer 
to the research question showing that a taxonomy 
of information security risk can be populated with 
associated standards to treat the risks in that 
taxonomy. The project delivered a method for 
populating the catalogue, keeping it up to date and 
adding value to lists of standards by introducing a 
classification scheme for the level of treatment a 
standard provides for a risk and the expertise 
required of those who implement the advice 
encapsulated in the standard. 
LeGSB (ζ) LeGSB required a process to select standards to 
address areas of risk and it was through this 
process that they would engender a consensus 
view of acceptable standards. 
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Table 62: Research questions: what can we learn from the research projects? 
Research 
question 
Project Shows 
Finding human 
vulnerabilities in 
information systems 
(δ) 
On the understanding that human vulnerabilities are 
a prevalent risk in information systems, this project 
set out to find a way to identify them (which it did). 
Applying the premise that standards – as the 
definition of controls or regulators (Ashby, 1957; 
Beer, 1993) for risk – can be introduced to counter 
weaknesses from human vulnerabilities in 
information systems. By seeing the level of risk an 
organisation faces with respect to those human 
vulnerabilities in its information systems, a 
connection is made to the risk-controlling 
(regulating) standards which have the potential to 
make the organisation more or less reliant on the 
risk attitude of the people working for it. 
Fieldwork: housing 
association (η), 
construction (θ), and 
finance (ι) 
Each of these three organisations should confer an 
understanding of the value of information to their 
stakeholders. This includes, respectively, examples 
such as information on vulnerable people who were 
eligible for social housing, having access to 
blueprints for banks, or detailed information on 
people’s pensions. A loss of confidentiality would 
result in at least reputational damage and in some 
cases prosecution. The organisations found that 
standards for information security management set 
out controls to ameliorate situations that could lead 
to these risks being realised and so provided case 
studies of organisations actively linking risks with 
mitigating standards. 
6.6 Reviewing the methodologies 
The core methodologies in this research were (one) peer-reviewed desk research which 
provided a firm foundation to apply and extend that learning in (two) action research. The 
challenge of the action research – ‘intervening with purpose’ – was that the projects may or 
may not retain their quality of fit to the research agenda (that is, answering the three 
research questions) as work progressed with the commissioning bodies. Happily, each has 
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contributed to the narrative and so they are presented in the thesis in order of learning – 
helping me to understand the problem better or answer (in part or wholly) some, or all of, 
one or more research questions. 
In considering how the results were found to answer the questions, it is necessary to look at 
the planned intentions and expectations and compare them with the reality of the selected 
projects. My original intention was to investigate the research questions respectively by: 
(1) Designing a usable framework from which mitigating standards may be identified 
from the risks that give rise to their need. 
(2) Creating a methodology to populate this framework. 
(3) The analysis of standards implementation to understand if risk was managed as a 
result of the application of standards. 
I expected the research to be more developmental with the cataloguing of risks and 
mitigating standards to be the greatest part of the work in terms of time and effort. What 
actually happened was when the opportunity arose to apply the research methods to the 
catalogue of publicly available information assurance advice (constructed from a taxonomy 
of information security risk and published standards – see Chapter 3) the catalogue 
development became a small subsection of the work to be done to investigate the research 
questions. It helped significantly in the research to find linkage between risks and standards 
but was superseded by the more interesting work to investigate how the strength of the 
mitigating standards may be used to counter human vulnerabilities in information systems 
(Chapter 4) and the efficacy of standards in fieldwork (Chapter 5). The result is a thesis 
which presents a developing framework of projects for learning about the application of 
standards in mitigating risk. It documents a journey from the initial reasoning and motivation 
in Chapter 1 and literature review of work in this area in Chapter 2195. Chapter 3 describes 
how the research framework was steered by the three desk-research projects – the survey 
of surveys that identified a list of the ‘Top 10’ IS/IT risks (α) and the Project Brief for BSI (β) 
which both served to refine and define the scope of the research, and the gap analysis and 
cataloguing for CSIA (γ) which answers the question about linkage but shows that in terms 
of its actual uptake and implementation the cataloguing work is superficial. The more 
important need to look at the real-time attitude to risk and implementation of standards is 
embodied in the selection of the projects in Chapter 4 and 5. This journey through the 
projects over a five-year period demonstrated the challenge of steering the research to stay 
focused on the original questions, a challenge of action research struggling to maintain 
rigour in the heart of changing the relevance of – at least – the participants’ priorities 
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1996). 
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 Chapter 4 also has a significant element of literature review – carried out as part of the 
investigation into the human vulnerabilities in information systems. Appendix A lists those 
references used specifically to derive the risk attributes of the subjects under scrutiny. 
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6.7 Contribution to the body of knowledge 
This research has contributed to the body of knowledge in four areas: knowledge 
management, risk management, measuring security culture or risk attitude, and 
methodologies for information systems research. More specifically the contributions are 
methodological as described in Table 63. 
Table 63: How the research contributes to the body of knowledge 
Methodological aspect Contribution 
How standards are a channel 
for knowledge management. 
The command and control of organisations may be 
regulated by applying the practices contained in standards. 
The knowledge is adapted locally but the standardising 
theme remains under central ownership of the standards-
creating body. This results in an ecosystem that allows 
requisite variety but feeds back the lessons learnt. The 
idiosyncrasies of the organisation protect the day to day 
activity from stagnation. 
How risks can be linked to the 
standards that mitigate them. 
Here I have shown how an existing taxonomy of risks can 
be selected and a validated catalogue of standards which 
describe the mitigation of those risks can be assembled 
taking the goodness of fit and expertise required to apply 
the advice into account. 
How the security culture of an 
organisation can be used as 
an indicator of which 
standards are needed for 
information assurance. 
This work has bridged a gap. It matches other work in the 
field (Coles and Hodgkinson 2008)196 which focuses on 
measurement and then takes this forward with a course of 
action – through the application of standards – to regulate 
the resultant measurement within a defined tolerance. 
How a body of knowledge197 
creates a framework for 
learning about information 
assurance. 
The concept of applying a methodology to learn about a 
framework of ideas has become an intense part of the 
methodology itself with the standards forming the 
framework and providing the instruction on how to apply it. 
The discussion below shows the derivation of these contributions from the research. 
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 Also the SeCURE ‘risk culture’ measuring tool from the Centre for the Protection of the National 
Infrastructure. 
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 For example HMG’s Communications and Electronic Security Group’s (CESG) library of 
standards, policies and guidance, or BSI catalogue of standards. 
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6.7.1 Idiosyncrasy as the saviour of standardisation 
The projects have provided evidence or the epistemological framework for understanding. 
Interventions in the action research may not necessarily have helped change – clients have 
embraced the reports delivered from the research but the work was done in an environment 
of knowledge transfer enabling their own audit. This has reduced the opportunity to return to 
answer my first research question, ‘Do implemented standards mitigate risk?’. However, 
each project has made a contribution to understanding. So I can attest to their usefulness if 
not to create change in the organisations but at least to create a better understanding of 
what the organisations should do for improvement on the assumption that the validated 
advice and experience encapsulated in standards (Figure 11) mitigates the predicted risk. 
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Figure 42: Risk stirs Emotion which promotes Idiosyncrasy that releases the 
Knowledge from standards 
If I was to return to the organisations involved in the field work to assess the efficacy of the 
standards which have been applied, I would be challenged to find the appropriate metrics to 
measure improvements (or otherwise). This in itself would be a worthy research project 
because although a measurement methodology for risk treatment has recently been 
encapsulated in a standard (BS ISO/IEC 27004:2009) that has been through review and 
validation processes such as those described in my literature review (Chapter 2), the new 
standard is not strong in defining which measures prove the efficacy of a treatment. For 
example, an organisation may set a policy of training its staff to reduce the human 
vulnerabilities in its information systems in accordance with the recommendation of security 
objective A.8.2.2. Information security awareness, education and training (from BS ISO/IEC 
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27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005). However the objective is then measured quantitatively 
comparing the number of employees who received annual information security awareness 
training and the number of employees who need to receive annual information security 
awareness training. Whereas this may be an important measure for planning to ensure that 
the employees attend the programme, it lacks the qualitative assessment of the employees’ 
attitude to risk that should have been improved as a result of attending. This second, 
qualitative metric may be measured using the assessment method described in Chapter 4. 
Opposition to the usefulness of standards suggested that as the implementation of a 
standard is characterised by the people, processes, and technology to be found within an 
organisation, there is no standardisation without uniformity and accusations (Knight, 2005; 
Schultze and Stabell, 2004) and this leads to constraint and stagnation. I discussed this as 
the ‘Toynbee conflict’ in my literature review (Chapter 2). My investigation throughout the 
literature review pointed to a cycle of standardisation where a degree of localisation was 
either tolerated, or in the case of management system (process and control) standards 
encouraged within a framework so that as long as an organisation stayed within the 
framework (for example of acceptable risk management in BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 
7799-2:2005) the activity of the organisation could be deemed to remain compliant with that 
standard. And this was witnessed repeatedly in the three fieldwork projects (η, θ, and ι) and 
their localisation of the good practice and standards that the organisations were embracing 
to satisfy stakeholders, regulatory requirements, a desire to follow good practice, or all three. 
Over time, lessons learnt may be collected to normalise the standard with the current, 
common, good practice and update the documentation for the standard (Figure 43). In this 
model (sic!) variety is protected by the proliferation of different implementations of the 
standard – intuitively sounding like an oxymoron and a rallying point for critics of standards. 
But the good use of standards allows their application within certain tolerances (variety198 is 
amplified) whereas in contrast there is bad use of standards where there is no benefit from 
complying uniformly with every clause (variety is attenuated) and risks cannot be treated 
because the cybernetic system of managing risk is prevented from healing itself. 
The three organisations scrutinised in the fieldwork had a common goal of wanting to 
achieve a state of information security. Each organisation required benchmarking against 
recognised good security practice with a view to changing as necessary, in relation to that 
benchmark. The changes expected would control information handling activities (to use the 
current terminology of standards rather than the more useful description of ‘regulators’ – see 
2.7 The Toynbee conflict). The organisations under scrutiny during the action research had a 
common goal and a common frame of reference to the body of standards which record the 
accepted good practice in information security. Hence, that body of knowledge was the 
equivalent of the model where a framework of ideas is applied to an area of concern – 
information risk – for learning (Checkland and Holwell, 1998). Here, the organisations have a 
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framework of ideas comprising the information security standards which are applied and 
subsequently used to learn from (through monitoring) to discover whether the adopted 
framework is effective. This is true to Deming’s revised cycle – plan, do, learn (or study), act 
(Deming, 1986). An information security management system – formally in place with a set 
of audited policies and procedures or implied by the overlaying, by an observer, of the 
information security framework promoted by the documented standards – is a protective 
framework to regulate information security risk. This framework, as applied within the 
organisation or used as a lens by the observer, is shaped by: 
• The operational objectives of the organisation. Why is it there? 
• What is the structure of the organisation in terms of its location(s) or premises and 
the arrangement of its personnel? 
• Are they human resources or human vulnerabilities? 
• Collective and individual risk attitudes which are unique to each organisation which is 
shaped by individuals, decisions made, and how it adapts to its environment 
(Checkland, 1981). 
Each organisation draws on their knowledge in standards and implements them according to 
their own idiosyncrasies, their mode of behaviour or way of thought peculiar to an individual 
or a distinctive or peculiar feature or characteristic of a place or thing (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2011, accessed online). It is the same standard deployed in each organisation but 
to the casual observer, the practice may not seem to be standard at all. With such a dynamic 
status, there is a need to have some benchmark of whether the organisation is within a 
tolerable level of risk. This is a contextual judgement that may be supported by the analysis 
provided by the appetite/attitude measurement described in Chapter 4. This takes into 
account the sociotechnical spectrum of information security activities to enable the observer 
to conclude whether the organisation has the regulators in place to be said to be in a state of 
information assurance. Information governance is needed to alter that state – to improve it or 
keep it steady in the changing risk landscape. Idiosyncrasies may be the regulators to 
manage risk. Where they are, encourage them for sustainability; where they are not, the 
organisation should look to the standard practices to inject into its operations and hook them 
on to the idiosyncrasies until idiosyncrasies and the practice of standards merge. 
Awareness of this apparent difference in the implementation of a standard in different 
organisations should provide the standards makers with the confidence to include the 
guidance material in standards as a way of educating the implementers of standards as to 
the ‘why’ a standard defines a policy so. The classic reductionist stance of the standards 
makers to focus on the normative clauses which puts the use of standards at risk as 
implementers reject overall compliance and begin to create their own standards from first 
principle where they are just learning the lessons that the standards makers have already 
learnt. Standards makers, standards implementers, and the auditors of compliance would do 
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better to encourage the energies, expertise and innovation that grows from tacit knowledge 
and look to see that compliance is within a tolerance which itself is likely to fluctuate. They 
should ask when is a standard no longer being followedS? From this we can learn how to 
write better standards, use standards, and improve those standards already set. 
Standards
S1 S2 Sn
I1 I2 In
D1 D2 Dn
Implementation of all or some of the 
standards
Distribution through explicit 
documentation or tacit experience of 
practitioners
 
Figure 43: Standards are localised and lessons learnt are centralised 
In defining this process, I considered when a standard may diverge from the norm and 
become unique in its application. Are uniqueness and standardisation mutually exclusive? 
The state of obsolescence identified during the literature review – where a standard is still in 
use despite the emergence of others – suggests that whilst standards raise an expectation 
of majority use, they don’t require a democratic majority to remain on the catalogue although 
spare parts for a product made to an old standard may be difficult to procure. For example, 
the popular anecdote (Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom 1992) of Betamax video 
which was overtaken by the VHS format, or the audio cassette that has been mostly – at the 
time of writing – superseded by the Compact Disc. These are standards developed to 
reduce the risk of recordings being lost, incomplete, or inaccessible. Figure 44 shows where 
a zone of proliferation – where there are no obvious followers – exists for standards that fail 
to reach some level of popularity. Standards may emerge out of popularity (which may be 
the result of successful marketing) taking the ‘experimental route’ or through development 
and consensus such as a common gauge for rail travel. 
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Figure 44: When is a standard not a standard? 
In compiling a catalogue of standards to mitigate risk and keep it up to date (for example 
project γ, Chapter 3), there is a need for change and learning – appreciating when a 
standard is still a standard. In Figure 44, I consider a specification Sn which may or may not 
be a standard. Sn+R (where R is the influencing risk) is a standard associated with a risk and 
will remain the zone of standardisation. Sn-R will be outside the zone of standardisation – a 
specification without an associated risk. Sn will not be a standard if it does not address a 
risk. So a standard that is not used can still be a standard. So a more popular standard does 
not negate the status of ‘rival’ standard(s). R = may or may not be known.  
Accessibility of the standard and the information it contains depends on its usefulness, its 
supportiveness in treating all or part of one or more risks, it’s helpfulness in effecting a 
satisfactory outcome to the risk management (Swann, 2000), and its adaptiveness to 
changing or emerging risks (Carr, Konda, et al., 2003). 
6.7.2 Linking risk and standards 
The research for CSIA (Project γ, Chapter 3) found that a lack of confidence in standards 
mitigating risk could be attributed to a lack of clarity in how suitable a treatment was for a 
risk – would it solve all or part of the problem? In working with users of information systems 
and the publishers of standards and good practice (Chapters 3 and 5), it became apparent 
that only part of the application of standards was inhibited by the completeness and rest was 
a function of the expertise of those applying the standard. To manage the level of expertise 
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and expectations of the outcome of implementing one or more standards to mitigate risk, the 
following labelling scheme (Table 64) was devised and applied through CSIA’s catalogue. 
Table 64: Ranking of the risk treatments in the catalogue 
 How directly applicable is the guidance to the risk 
that it could mitigate? 
A thorough 
approach 
Significant 
guidance 
Some help 
A B C 
No expertise 1 A1 B1 C1 
Some expertise 2 A2 B2 C2 
Expert knowledge needed 3 A3 B3 C3 
6.7.3 Security culture as an indicator of which standards are needed 
In my investigation to determine a method to highlight human vulnerabilities in an 
information system (Project δ, Chapter 4), the results showed that the organisations (or 
communities) examined were stronger on policy than awareness of the individuals 
suggesting that closing this gap could reduce the human vulnerabilities, with a resulting 
improvement in risk culture. This has brought utility into my research to link risk and 
standards because the knowledge from considering the research questions was producing 
interesting definitions of risk and its treatment with standards. Without the research into the 
human vulnerabilities in information systems, the application of the research was lacking. 
Figure 45 and Table 65 show how an evaluation of the appetite of organisations and the 
attitude of individuals was compared to four points. By defining the appetite to risk of the 
organisation as adjustable by whichever controls – defined by standards - may be chosen I 
had created a chart of the cause and effect of introducing standards and expecting their 
update.  
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Figure 45: A risk chart: where are mitigating activities needed? 
Table 65 Benchmarks of risk appetite and risk attitude 
1 An organisation or community with a ‘balanced’ appetite for risk with individuals who 
have a good attitude to risk 
2 An organisation or community with a ‘balanced’ appetite for risk with individuals who 
have a poor attitude for risk 
3 An organisation or community with a poor appetite for risk with individuals who have a 
poor attitude for risk 
4 An organisation or community with a poor appetite for risk with individuals who have a 
good attitude for risk 
The term balanced is used here to describe an organisation that is ready to use computer 
networks with their inherent risks but with controls – or regulators – in place that meet the 
current best practice (defined herein by International standards). The term good is used here 
to describe individuals who appreciate their responsibilities to manage a degree of risk and 
whose awareness encompasses the organisational measures in place to allow risk-
managed access to the computer network. 
Figure 46 shows the chart with the method’s results applied to organisations who took part in 
the in-depth interviews described in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 46: Placing respondents on the at-risk from human vulnerabilities monitor 
What may be concluded? I consider that if the attitude of individuals to risk is appropriate, 
and a organisation (or community) has sound security policies that see benchmarked 
controls through to implementation, then a risk culture may be said to be fit for the situation 
when risk attitude and security policies converge. This is shown by the proximity of an 
organisation (or community) to the bottom left quadrant of Figure 46. This same observation 
can be used to identify divergence from the accepted appetite and so identify the risk of 
human vulnerabilities in the computer network. The degree of convergence can be used to 
measure the amount of remedial action – such as an improvement in risk awareness or a 
strengthening of security policy. 
The project demonstrated four elements of innovation: 
(1) An innovative approach to the numerical measurement of an individual’s attitude to 
risk. 
(2) An innovative approach to the numerical measurement of an organisation’s appetite 
for risk. 
By combining the first and the second innovations, the method derives a new measure of 
system vulnerability that allows us to identify zones of like-risk culture so that a gap analysis 
of the ‘as is’ and ‘to be’ risk cultures can now provide a basis for: 
(3) Systematic assessment and management of the human component of overall 
system vulnerability; and 
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(4) Systematic assessment and management of the organisational component of 
overall system vulnerability 
The data collected in this project demonstrate that there is indeed adequate sensitivity in 
both the individual and organisational measurement methodologies to provide useful 
differentiation on both axes and in the derived measure of human vulnerability (Figure 30). 
The sociotechnical innovation is shown whereby a more aware and risk-responsible ICT 
user community should engender a better environment of trust so that, for example, 
customers would engage with on-line facilities, use the tools given to them by the service 
providers (such as authentication technology offered by banks) and be themselves more 
responsible in their behaviour with confidential information. This could impact the potential 
for teleworking if organisations have used the methodology to make remote users more risk 
aware and if the organisations take advantage of the vulnerability analysis it provides to 
show where their teleworking ‘human network’ may be the greatest risk and so treat it with 
the lessons-learnt such as the controls or regulators (Ashby 1957; Beer, 1993) in a standard 
(BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 BS 7799-1:2005). Benefits of less commuting on staff may accrue 
for their health, traffic congestion, and opportunities for a work-life balance. 
Economic, environmental, and societal benefits may accrue from this methodology. 
Engagement with this methodology can deliver the opportunity to manage human 
vulnerabilities and the security breaches associated with them. A tool applying the 
methodology could be opened up to the whole ICT user market given the ubiquitous nature 
of network usage either within organisations or between users over the Internet. An 
ontological approach of preparing user views could adapt the project’s deliverables for the 
home user, the small to medium-sized business, the voluntary sector, corporates, and the 
public sector too. Statistics from the business sector (DTI/Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2006) 
were that the average saving of avoiding a security breach would range between £8,000 to 
£17,000 overall (£65,000 to £130,000 for large businesses) per incident and that this cost 
increases year on year (DTI/Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). As the 2006 survey points 
out that 62% of businesses realise a security breach and that 49% of security breaches are 
the result of human factors, the potential savings from using the method to identify the 
weaker security links would be self sustaining. 
The opportunity for improvement increases further by using the method to improve the 
security culture and therefore reduce the number of most kinds of security incidents. As the 
dynamic profile changes with technology previously in the domain of the corporates 
extending to home users (wireless networks for example), the method’s database of risks 
and treatments would be kept up to date to educate the changing profile of the user 
community. By reducing security incidents ICT can be used more effectively for 
administration, innovation, research, and leisure. 
The costs that would otherwise have been wasted on dealing with security breaches in 
supply chains can be focused on the core business of users of this method. As the method 
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will realise an improvement in risk culture within the viewpoints of the ICT user community 
(suppliers, intermediaries, and end-users) there will be a self-sustaining ‘spill over’ chain of 
improvement fuelling the ongoing maintenance of the method to detect human vulnerabilities 
in information systems for that community. 
The method may have the potential to be used as part of a standard for supply chain 
formation (Dresner and Wood, 2007). The method would support this by supplying human 
vulnerability measures that can be compared to see what needs to be done for organisations 
to create zones of common acceptance (of risk). 
6.7.4 Enhancing learning through research frameworks 
Throughout the period of research I have worked within a three-tiered model (Figure 47) that 
has organised the research framework into the refined – usually peer reviewed – published 
knowledge of academic papers and business reports199, the framework of the standards 
themselves, and the framework of research projects that have been applied to investigate 
the research questions (Figure 41). 
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Figure 47: The three-tiered framework of knowledge and research 
                                                                                                                                                      
199
 The peer review of the business reports may not be as clear as the process for academic journals 
but it is prevalent and is shown by the credits in the DTI/BERR/BIS information security breaches 
surveys, and the review of information assurance policies published by Cabinet Office and CESG 
within the information security community. These two examples are referred to here because the 
significant references to these publications throughout my research. 
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Figure 48 extends the Checkland-Holwell construct to show how the framework (F) of the 
standards and the methodologies of the investigating projects (M) merge as the research 
papers yielding the learning are themselves a framework. The framework of projects 
overcame at least part of the problem of finding a single methodology that can present 
meaningful results with surety. The framework (Checkland and Holwell, 1998) introduces 
variety (Ashby, 1957) to regulate the risk that a monolithic case study may not deliver the 
breadth of information required for meaningful analysis. So, the framework of projects 
presents itself as the answer to the meta-research questions about the efficacy of the 
methodology itself – is this framework a good way of investigating whether standards 
mitigate risk? The variety in the projects is a risk reduction technique in itself; by looking at 
the problem through a selection of lenses it is more likely to remove the bias that a single 
view would constrain. Just as the relationship between many risks and many standards 
provide the requisite variety for cybernetic assurance, the framework of projects also protect 
the variety of research from attenuation (Beer, 1993). 
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Figure 48: A framework for learning about information assurance 
6.8 Recommendations for future work 
In this section, I look forward to further investigation to support the findings of my research – 
to answer with surety the question: do standards mitigate risk? Also proposed is work to 
develop the tool to find human vulnerabilities in information systems (which is the clearest 
application of the research done) and to extend the research into a new piece of work that 
considers the language of risk and builds on the ideas of accessibility of the knowledge in 
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standards to create an expertise-agnostic method for defining the risk management 
(security) requirements of an information system. 
6.8.1 Do standards mitigate risk? 
Despite the popular feedback and positive responses from the participants in the research 
projects that demonstrated a consensus view that standard mitigate risk, there appears to be 
no evidence of a hard, causal link between the two. The connection remains intuitive. The 
feedback may be prompted by the apparent comfort that standards may provide. The uptake 
of standards may be the result of the desire to put trust in the methods of others, and 
abrogate one’s own responsibility for taking risk. Although when standards are proposed as 
risk mitigating methodologies200 they are warmly accepted as ‘lessons learnt’ which fits 
Deming’s management cycle of Plan-Do-Check-Act (Deming 1950). ‘Check’ was later 
refined to ‘Study’ (Deming 1986) where study introduces cybernetic feedback to shape the 
act of adjustment. Although, as the British Standards Institution states in each of its 
publications the ‘compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from legal 
obligations’, it is likely to be a mitigating defence around the seriousness of an infraction if 
evidence of compliance can be shown. This is suggested by the threat of a £500,000 fine 
from the Information Commissioner being lessened when an information security 
management system (BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 BS 7799-2:2005) is operating. 
6.8.2 Developing the tool to find human vulnerabilities in information systems 
Chapter 4 describes a feasibility study of the methodology to find human vulnerabilities in 
information systems using a limited selection of tell-tale vectors derived from a corpus of 
related research (mainly into insider threats). The methodology would benefit from extracting 
other elements from the body of research to refine the calculations that produce the plot of 
corporate risk appetite against individual risk attitude. These may include length of service, 
or greater psychological or temporal components for example: latent risk (related to the 
activity supported by the information system), any propensity to risk, and the variation of how 
people will behave (see Table 68). 
A significant contribution to the ‘factors’ to test for came from Hillson and Murray-Webster, 
(2007). This was useful in encouraging a partially psychological approach to some of the 
questioning. A ‘wholly psychological’ side of vulnerability identification was felt to be beyond 
the timescales of the feasibility study and would have lost out by excluding some of the 
components that the research literature includes. This is also something to be developed in 
future work. 
The method to determine the intensity of human vulnerabilities is designed to complement 
the technical and non-technical – or blended  – countermeasures that are well known for use 
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 For example by the members’ help desk of The National Computing Centre – see Chapter 1. 
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against outsider threats such as hackers or the malicious software of criminal programmers. 
Technical measures would include intrusion detection and prevention systems, 
antivirus/spyware programs and firewalls. Blended measures comprise a combination of 
more than one reaction to threat, such as an implementation which may use technology to 
distract a criminal from gaining inappropriate access to a computer network by enticing 
attempts to access a decoy network or ‘honeypot’. The method focuses particularly on the 
insider threat to information systems but in the wider context of including any stakeholder 
with legitimate access as an insider. These may include threat-pair vulnerabilities or 
potential discontentment at not being allowed (say) to use company equipment for personal 
MP3 downloads. The questions may be refined in future work to investigate more completely 
how the risk of uncontrolled equipment is made acceptable201. It also strengthens the 
general philosophy for the method: putting the risks into context so that an apparently high 
risk may be well mitigated by a control. For example, technology designed to manage 
network deperimeterisation that inspects hardware/software configurations before granting 
access. 
It is considered that non-tangible assets such as reputation, goodwill, staff morale etc. 
cannot be assigned meaningful, quantitative financial cost (Flechais, Sasse, Hailes, 2003). 
However, applying relative numbers to the attitude of those who may interact with an 
information system can translate them into a weighted ranking to put more obvious concerns 
– as shown by, for example, the Annualised Loss Estimate (Hayden, 2010) – into context to 
give a final judgement of where attention should be focused and countermeasures deployed 
to mitigate the risk. These may be new standards which require investment in equipment 
and training. 
The method could be implemented in a tool – which has been labelled ‘CatalysIS’ – as the 
hub of a programme to improve risk culture. The tool derived from the method – shown in 
Figure 49 and explained in Table 66 – would work by asking network users about their 
attitude to risk, causes of risk, and the activities that may mitigate the risks and their 
outcomes. The user responses will be analysed for the ‘quality of fit’ of the attitude of users 
to the appetite for risk that the network’s security policy is intended to realise.  
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 A problem being tackled with technical controls by the consortium-led Trusted Computing Module, 
a ubiquitous microchip implanted in 350 million devices (Trusted Computing Group, August 2010). 
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Figure 49: Activity in the method for finding 
the human vulnerabilities in information systems 
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Table 66: Components of the method for finding the human vulnerabilities 
information systems 
 
(a) Mapping the landscape of risk culture 
The tool will question an information system’s users about: 
• The organisation or community that has the prevalent stake in the 
security of the network on which the system relies. 
• The profile(s) of the users. 
• How they (the users) feel about risks to the information system and 
what can be done to treat those risks. 
 
(b) Getting the measure of attitudes to risk 
The responses will be scored using a weighted ranking system to give a 
judgment of: 
• The quality of fit of the individual’s attitude to the organisation’s/ 
community’s appetite for risk. 
• The maturity of the individual’s risk attitude in relation to the context in 
which the information system is used. 
 
(c) Finding the human vulnerabilities and establishing the 
programme to improve risk culture 
The judgement on the risk appetite/attitude will be used to recommend an 
appropriate security risk awareness programme to improve the risk culture 
of the organisation or community under scrutiny. 
 
(d) Programme of improvements to the risk culture 
Aggregated results from the tool will be used to analyse the overall risk 
culture and report to stakeholder organisations as well as feeding back into 
the tool to ensure that its questions and supporting advice are kept up to 
date. 
An established implementation of the tool would alert network authorities to the types of 
users who may pose a threat to the network. The difference between the users’ attitudes 
and the intentions of the network security policy will be used to call on appropriately 
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identified awareness material from a collated body of knowledge and the standards which 
will match the appetite for risk of the organisation with the impact level of the information that 
it handles. This would lead to setting benchmarks of risk appetite and attitude which may 
assist judgements of risk in developing partnerships and supply chains and provide an 
ongoing body of research data that may be analysed to show areas of risk amongst different 
sectors or roles (zones of common risk acceptance – Dresner and Wood, 2007).  
6.8.3 The language of risk 
Some supporting research around the language of risk is needed to support the 
promulgation of a tool for detecting human vulnerabilities in information systems. Are the 
terms risk attitude and risk appetite sufficiently defined and understood? How does one 
describe appetite which may vary from one organisation to another, yet be good enough for 
each depending on the risk treatments deployed and the respective residual risk that 
remains? Some of this is addressed in the model for connecting organisations with a 
standards-based approach (Dresner and Wood, 2007). The term good is used here to 
describe individuals who appreciate their responsibilities to manage a degree of risk and 
whose awareness encompasses the organisational measures in place to allow risk-
managed access to the information system. 
My interest in standards implementation being invoked by the emotional response to risk 
may be extended to a communications methodology that recognises that certain symbolism 
evokes emotional responses. For example, the use of red signage in many cultures to warn 
the viewer of danger or perhaps to use that same emotion to promote a feeling of excitement 
by the use of red. 
Semiotics is the art, science, or understanding of symbols. Words can also be associated 
with strong emotion and may also be combined with colour to heighten the response – such 
as the encapsulation of an instruction to ‘stop’ within a red border. Specifiers of requirements 
for products or services that store and process information may find that the association of 
certain words can either inhibit or enable specifications that require interpretation to move 
from intention to realisation. Stating that an information system must be, for example, 
‘secure’ may result in the implementation of hardware, software, and processes which 
restrict access to such an extent that users – with no malicious intention – work around the 
security constraints and inject information into unintentional information systems or, 
conversely fail to realise the possible protection with safe outcomes. A requirements 
specification is challenged with being detailed enough to represent complexity whilst being 
simple enough to be unambiguous and understandable and not attenuating the description 
of the information system it models. Security is a non-functional requirement of an 
information system that must be as clearly defined as the colours, (data-formats for 
example) that are usually associated with other quality attributes, such as usability or 
interoperability. However, words associated with the specification of security are so riddled 
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with their own semiotic baggage that they are either used inappropriately, too often, too little, 
or not at all. Words such as ‘control’, ‘restrict’, ‘legal’, or even ‘risk’ suggest the red 
terminology of protection or danger. 
In the specification of information systems that handle data in a way that is commensurate 
with all reasonable expectations of the impact resulting in compromise to its confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability, we need a language that recognises that it can be adapted to the risk 
literacy of both those who specify the information system and those who must apply that 
specification in development or delivery. This would manifest in a method to support the 
development of secure information systems by reducing the risk of inappropriate data 
processing and increasing the risk of containing the information in an accurate state and 
available where it is genuinely needed. The method would benefit human vulnerabilities 
detection (Chapter 4) by providing clear, unambiguous language for questioning the 
information system actors involved. The lack of a simple language-based tool: a 
methodology to articulate the requirements for security (MARS) would fill the standards gap 
shown in the Figure 50 below. In a recent application of the feasibility study tool202, the 
language of security risks and their treatments that were used in common parlance was 
frequently misinterpreted by the different actors taking part. 
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Figure 50: The gap between a non-expert language for formal specification of security 
requirements and available standards 
The need for MARS is shown by the cataloguing work and gap analysis carried out for CSIA 
that developed the labelling system that was based on the quality of fit of a standard to the 
risk it was intended to treat and the expertise required to apply the risk treatment captured in 
the standard. MARS should also be a context-neutral language (Coles-Kemp 2008). 
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6.8.4 Looking back 
Looking back over this seven-year period of research – and particularly in experience from 
the investigation of the risks from human vulnerabilities, development – I would recommend 
a simpler path and research method which may be viewed as integrated rather than the 
mixed method that was realised. The steps in the method would comprise (in order) the 
cataloguing of standards that may treat risk in information systems (projects α and γ), the 
research and development of the tool to detect human vulnerabilities in information systems 
(project δ), then field work to apply the tool, find risk from human vulnerabilities, apply 
standards selected from the catalogue and then reapply the tools after a period of time to 
determine if those risks had been treated. This course of action would satisfy the first 
research question: ‘Do implemented ‘Standards’ mitigate risk?’. 
6.9 Conclusions 
When I established the three questions (Table 67) to shape and direct this research, I did 
not expect the rich picture of risk, standards, and research that would be sketched, linking so 
many people across so many organisations for the quality improvement of information 
systems through the treatment of risk, and a propensity for treating that risk efficiently 
through the uptake of lessons learnt as documented in standards. It is encouraging that 
although the research has not provided compelling evidence to answer all three questions, 
the overall approach of the methodology has become – in parallel to my work – a de facto 
way of working in many organisations including the policy (or standard) setters in influential 
areas. I have seen the rigour in the methodology supported academically (Hodgkinson and 
Coles 2008) and a significant element of its application shown relevance by the 
development, by the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI), of the 
SeCURE software tool. CPNI’s tool measures the Security Culture Type Indicator (SCTI) as 
the current nature of the organisation's security culture – the 'desired aspirations' – and the 
Security Climate Evaluation Survey (SCES) which presents a snapshot of the organisation's 
security climate according to its employees. This is complementary to the development of 
the human vulnerabilities tool which plots the information system risk an organisation faces 
as a function of its appetite and the attitude of its staff. 
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Table 67: Final evaluation of the research questions 
 
Question What has the research shown? 
Question 
answered? 
 
Do implemented 
‘Standards’ 
mitigate risk? 
There is significant backing for this, showing 
faith in this premise but the research has not 
delivered compelling evidence that this is so. 
No 
 
Can ‘Standards’ 
be made more 
accessible? 
Doubts in the relevance of standards and the 
proliferation of standards which reduce the 
accessibility of standards and suggest that 
standards remain an under-utilised body of 
knowledge are shown to be settled by making 
the uptake of standards a source of knowledge 
for mitigating risk which is – at least at an 
emotional level – an accessible topic. 
Yes 
 How do you link 
risks to the 
‘Standards’ that 
may mitigate 
them? 
The methodology of creating or selecting a 
taxonomy of risk against which standards can be 
mapped according their efficacy and the 
expertise required to unlock the knowledge 
therein has delivered a linking mechanism from 
the research. 
Yes 
The work continues. Although there is work to be done to answer the initial research 
question – ‘Do implemented ‘Standards’ mitigate risk?’ – ongoing involvement in the field 
shows the connection between risk and emotion as the catalyst to release the knowledge 
from standards (Figure 11). An audit of physical security showed scant attention to the 
protection of company information but measures of protection were espoused when 
explained in terms of personal effect such as handbags and mobile telephones. Meanwhile, 
the interest in the field (Chapter 2) continues and there is articulated faith that standards 
mitigate risk to information systems: at a Cabinet Office workshop in July 2010 – all four 
working groups presented ‘standards’ as part of the solution to information assurance (IA) 
risk. 
This is useful experience and knowledge that supports an understanding of how to apply the 
paradigm of standards as treatment for risk, given the variables (Table 68) of standards of 
varying suitability, risks of varying complexity, and people of varying attitude. 
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Table 68: Variables for the methods’ success 
 Risk Mitigating standard 
Acceptance of risk 
 
There is a risk but will the actors 
do anything about it? 
 
There is a standard 
that could mitigate the risk 
Utilisation of standard 
 
Actors do not extract the explicit 
risk treatment from the standard 
 
 
Actors do extract the explicit 
risk treatment from the 
standard 
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Appendix B. Project catalogue 
Label Project 
Alpha 
α 
An analysis of surveys for the Small Business Service of the Department of 
Trade and Industry where a 'Top 10' view of risks to information systems was 
derived. This highlights what the research problem is. 
Beta 
β 
Research and development of a project Brief for the British Standards 
Institution (BSI), 'Using Standards to Mitigate Risk in Information Systems’ 
which made the justification of why guidance is needed to promote standards 
should be promulgated as risk treatments. 
Gamma 
γ 
A project to establish a catalogue of which standards treat risks associated 
with information assurance. 
Delta 
δ 
Research and development of tools to detect where there are risks as a result 
of human vulnerabilities in information systems. 
Epsilon 
ε 
The development of the Accredit UK (AUK) General Segment – a standard to 
manage the risk in the supply of ICT by small to medium-sized ICT suppliers203 
Zeta 
ζ 
Work with the Local e-Government Standards Board (LeGSB204) to define a 
process for the development and adoption of standards, and to pilot a process 
to ‘certify’ the acceptance of standards. 
Eta 
η 
Fieldwork: Housing association – recommending an information systems risk 
(security) strategy. 
Theta 
θ 
Fieldwork: Construction – supporting a firm in its identification of risk and the 
selection of controlling treatments to mitigate them. 
Iota 
ι 
Fieldwork: Pensions and actuarial services – a review of risk management 
(information security) policies in a financial services firm. 
                                                                                                                                                      
203
 A segment is an ICT discipline such as network design and installation, software development, or 
ICT consultancy. Each discipline is expected to manage risk by carrying out its own specialist 
activities and a set of activities that are carried out in every ICT business. It is the latter set of 
activities that are defined in the ‘General Segment’. 
204
 Eventually becoming the e-Standards Body (e-SB) 
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Appendix C. Achievements based on this research 
A.1. Projects 
Information Assurance for SMEs (IASME) with the University of Worcester (2009 - ) 
Development of The National Computing Centre Standard for IT Departments 
(and 4 pilot assessments) 2009 
Information Governance Watch, exploring a standards observatory for the Technology 
Strategy Board, March 2009 
Assessing to the Accredit UK standard for ICT suppliers 
Communications Consultancy and Software Segments 
October 2008 - 
CatalysIS: Are you, or have you ever been, vulnerability? November 2007  
A Catalogue of Publicly Available Information Assurance Guidance, and Maintaining a 
catalogue of standards and best practice advice for effective information assurance, 
for the Central Sponsor for Information Assurance 
March 2007  
Development of the Accredit UK General Expectations standard for ICT suppliers 2006 
IT Risk Assessment and Guidance Tool, Small Business Service of DTI/Business Link 
Using Standards to Mitigate Risk in Information Systems: Project Brief  
Prepared by The National Computing Centre for The British Standards Institution in 
response to: the work programme of Committee IST/15 Software Engineering in 
collaboration with BSI Publications 2004  
Local e Government Standard Board: Standards Development and Adoption Process (2004) 
A.2. Books 
Information Security Management: A standards approach. A Best Practice guide for decision 
makers in IT, The National Computing Centre, ISBN 0-85012-885-4, 2006 
Armstrong, J., Rhys-Jones; M., Dresner, D., Managing Risk: Technology and 
Communications, Lexis Nexis, ISBN/ISSN 0-7545-2468-X (Chapter 7: Managing 
Operational ICT Risk with Standards and Best Practice) 2004 
A.3. Conferences and seminars 
Amulets, kitemarks and certificates: How to nail IA standards to the pedestal of trust 
Seminar for CESG, October 2009 
The human face of information assurance - A tool box to keep a smile on it 
Seminar for the Home Office, July 2009 
Emerging trends, Redstone seminar, July 2009 
 submissionvi_dgd08 
272 
Business Oriented Security Strategy, Symantec seminar, May 2009 
Policy management for IT Governance, British Standards Institution Conference, May 2009 
Chairing the England North Branch of the Institute of Information Security Professionals 
(seminar meetings January, April, September 2009) including ‘I'm certified therefore 
I'm secure. So many badges to choose from ....’ (How The National Computing 
Centre IT Department Standard provides one rule to ring them all.) 
Information security, (ISO/IEC 27001 in 13 Steps), DLM Forum Members Meeting, Prague, 
April 2009 
Standards, Innovation, and the Toynbee Conflict at Information Governance Watch, 
March 2009 
Representing the user view at the ENISA/Cyber security KTN workshop, March 2009 
From here to . . . ity:  . . . a route map to standards (. . . and what needs standardising), 
Civil IA Products and Services Coordination Group (CIPCOG) Standards and Policy  
Conference Sept 2008, (London)  
Are you now, or have you ever been, a vulnerability? (The people/technology balance), 
Symantec Seminar June 2008, (Manchester)  
Security: the other inconvenient truth: the tackling the 'green' agenda satisfies your security 
requirements too, NCC Conference 2008 – Sustainable IT June 2008  
PKI for Aspiring Dummies, ISACA Northern England Chapter February 2008  
Finding Risk One of the Top 10 IS/IT Risks, IT Hot Spots - The Sequel  
Institute of Internal Auditors January 2008 (Manchester)  
Acceptable risk across the enterprise, NCC Enterprise Architecture Workshop 
December 2007  
The risk of success, NCC Business Continuity Conference September 2007  
Risks are your responsibility! What are they and what can you do about them? 
NCC IT Governance Seminar 
May 2005 (Manchester), November 2005 (London), June 2006 (Cardiff,) 
and March 2007 (Birmingham)  
Robust service delivery through standards, NCC Professionalism Workshop 
December 2006  
Risks are your responsibility! What are they and what can you do about them? 
Presentation to a joint NCC/BSI IT Governance Conference 
November 2005  
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Top Ten IS/IT Risks (and what to do about them) 
A paper presented to a joint conference of the Northern Chapters of 
the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
and Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) 
October 2005  
Enrolling the fifth column: Don't teach security, teach risk management 
Presentation at the 'Teaching Security' conference at the University of Leeds 
January 2005  
Leadership Lecture/Case Study: Fulfil your digital obligations in 13 steps, Infosecurity North 
October 2004  
A.4. Papers and articles 
The Challenge Remains for Escrow, NCC Weekly News, 11 May 2010 
Privacy should be a social norm, Pulse, 
The Journal of the Institute of Information Security Professionals, Spring 2010, Issue 3 
NCC Guidelines for IT Management 332 
Business Oriented Security Strategy: when did you last see your data? January 2010 
Information Governance Watch, report from an exploratory workshop, 24 March 2009 
Whose data is it anyway? A fresh view on cost-effective security measures 
Public Sector Executive, December 2008  
NCC Guidelines for IT Management 275 Desert Island Standards II, November 2008 
Are you now, or have you ever been, a vulnerability? - Fresh view on an old problem 
Conspectus, IT Infrastructure and Security Review, November 2008 
NCC Guidelines for IT Management 319 Information Systems Continuity - a framework for 
accountability, continuity, quality, security, sustainability and maturity, October 2008 
Computer Weekly Security Think Tank: 
• What are the national threats from hackers, Sept 2008 
• How do you protect from malware your mobile employees and customers, who lie 
beyond the network frontier? May 2008 
• Has the government got the business case for ID cards right? April 2008  
• What tools can be used to prevent or mitigate employee wrongdoing? March 2008 
HMRC fiasco offers risk culture lessons Computer Weekly, 8 January 2008  
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With Professor J. Robert (Bob) G. Wood, Operational risk: acceptability criteria, The Third 
International Symposium on Information Assurance and Security (IAS 2007, Manchester) 
IEEE CS Press, 2007  
Dr Who and the fable of the exploding door – defence in depth 
Computer Weekly, 2 November 2007  
Make sure SOA truly starts with service, Computer Weekly, 21 November 2007  
Security means quality means governance, 
Public Sector Executive magazine, December 2005  
Top Ten IS/IT Risks 
An analysis of surveys for the Small Business Service of the Department of Trade and 
Industry, February 2005  
The Standard Response,  
IT Adviser, The Magazine for Members of The National Computing Centre, July/August 2005  
With William Roebuck, NCC Legal Guideline 5 
ICT Legal Compliance, September 2005  
Creating a metathesis or ‘Thesis writing: the great leveller’, a co-developed paper for the 
doctoral school at the School of Informatics 
University of Manchester, 2005 (Wood-Harper, Trevor, al Balushi Taiseera; Ding, Yishu; 
Dresner, Daniel; Gledson, Ann; Hargreaves, Katharine; Khan, Mukaram; Kuo, Chen-Li; Lee-
Klenz, Soonhwa)  
How risk can be mitigated by standards, 2005 (Academic report)  
How risk can be mitigated by standards, 2004 (Business report)  
Managing Risk and Your Business, 
IT Adviser, The Magazine for Members of The National Computing Centre, March/April 2004  
A.5. Education and training 
Information Asset Management, ½ day workshop, January 2010, (Maidenhead) 
Internal Audits of Business Continuity, One day workshop, October 2009, (London) 
Information Security in the Public Sector 
Training Programme for the Chinese Ministry of Finance, July 2009, (Manchester) 
IT Governance, workshop for the British Standards Institution, May 2009, (London) 
Assessor Training – accrediting new assessors for AccreditUK 
April and May, 2009 (Manchester) 
IT Governance workshop, February 2009 (Edinburgh), March 2009 (Cardiff) 
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Security: From Risk to Treatment, One day workshop:  
April 2008 (NCC, Manchester), July 2008 (London), September 2008 (Manchester), 
February 2009 (London)  
CS639/COMP60391/COMP61421 Computer (and Network) Security Module of the University 
of Manchester Advanced Computer Science MSc, 2004, updated 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010205 
Dredge first, hedge later: Keeping risk business-focused (Aspects of information risk - being 
proportionate)  
Construction Industry Computing Association (CICA) Workshop, 7 November 2007  
Information Security Management: A standards approach 
One day workshop: March 2006 (NCC, Manchester)  
A.6. Action research/field work 
IT Department Accreditation including a government agency, an examining body, and a 
university administration body (2009 – 2010) 
ISO/IEC 27001 implementation in construction (2010) 
A route map for compliance to security (ISO/IEC 27001) and business continuity (BS 
25999/25777) standards in construction (2010) 
A route map for compliance to security standards (ISO/IEC 27001) in construction (2009) 
Awareness of Information Assurance for the IT department of a county constabulary (2009) 
Good practice in IT services (ISO/IEC 20000) – a review for a financial service firm (2009) 
Business continuity advice (BS 25999/BS 25777) for a financial service firm (2009) 
Information security audit in finance – life policy trading (2008 and 2010)  
Software quality standards implementation (2008)  
Round table investigation into compliance and standard in finance 
 – venture capitalist (2008)  
Information security management project in the construction sector (2007 - 2008)  
Security analysis and policy development in finance – pensions and actuarial services (2007)  
Information security management project in the social housing sector (2007) 
Piloting the Local e Government Standard Board Standards Certification Process (2005) 
                                                                                                                                                      
205
 44 students (2004), 34 students (2005), 71 students (2006), 57 students (2007), 61 students 
(2008),  82 students (2009), 45 students (2010). 
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A.7. Other activity 
Commentary and contributions to the following, developing standards: 
• BS 25777 IT Service Continuity Management (2008) 
• PAS77 - IT Service Continuity Management  (May 2006) 
• BS 31100 Code of practice for risk management (July 2007) 
• PAS 74 Internet safety - Access control systems for the protection of children 
online - specification (June 2006) 
Commentary on the BIS Information Security Breaches Survey 2010 
Commentary on the BERR Information Security Breaches Survey 2008  
Response from: The National Computing Centre to the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee Investigation of Personal Internet Security, October 2006  
Commentary on the DTI Information Security Breaches Survey 2006  
MPhil/PhD transfer report: Using standards to mitigate risk in information systems 
30 November 2005  
